Narrative:

While on arrival; we had just leveled at 12;000 ft. And received a 'flaps fail' caution message. Flaps failed at zero degrees and crew had not initiated any flap lever movement. Airspeed [was] approximately 270 KTS at time of failure. Captain was pilot flying and flew the aircraft and took over communications while the first officer ran [the] QRH. Captain asked approach control for vectors to northeast side of airport (ATIS had us expecting to land on 19L) while we ran QRH and communicated with all parties. The first officer completed QRH and then initiated contact with dispatch who in turn contacted maintenance control.the first officer then contacted the flight attendant; operations and finally made PA for passengers. Captain declared an emergency due to the thin margin between v-ref (171 KTS at our weight) and tire speed (182 KTS). Just prior to approach; landing weight was 46;000 pounds. Surface winds were 230 at 22 KTS with gusts; so crew elected to conduct an ILS 27. Approach switched us to tower; who in turn gave us a dedicated frequency. On this frequency we had communication with ATC (tower) and crash fire rescue equipment; who was standing by. We let them know the issue would be one of tires and brake heat with a possible evacuation on the runway if there were any problems. Crew acquired runway visually just inside the FAF. Touchdown was at a vertical speed of 200 FPM and the captain utilized reverse thrust extensively during landing. We exited the runway at the end and turned on a parallel taxiway to communicate with crash fire rescue equipment. They did a drive around and noted no abnormalities. Captain made a PA to the passengers and unloading went uneventfully. Crew then initiated contact with maintenance control. There had been a previous write-up for the same event a few days prior. It was noted in the log that the fecu had been replaced subsequent to that event. In accordance with maintenance control (and ad 2009-06-12); crew did a flap reset procedure. Only later in the day; with a chance to read through all documentation (fsm; ops manual; supplements; etc.) did captain note that this reset was done wrong or at least incomplete. We were told by maintenance control to open both breakers F4 (panel 1 and 2) and wait 30 seconds then close breakers; followed by driving flaps to 45 degrees and then back to zero degrees. If no abnormalities noted and 'flaps fail' caution message clears; then reset is successful. During this process; the captain asked how long the entire procedure would take as we were already late for the next flight. Maintenance said; 'that's it.' captain asked; 'that's it?' I thought it would be a much longer procedure. Only later in the day did captain have a chance to read the entire supplement 9; ops manual and fsm and discover that we were supposed to drive flaps (at maintenance direction) four more times to 45 degrees and back to zero. With what we thought was a complete and successful flaps reset; we made appropriate log entries (flaps fail caution message had cleared) and proceeded to our next flight.flight proceeded uneventfully until descending through 14;000 ft while on arrival. Airspeed was approximately 250 KTS when we received another 'flaps fail' caution message. The first officer was pilot flying at this time. Captain told ATC that we had an issue and would need vectors northwest of [the airport] while we ran checklists. Captain then communicated with the flight attendant and made a PA to passengers. Captain (with concurrence of first officer) took over control of the aircraft. First officer then ran all QRH items and checklists and we informed ATC that we would need a managed descent as it would be difficult to 'come down and slow down.' captain then declared an emergency with ATC. We basically conducted this landing just as we had done our previous landing since we had just been through the entire process. Maintenance initially said that we would do another reset procedure. I noted that this would be the third one(third flap failure and reset) in the last few days and they suggested that we would be conducting a ferry flight back once all the paperwork had been completed. Captain suggested that the exact same thing would more than likely happen (flaps fail); and thought there was something more that should be done at this point.suggestions: flap failures are issues that we deal with occasionally operating the crj. In this case; I don't think that anything could have avoided the first scenario. However; better communication from maintenance control during the reset procedure might have changed the second scenario. Had maintenance let us know that the 'supplement 9' they were referencing was something in our fsm; I would have referred to it and noted at the time that we needed to drive the flaps to 45 degrees and back to zero degrees a total of five times. I asked maintenance control (prefacing that I knew it was not standard procedure to open circuit breakers while in flight); 'if failure at zero degrees is already our worst case scenario possible; why can't we do flaps reset procedure; in coordination with maintenance control; in the air?' even if we were able to get flaps to 8 or 20 (or in reality; anywhere out of zero) we would dramatically increase our landing speed margin as the difference between reference and tire speed would by much greater than they were in the above cases. Maintenance said that it was not procedure and the chief pilot said that same thing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-50 flight crew experiences a 'Flaps Fail' alert on approach; declares an emergency and executes a no flap landing. Crew performed an abbreviated flap reset procedure prior to departure; but then experienced another flap failure and emergency landing on the subsequent flight.

Narrative: While on arrival; we had just leveled at 12;000 FT. and received a 'Flaps Fail' caution message. Flaps failed at zero degrees and crew had not initiated any flap lever movement. Airspeed [was] approximately 270 KTS at time of failure. Captain was pilot flying and flew the aircraft and took over communications while the First Officer ran [the] QRH. Captain asked Approach Control for vectors to northeast side of airport (ATIS had us expecting to land on 19L) while we ran QRH and communicated with all parties. The First Officer completed QRH and then initiated contact with Dispatch who in turn contacted Maintenance Control.The First Officer then contacted the Flight Attendant; Operations and finally made PA for passengers. Captain declared an emergency due to the thin margin between V-REF (171 KTS at our weight) and tire speed (182 KTS). Just prior to approach; landing weight was 46;000 LBS. Surface winds were 230 at 22 KTS with gusts; so crew elected to conduct an ILS 27. Approach switched us to Tower; who in turn gave us a dedicated frequency. On this frequency we had communication with ATC (Tower) and CFR; who was standing by. We let them know the issue would be one of tires and brake heat with a possible evacuation on the runway if there were any problems. Crew acquired runway visually just inside the FAF. Touchdown was at a vertical speed of 200 FPM and the Captain utilized reverse thrust extensively during landing. We exited the runway at the end and turned on a parallel taxiway to communicate with CFR. They did a drive around and noted no abnormalities. Captain made a PA to the passengers and unloading went uneventfully. Crew then initiated contact with Maintenance Control. There had been a previous write-up for the same event a few days prior. It was noted in the log that the FECU had been replaced subsequent to that event. In accordance with Maintenance Control (and AD 2009-06-12); crew did a flap reset procedure. Only later in the day; with a chance to read through ALL documentation (FSM; Ops Manual; Supplements; etc.) did Captain note that this reset was done wrong or at least incomplete. We were told by Maintenance Control to open both breakers F4 (Panel 1 and 2) and wait 30 seconds then close breakers; followed by driving flaps to 45 degrees and then back to zero degrees. If no abnormalities noted and 'flaps fail' caution message clears; then reset is successful. During this process; the Captain asked how long the entire procedure would take as we were already late for the next flight. Maintenance said; 'That's it.' Captain asked; 'That's it?' I thought it would be a much longer procedure. Only later in the day did Captain have a chance to read the entire Supplement 9; Ops Manual and FSM and discover that we were supposed to drive flaps (at Maintenance direction) four more times to 45 degrees and back to zero. With what we thought was a complete and successful flaps reset; we made appropriate log entries (flaps fail caution message had cleared) and proceeded to our next flight.Flight proceeded uneventfully until descending through 14;000 FT while on arrival. Airspeed was approximately 250 KTS when we received another 'Flaps Fail' caution message. The First Officer was pilot flying at this time. Captain told ATC that we had an issue and would need vectors northwest of [the airport] while we ran checklists. Captain then communicated with the Flight Attendant and made a PA to passengers. Captain (with concurrence of First Officer) took over control of the aircraft. First Officer then ran all QRH items and checklists and we informed ATC that we would need a managed descent as it would be difficult to 'come down and slow down.' Captain then declared an emergency with ATC. We basically conducted this landing just as we had done our previous landing since we had just been through the entire process. Maintenance initially said that we would do another reset procedure. I noted that this would be the third one(third flap failure and reset) in the last few days and they suggested that we would be conducting a ferry flight back once all the paperwork had been completed. Captain suggested that the exact same thing would more than likely happen (flaps fail); and thought there was something more that should be done at this point.Suggestions: Flap failures are issues that we deal with occasionally operating the CRJ. In this case; I don't think that anything could have avoided the first scenario. However; better communication from Maintenance Control during the reset procedure might have changed the second scenario. Had Maintenance let us know that the 'Supplement 9' they were referencing was something in our FSM; I would have referred to it and noted at the time that we needed to drive the flaps to 45 degrees and back to zero degrees a TOTAL of five times. I asked Maintenance Control (prefacing that I knew it was NOT standard procedure to open circuit breakers while in flight); 'If failure at zero degrees is ALREADY our WORST CASE scenario possible; why can't we do flaps reset procedure; in coordination with Maintenance Control; in the air?' Even if we were able to get flaps to 8 or 20 (or in reality; anywhere out of zero) we would dramatically increase our landing speed margin as the difference between REF and tire speed would by much greater than they were in the above cases. Maintenance said that it was not procedure and the Chief Pilot said that same thing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.