Narrative:

On 9/wed/88, at approximately XA30, takeoff was aborted by the captain due to #4 engine malfunction. Since I wear earplugs and was concentrating on an upcoming airspeed call, I didn't see the fluctuations nor hear the engine banging. After cleared the runway we ran up the engine in a trouble shooting endeavor only to confirm that there was a visible flame concurrent with the banging from #4 tailpipe, accompanied with cockpit instrument gauge fluctuations at high (above 90%) RPM. In addition to the 3-M crew, an FAA inspector was aboard. The FAA man hung around to watch the F/east make the appropriate logbook entry. The F/east and I then inspected the compressor and turbine (actually I held a rather rickety boarding ladder stable and turned the propeller, while the F/east looked for damage--things looked ok to him, though subsequent inspection at gso revealed last stage compressor blade damage). Upon return from our inspection transportation was waiting. I left the other 2 crewmembers, informing them I'd make sure they had a bed. About an hour later they showed up at the motel with words to the effect of 'we're going to gso after the plane is unloaded'!! The 'Z-monster' then captured my tired, 53 yr old body. The phone rang. A company employee, temporarily in bdl to ramrod the operation, informed me the plane was off loaded and what time could we go. I called the captain and the F/east. We met in the lobby and left for the aircraft. Somewhere between this time and starting engines, the bubble was lost, for instead of the 3 engine ferry (#4 feathered), we made a normal takeoff with reduced power on #4 at XJ40 on 9/thurs/88. Some background information may contribute to this situation. The company has, for several yrs, had in their employ puerto rican crews whose native language is spanish. For various reasons, real/imagined, they are perceived by some to not match up to english speaking crews. My personal experience with these 2 particular crew members serves to reinforce that feeling. The captain, on landing at bdl, was 25-30 KTS fast over the fence and T/D was 1/3-1/2 way down the runway. On another flight he wheel-barrowed the aircraft. The first officer had fuel starved an engine on yet another flight. So when it was suggested that #4 engine be utilized, I remember favorably endorsing the idea with 'some power is better than no power.' did my subconscious tell me not to ride through a 3 engine takeoff with these 2? Since the company had been known to support rule bending, did they tell the captain something that he chose not to share with me?? Sad to say, but I really don't know how this event occurred! The company is upset about additional engine damage and lord only knows how many far's were busted!! After 30 yrs of flying (20, military), had someone told me 3 engine ferry, I would not, with wanton disregard for the consequences, have done otherwise. I don't think I was ever informed that '3 engine it' was to happen. In later discussions the F/east said otherwise. The captain was rather mum after telling me at one point he would have kept going had the feds not been aboard. Ironically, some details are clear as a bell and others nonexistent. What about the logbook entry? It never crossed my mind. Besides, any serious discrepancies rate a separate piece of paper passed to the next crew/maintenance, particularly away from home. I believe communication (or lack of it) played a great role in creating this problem, but beyond that, I'm stumped!! Normally, I would have been involved/overheard the discussion with gso, but because I was securing accommodations, I removed myself from that facet.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT ENGINE MALFUNCTION OR TKOF ABORTED. LATER OPERATING UNDER 3 ENGINE FERRY PERMIT CREW OPERATED ENGINE CAUSING ADDED DAMAGE.

Narrative: ON 9/WED/88, AT APPROX XA30, TKOF WAS ABORTED BY THE CAPT DUE TO #4 ENG MALFUNCTION. SINCE I WEAR EARPLUGS AND WAS CONCENTRATING ON AN UPCOMING AIRSPD CALL, I DIDN'T SEE THE FLUCTUATIONS NOR HEAR THE ENG BANGING. AFTER CLRED THE RWY WE RAN UP THE ENG IN A TROUBLE SHOOTING ENDEAVOR ONLY TO CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS A VISIBLE FLAME CONCURRENT WITH THE BANGING FROM #4 TAILPIPE, ACCOMPANIED WITH COCKPIT INSTRUMENT GAUGE FLUCTUATIONS AT HIGH (ABOVE 90%) RPM. IN ADDITION TO THE 3-M CREW, AN FAA INSPECTOR WAS ABOARD. THE FAA MAN HUNG AROUND TO WATCH THE F/E MAKE THE APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRY. THE F/E AND I THEN INSPECTED THE COMPRESSOR AND TURBINE (ACTUALLY I HELD A RATHER RICKETY BOARDING LADDER STABLE AND TURNED THE PROP, WHILE THE F/E LOOKED FOR DAMAGE--THINGS LOOKED OK TO HIM, THOUGH SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION AT GSO REVEALED LAST STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADE DAMAGE). UPON RETURN FROM OUR INSPECTION TRANSPORTATION WAS WAITING. I LEFT THE OTHER 2 CREWMEMBERS, INFORMING THEM I'D MAKE SURE THEY HAD A BED. ABOUT AN HOUR LATER THEY SHOWED UP AT THE MOTEL WITH WORDS TO THE EFFECT OF 'WE'RE GOING TO GSO AFTER THE PLANE IS UNLOADED'!! THE 'Z-MONSTER' THEN CAPTURED MY TIRED, 53 YR OLD BODY. THE PHONE RANG. A COMPANY EMPLOYEE, TEMPORARILY IN BDL TO RAMROD THE OPERATION, INFORMED ME THE PLANE WAS OFF LOADED AND WHAT TIME COULD WE GO. I CALLED THE CAPT AND THE F/E. WE MET IN THE LOBBY AND LEFT FOR THE ACFT. SOMEWHERE BTWN THIS TIME AND STARTING ENGS, THE BUBBLE WAS LOST, FOR INSTEAD OF THE 3 ENG FERRY (#4 FEATHERED), WE MADE A NORMAL TKOF WITH REDUCED PWR ON #4 AT XJ40 ON 9/THURS/88. SOME BACKGROUND INFO MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS SITUATION. THE COMPANY HAS, FOR SEVERAL YRS, HAD IN THEIR EMPLOY PUERTO RICAN CREWS WHOSE NATIVE LANGUAGE IS SPANISH. FOR VARIOUS REASONS, REAL/IMAGINED, THEY ARE PERCEIVED BY SOME TO NOT MATCH UP TO ENGLISH SPEAKING CREWS. MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH THESE 2 PARTICULAR CREW MEMBERS SERVES TO REINFORCE THAT FEELING. THE CAPT, ON LNDG AT BDL, WAS 25-30 KTS FAST OVER THE FENCE AND T/D WAS 1/3-1/2 WAY DOWN THE RWY. ON ANOTHER FLT HE WHEEL-BARROWED THE ACFT. THE F/O HAD FUEL STARVED AN ENG ON YET ANOTHER FLT. SO WHEN IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT #4 ENG BE UTILIZED, I REMEMBER FAVORABLY ENDORSING THE IDEA WITH 'SOME PWR IS BETTER THAN NO PWR.' DID MY SUBCONSCIOUS TELL ME NOT TO RIDE THROUGH A 3 ENG TKOF WITH THESE 2? SINCE THE COMPANY HAD BEEN KNOWN TO SUPPORT RULE BENDING, DID THEY TELL THE CAPT SOMETHING THAT HE CHOSE NOT TO SHARE WITH ME?? SAD TO SAY, BUT I REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW THIS EVENT OCCURRED! THE COMPANY IS UPSET ABOUT ADDITIONAL ENG DAMAGE AND LORD ONLY KNOWS HOW MANY FAR'S WERE BUSTED!! AFTER 30 YRS OF FLYING (20, MIL), HAD SOMEONE TOLD ME 3 ENG FERRY, I WOULD NOT, WITH WANTON DISREGARD FOR THE CONSEQUENCES, HAVE DONE OTHERWISE. I DON'T THINK I WAS EVER INFORMED THAT '3 ENG IT' WAS TO HAPPEN. IN LATER DISCUSSIONS THE F/E SAID OTHERWISE. THE CAPT WAS RATHER MUM AFTER TELLING ME AT ONE POINT HE WOULD HAVE KEPT GOING HAD THE FEDS NOT BEEN ABOARD. IRONICALLY, SOME DETAILS ARE CLEAR AS A BELL AND OTHERS NONEXISTENT. WHAT ABOUT THE LOGBOOK ENTRY? IT NEVER CROSSED MY MIND. BESIDES, ANY SERIOUS DISCREPANCIES RATE A SEPARATE PIECE OF PAPER PASSED TO THE NEXT CREW/MAINT, PARTICULARLY AWAY FROM HOME. I BELIEVE COM (OR LACK OF IT) PLAYED A GREAT ROLE IN CREATING THIS PROB, BUT BEYOND THAT, I'M STUMPED!! NORMALLY, I WOULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED/OVERHEARD THE DISCUSSION WITH GSO, BUT BECAUSE I WAS SECURING ACCOMMODATIONS, I REMOVED MYSELF FROM THAT FACET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.