Narrative:

Our flight was cleared to depart clt via the SID JACAL5; naley transition. This SID is a prnav procedure and is the one regularly received on our route. The clt tower controller instructed the crew; 'RNAV to girgy; runway 18C; cleared for takeoff.' girgy is the initial fix on this departure procedure departing runway 18C. I (the captain) was the flying pilot. In accordance with our normal RNAV procedures; at 400 ft AGL; I requested navigation mode and the first officer selected it. At 600 ft AGL I requested the autopilot to be turned on and the first officer selected that. The tower controller then instructed us to 'contact departure in the turn at girgy.' this meant to us to wait a few moments and stay on the tower frequency until reaching girgy and initiating the turn. Shortly after acceleration altitude; 'flaps 1' was selected as usual. We were about 10 seconds away from beginning the turn at girgy and about to enter the clouds when my pfd went blank; a single chime sounded in conjunction with a caution message; and the first officer had multiple flags on her pfd. The autopilot remained on the entire time. It was poor timing for this particular event since we were about to make a turn and were just entering IMC. It took a few moments for the first officer and I to ascertain what was wrong. My pfd was completely dark; an EFIS comp inoperative caution message was displayed on the EICAS; a red FD annunciator flag appeared on the first officer's pfd; and red strike lines were drawn through the vertical and lateral modes on the FMA of the first officer's pfd. We quickly determined that the flight data on the first officer's pfd looked fine and both mfd's continued to display position and navigation information normally. We also knew that we were due to make the initial 19 degree course change to zasro. We had not yet switched to the departure frequency and the tower frequency was congested. We knew that we needed to make the turn; so we quickly agreed to switch the autopilot to the first officer's flight director and reselect the lateral and vertical modes. This appeared to be the fastest method to get the aircraft going where it needed to go. The aircraft made the turn and re-intercepted the course. In spite of the late turn; it appeared that we did not deviate very much from our intended course. The aircraft re-intercepted the course normally. ATC did not say anything to us; and because of the small deviation it seems reasonable to believe that our track was within their tolerances or perhaps they did not even notice. We were still very busy with multiple abnormal indications in IMC and the deviation may have been greater than we thought. When the autopilot was selected to the first officer's flight director; her abnormal FD messages disappeared. After the airplane configuration was cleaned up; climb thrust was selected; and we started talking to departure. We then referenced the QRH for the remaining abnormal indications. As we started to look at checklists; my pfd screen returned and appeared normal and the caution message extinguished. The screen was dark for approximately 30 seconds. We reviewed the QRH for the indications we had anyway to familiarize ourselves with what happened. Everything appeared normal once again and we continued our flight without further incident. While enroute; we sent an ACARS message to operations control informing the company. Upon arrival at our gate; mechanics were waiting. I entered a discrepancy detailing all the abnormal indications and that they lasted for approximately 30 seconds. This appeared to be a unique; momentary equipment anomaly that occurred at a relatively critical moment in time.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-700 experienced significant loss of flight data displays during the initial stages of the JACAL RNAV SID from CLT and had to react extemporaneously to establish flight path control prior to consulting the associated check lists.

Narrative: Our flight was cleared to depart CLT via the SID JACAL5; NALEY transition. This SID is a PRNAV procedure and is the one regularly received on our route. The CLT Tower Controller instructed the crew; 'RNAV to GIRGY; Runway 18C; cleared for takeoff.' GIRGY is the initial fix on this departure procedure departing Runway 18C. I (the Captain) was the flying pilot. In accordance with our normal RNAV procedures; at 400 FT AGL; I requested NAV mode and the First Officer selected it. At 600 FT AGL I requested the autopilot to be turned on and the First Officer selected that. The Tower Controller then instructed us to 'contact Departure in the turn at GIRGY.' This meant to us to wait a few moments and stay on the Tower frequency until reaching GIRGY and initiating the turn. Shortly after acceleration altitude; 'flaps 1' was selected as usual. We were about 10 seconds away from beginning the turn at GIRGY and about to enter the clouds when my PFD went blank; a single chime sounded in conjunction with a caution message; and the First Officer had multiple flags on her PFD. The autopilot remained on the entire time. It was poor timing for this particular event since we were about to make a turn and were just entering IMC. It took a few moments for the First Officer and I to ascertain what was wrong. My PFD was completely dark; an EFIS COMP INOP caution message was displayed on the EICAS; a red FD annunciator flag appeared on the First Officer's PFD; and red strike lines were drawn through the vertical and lateral modes on the FMA of the First Officer's PFD. We quickly determined that the flight data on the First Officer's PFD looked fine and both MFD's continued to display position and navigation information normally. We also knew that we were due to make the initial 19 degree course change to ZASRO. We had not yet switched to the Departure frequency and the Tower frequency was congested. We knew that we needed to make the turn; so we quickly agreed to switch the autopilot to the First Officer's flight director and reselect the lateral and vertical modes. This appeared to be the fastest method to get the aircraft going where it needed to go. The aircraft made the turn and re-intercepted the course. In spite of the late turn; it appeared that we did not deviate very much from our intended course. The aircraft re-intercepted the course normally. ATC did not say anything to us; and because of the small deviation it seems reasonable to believe that our track was within their tolerances or perhaps they did not even notice. We were still very busy with multiple abnormal indications in IMC and the deviation may have been greater than we thought. When the autopilot was selected to the First Officer's flight director; her abnormal FD messages disappeared. After the airplane configuration was cleaned up; climb thrust was selected; and we started talking to departure. We then referenced the QRH for the remaining abnormal indications. As we started to look at checklists; my PFD screen returned and appeared normal and the caution message extinguished. The screen was dark for approximately 30 seconds. We reviewed the QRH for the indications we had anyway to familiarize ourselves with what happened. Everything appeared normal once again and we continued our flight without further incident. While enroute; we sent an ACARS message to Operations Control informing the company. Upon arrival at our gate; mechanics were waiting. I entered a discrepancy detailing all the abnormal indications and that they lasted for approximately 30 seconds. This appeared to be a unique; momentary equipment anomaly that occurred at a relatively critical moment in time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.