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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 955740 |
Time | |
Date | 201106 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SCT.TRACON |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B757-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Autoflight System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 167 Flight Crew Total 13600 Flight Crew Type 2500 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach |
Narrative:
I received 'training' in the new VNAV non-precision approach procedure approximately one month ago. I put the word 'training' in quotes because it was the worst introduction of a new procedure that I've ever encountered in almost 20 years as an airline pilot. We were basically told to just follow the guidance on the quick reference briefing card without over-thinking it too much. We were also told that the VNAV approach procedure didn't work very well in the simulator; that the software was still being tweaked; that it would probably work better in the airplane; and that we should watch it very closely if we decided to use it for real. We got to practice this new procedure only once before we were evaluated on it. These two simulator approaches consisted of long vectors to intercept the VNAV path from below at the speed of our choosing; which is exactly the way it doesn't work in real life. Considering how infrequently we encounter non-precision approaches on the line; I can't believe the FAA approved the use of an entirely new procedure after such a limited and unrealistic training event. The training we received several years ago when we switched from the 'dive and drive' method of non-precision approaches to the cdap method was considerably more thorough and well-presented. The above sets the stage for today; where we twice got to try the new VNAV procedure on the localizer 27 at san. We got to do it twice because bad ATC planning on the first attempt put us too close to a slow single-engine airplane and resulted in a tower-directed go around from inside the final approach fix. Both times we were vectored to intercept the VNAV path from above in a slam-dunk situation; which is common in real life and almost never practiced in the simulator. On the first approach I engaged VNAV a few hundred feet above the path; which resulted in several uncomfortable pitch oscillations. On the second approach I waited to engage VNAV until we were precisely on the path; and the same pitch oscillations occurred. Interestingly; this is exactly the same behavior I observed in the simulator; the same behavior I was told was a simulator software issue that needed tweaking; and the same behavior I was told would not occur in the real airplane.additionally; although we thoroughly briefed the approach prior to the top of descent using the quick reference briefing card as we had been trained to do; on both approaches we forgot to insert the target speed at the final approach fix on the FMC legs page. This might have been the cause of unwanted throttle movements which had to be manually overridden when VNAV was initially engaged; simultaneous with the aforementioned pitch oscillations. On both approaches we configured early and were on-speed; but in both cases the airplane did some funny things (just like the simulator) upon VNAV engagement and took several seconds to settle down. I subsequently examined the quick reference briefing card again; only to discover that it doesn't actually direct us to insert the target speed in the FMC. This is a pretty glaring omission; but it's missing some other important information as well. Ironically; it includes some things that are completely irrelevant. In my opinion the entire card should be re-written in a procedural format since we encounter non-precision approaches so infrequently. Two unrealistic practice approaches in the simulator along with verbal guidance to 'watch it because it may not work quite right' is totally unsatisfactory training; and I expect better from one of the world's largest airlines. It seems almost as if this procedure was rushed out to line pilots prematurely; without extensive testing; in order to satisfy some sort of unrelated time line.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B757-200 pilot addressed what he considers inadequate and poorly administered training on VNAV/Autoflight non-precision approach procedures; stressing the fact that problems described as 'simulator programming issues that need to be tweaked' were replicated in actual practice on two VNAV Runway 27 approaches to SAN.
Narrative: I received 'training' in the new VNAV non-precision approach procedure approximately one month ago. I put the word 'training' in quotes because it was the worst introduction of a new procedure that I've ever encountered in almost 20 years as an airline pilot. We were basically told to just follow the guidance on the quick reference briefing card without over-thinking it too much. We were also told that the VNAV approach procedure didn't work very well in the simulator; that the software was still being tweaked; that it would probably work better in the airplane; and that we should watch it very closely if we decided to use it for real. We got to practice this new procedure only once before we were evaluated on it. These two simulator approaches consisted of long vectors to intercept the VNAV path from below at the speed of our choosing; which is exactly the way it doesn't work in real life. Considering how infrequently we encounter non-precision approaches on the line; I can't believe the FAA approved the use of an entirely new procedure after such a limited and unrealistic training event. The training we received several years ago when we switched from the 'dive and drive' method of non-precision approaches to the CDAP method was considerably more thorough and well-presented. The above sets the stage for today; where we twice got to try the new VNAV procedure on the LOC 27 at SAN. We got to do it twice because bad ATC planning on the first attempt put us too close to a slow single-engine airplane and resulted in a tower-directed go around from inside the final approach fix. Both times we were vectored to intercept the VNAV path from above in a slam-dunk situation; which is common in real life and almost never practiced in the simulator. On the first approach I engaged VNAV a few hundred feet above the path; which resulted in several uncomfortable pitch oscillations. On the second approach I waited to engage VNAV until we were precisely on the path; and the same pitch oscillations occurred. Interestingly; this is exactly the same behavior I observed in the simulator; the same behavior I was told was a simulator software issue that needed tweaking; and the same behavior I was told would not occur in the real airplane.Additionally; although we thoroughly briefed the approach prior to the top of descent using the quick reference briefing card as we had been trained to do; on both approaches we forgot to insert the target speed at the final approach fix on the FMC legs page. This might have been the cause of unwanted throttle movements which had to be manually overridden when VNAV was initially engaged; simultaneous with the aforementioned pitch oscillations. On both approaches we configured early and were on-speed; but in both cases the airplane did some funny things (just like the simulator) upon VNAV engagement and took several seconds to settle down. I subsequently examined the Quick Reference briefing card again; only to discover that it doesn't actually direct us to insert the target speed in the FMC. This is a pretty glaring omission; but it's missing some other important information as well. Ironically; it includes some things that are completely irrelevant. In my opinion the entire card should be re-written in a procedural format since we encounter non-precision approaches so infrequently. Two unrealistic practice approaches in the simulator along with verbal guidance to 'watch it because it may not work quite right' is totally unsatisfactory training; and I expect better from one of the world's largest airlines. It seems almost as if this procedure was rushed out to line pilots prematurely; without extensive testing; in order to satisfy some sort of unrelated time line.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.