37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 957062 |
Time | |
Date | 201107 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Hydraulic Main System |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
Prior to being assigned to this trip; we were asked in writing if we would accept the trip without a flight attendant. We both agreed that we would rather have a flight attendant on-board for safety. Unfortunately; our interest in cabin safety was overruled by the company and we were assigned the trip without a flight attendant. The captain called the chief pilot to ensure that our concern for cabin safety was on the record. While in cruise flight; we experienced a loss of flight hydraulic fluid. We also noted; on the hydraulic synoptic page; that the combined system fluid level was fluctuating in a manner inconsistent with a normally operating system. We decided to divert immediately. We informed center that we were diverting; called the company to inform them of our situation and intentions; completed the proper checklists; and attempted to brief the passengers. With the loss of our flight hydraulic fluid and the possible loss of the combined fluid as well (suspected because of the fluctuating combined reservoir readings mentioned earlier) we decided not to leave the cockpit but instead to bring a passenger to the cockpit via the aircraft 'no smoking' light and chime. I rang the chime repeatedly and eventually got one of the passengers to come to the cockpit. I informed him of the situation and told him to alert the remaining passengers and to get their seatbelts on for an unscheduled landing. A few minutes later; the lead passenger came to the cockpit and asked if we were descending. I again explained the situation and told him that I had already alerted another passenger and again asked them to prepare for an unscheduled landing in about 10 minutes. We landed without incident. A post flight inspection revealed a long trail of hydraulic fluid along our taxi route to the FBO and large puddle under the right engine nacelle. In my opinion; the real problem with this event was not the mechanical failure; but the exclusion of a flight attendant. Overall; I believe this event illustrates the point that our flight attendants are in the cabin primarily for safety and secondarily for passenger comfort. In a cabin of this size without a flight attendant; communication with and preparation of the passengers during an emergency or potential emergency can be challenging to say the least and a definite threat to cabin safety. The inclusion of a flight attendant would have greatly enhanced our cabin communication and safety.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A GIV-SP developed a hydraulic leak and diverted to an enroute airport; but had not been assigned a Flight Attendant to manage the passengers; which resulted in some communications issues explaining the diversion process.
Narrative: Prior to being assigned to this trip; we were asked in writing if we would accept the trip without a Flight Attendant. We both agreed that we would rather have a Flight Attendant on-board for safety. Unfortunately; our interest in cabin safety was overruled by the company and we were assigned the trip without a Flight Attendant. The Captain called the Chief Pilot to ensure that our concern for cabin safety was on the record. While in cruise flight; we experienced a loss of flight hydraulic fluid. We also noted; on the hydraulic synoptic page; that the combined system fluid level was fluctuating in a manner inconsistent with a normally operating system. We decided to divert immediately. We informed Center that we were diverting; called the company to inform them of our situation and intentions; completed the proper checklists; and attempted to brief the passengers. With the loss of our flight hydraulic fluid and the possible loss of the combined fluid as well (suspected because of the fluctuating combined reservoir readings mentioned earlier) we decided not to leave the cockpit but instead to bring a passenger to the cockpit via the aircraft 'No Smoking' light and chime. I rang the chime repeatedly and eventually got one of the passengers to come to the cockpit. I informed him of the situation and told him to alert the remaining passengers and to get their seatbelts on for an unscheduled landing. A few minutes later; the lead passenger came to the cockpit and asked if we were descending. I again explained the situation and told him that I had already alerted another passenger and again asked them to prepare for an unscheduled landing in about 10 minutes. We landed without incident. A post flight inspection revealed a long trail of hydraulic fluid along our taxi route to the FBO and large puddle under the right engine nacelle. In my opinion; the real problem with this event was not the mechanical failure; but the exclusion of a Flight Attendant. Overall; I believe this event illustrates the point that our flight attendants are in the cabin primarily for safety and secondarily for passenger comfort. In a cabin of this size without a Flight Attendant; communication with and preparation of the passengers during an emergency or potential emergency can be challenging to say the least and a definite threat to cabin safety. The inclusion of a Flight Attendant would have greatly enhanced our cabin communication and safety.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.