Narrative:

Arrived at the airport to find the aircraft was not ready due to multiple mels. Departed 2:30 late after resolving issues related to the mels and performance. We found the MEL manual difficult to use and had trouble deciding how to apply the penalty for an engine anti-ice problem. We had one MEL with no expiration date (40 flight hours but not noted anywhere on our release); two mels that had been cleared but the stickers were still in place; and two mels that were deferred under a 'method'. We could not determine what method was used and had to consult maintenance for assistance. Issues included: gear tilt problem engine anti-ice issue (penalty); one pack inoperative; two nef items; stab trim B inoperative (no sticker noting an inoperative autopilot); passenger oxygen indication (inspection); and door warning system (inspection). While waiting for the aircraft; I looked at the performance data on the company portal (JT9). I noted that there was temperature performance for this airport and asked when we should use this (noted as wef [when in effect]) (by NOTAM?). I also noticed this airport's performance data hanging on the bulletin board for both JT9 and CF6. I determined that those were out of date and noted that the JT9 manual was on revision 7. On the aircraft the performance manual was updated to revision 7; but it lacked the temperature data that was on the portal. Also; the release paperwork showed that the current revision was 5. Having seen this often in the past; including a recent conversation about another airport's performance; I felt certain that the on line data was incorrect. The temperature data should have been removed when the construction ended at this airport. The revision data on the release was not to be trusted; and that the data in the book (rev. 7) was correct. I have noted this as an ongoing endemic problem at this carrier. Next; we needed to apply the MEL penalty to our performance data. While the release noted that 'MEL penalty applied' it did not state what that penalty might be. We consulted dispatch as well as having a discussion on the issue; but it was not completely clear how this worked. The MEL lists 4 different penalties; so we used the most restrictive one; but I'm not sure when you would use the lesser figures. Upon landing at our first stop we made a 180 degree turn at the end of runway 1. During taxi back the brakes dragged and the aircraft came nearly to a stop. ATC asked if we had a problem and we advised them of the brake issue but continued the taxi to parking using extra power. Local maintenance changed a tire (unrelated to the brake issue) and resolved the brake problem. During the flight to our foreign destination we noticed a smoke warning on the main deck in zone 5 (aft main deck). While the first officer (pilot flying) and I discussed alternate landing fields the engineer went downstairs to check on the problem. He returned noting a possible odor but no smoke and noted that two overhead lights at the back of the main deck were not working. He suspected that it was related to a ballast failure but could not rule out a spurious warning. We decided to divert and landed about 20 minutes later. After speaking with other crewmembers I now realize that this has been a recurring problem with this aircraft. Maintenance in the divert station did not think the ballast was the cause and found a connector loose on the detector; possibly allowing FOD in. He also suspected that the detector had developed some condensation due to the large amount of water in the area around the side cargo door (it had been raining at the previous airport during loading). He did his best to clear the problem and we departed. Enroute detector 5 indicated smoke twice; and both times it later extinguished. We also showed a loss of hydraulic fluid from system 4 but had adequate quantity to complete the flight. There were a number of other issues on the flight and those discrepancies were added to the logbook. The primary event; a diversion to a non-alternate airport; was caused by the failure of a system which had been previously brought to attention of maintenance and had been cleared. A secondary cause was the flight crew lack of knowledge about the aircraft history related to this system. Suggestions: when an aircraft has an ongoing history related to a serious problem such as this; it would be good to communicate this to the flight crews or aggressively address the issue. That information would have been valuable when we were assessing our options. Maintaining up-to-date manuals on the aircraft has been a problem that does not seem to have a solution. Suggestions have been made but not implemented and the transition to an electronic flight bag will not solve these issues. It might be worthwhile to revisit this subject and focus on ensuring that at the minimum the performance data is maintained properly. The MEL is written in a manner that makes it very difficult to understand; and therefore difficult to achieve compliance. Both flight crews and maintenance have had problems with this. It needs to be reviewed by people who possess technical writing skills and updated to ensure that it is clear and concise. The current flight release contains a great deal of information but lacks detail in the MEL section. It should be clear what method was used and what expiration date; hours or days apply. Also; when conveying information to the crew; any statement should include all pertinent details. Just stating 'penalty applied' isn't very helpful. I question whether this airplane should have been dispatched from our original departure station with so many issues; many of them substantial. It is critical that the current revisions listed on the flight release be accurate. This is the only way a crew can determine if they have current data. This list often contains errors and they may remain for days.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-200 Captain reported confusing; incomplete and incorrect information in the Aircraft Performance Manual; Aircraft Maintenance Log and MEL. Airborne they diverted for cargo smoke detector which was previous documented.

Narrative: Arrived at the airport to find the aircraft was not ready due to multiple MELs. Departed 2:30 late after resolving issues related to the MELs and performance. We found the MEL manual difficult to use and had trouble deciding how to apply the penalty for an engine anti-ice problem. We had one MEL with no expiration date (40 flight hours but not noted anywhere on our release); two MELs that had been cleared but the stickers were still in place; and two MELs that were deferred under a 'method'. We could not determine what method was used and had to consult Maintenance for assistance. Issues included: Gear tilt problem engine anti-ice issue (penalty); one pack inoperative; two NEF items; Stab Trim B inoperative (No sticker noting an inoperative autopilot); passenger oxygen indication (inspection); and door warning system (inspection). While waiting for the aircraft; I looked at the performance data on the Company portal (JT9). I noted that there was TEMP performance for this airport and asked when we should use this (noted as WEF [When in Effect]) (by NOTAM?). I also noticed this airport's performance data hanging on the bulletin board for both JT9 and CF6. I determined that those were out of date and noted that the JT9 manual was on revision 7. On the aircraft the performance manual was updated to revision 7; but it lacked the TEMP data that was on the portal. Also; the release paperwork showed that the current revision was 5. Having seen this often in the past; including a recent conversation about another airport's performance; I felt certain that the on line data was incorrect. The TEMP data should have been removed when the construction ended at this airport. The revision data on the release was not to be trusted; and that the data in the book (rev. 7) was correct. I have noted this as an ongoing endemic problem at this carrier. Next; we needed to apply the MEL penalty to our performance data. While the release noted that 'MEL penalty applied' it did not state what that penalty might be. We consulted Dispatch as well as having a discussion on the issue; but it was not completely clear how this worked. The MEL lists 4 different penalties; so we used the most restrictive one; but I'm not sure when you would use the lesser figures. Upon landing at our first stop we made a 180 degree turn at the end of Runway 1. During taxi back the brakes dragged and the aircraft came nearly to a stop. ATC asked if we had a problem and we advised them of the brake issue but continued the taxi to parking using extra power. Local Maintenance changed a tire (unrelated to the brake issue) and resolved the brake problem. During the flight to our foreign destination we noticed a smoke warning on the main deck in Zone 5 (aft main deck). While the First Officer (pilot flying) and I discussed alternate landing fields the Engineer went downstairs to check on the problem. He returned noting a possible odor but no smoke and noted that two overhead lights at the back of the main deck were not working. He suspected that it was related to a ballast failure but could not rule out a spurious warning. We decided to divert and landed about 20 minutes later. After speaking with other crewmembers I now realize that this has been a recurring problem with this aircraft. Maintenance in the divert station did not think the ballast was the cause and found a connector loose on the detector; possibly allowing FOD in. He also suspected that the detector had developed some condensation due to the large amount of water in the area around the side cargo door (it had been raining at the previous airport during loading). He did his best to clear the problem and we departed. Enroute Detector 5 indicated smoke twice; and both times it later extinguished. We also showed a loss of hydraulic fluid from System 4 but had adequate quantity to complete the flight. There were a number of other issues on the flight and those discrepancies were added to the logbook. The primary event; a diversion to a non-alternate airport; was caused by the failure of a system which had been previously brought to attention of Maintenance and had been cleared. A secondary cause was the flight crew lack of knowledge about the aircraft history related to this system. Suggestions: When an aircraft has an ongoing history related to a serious problem such as this; it would be good to communicate this to the flight crews or aggressively address the issue. That information would have been valuable when we were assessing our options. Maintaining up-to-date manuals on the aircraft has been a problem that does not seem to have a solution. Suggestions have been made but not implemented and the transition to an electronic flight bag will not solve these issues. It might be worthwhile to revisit this subject and focus on ensuring that at the minimum the performance data is maintained properly. The MEL is written in a manner that makes it very difficult to understand; and therefore difficult to achieve compliance. Both flight crews and maintenance have had problems with this. It needs to be reviewed by people who possess technical writing skills and updated to ensure that it is clear and concise. The current flight release contains a great deal of information but lacks detail in the MEL section. It should be clear what method was used and what expiration date; hours or days apply. Also; when conveying information to the crew; any statement should include all pertinent details. Just stating 'penalty applied' isn't very helpful. I question whether this airplane should have been dispatched from our original departure station with so many issues; many of them substantial. It is critical that the current revisions listed on the flight release be accurate. This is the only way a crew can determine if they have current data. This list often contains errors and they may remain for days.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.