A B737 crew departed without the FMC programmed for the SID which resulted in a track deviation; a f...

Narrative:

This flight was running late and we had already worked three legs. The aircraft had two mels: one for the 'B' autopilot and one for the hgs (HUD). I was the pilot flying. At the gate; I briefed the departure SID off of the commercial chart page with the captain. I was familiar with the SID and waypoints. We got to the end of the runway. I did a runway update and we had the FMS on the takeoff page. At 400' I called for LNAV. At 1000' I called; 'set speed flaps 1; climb thrust.' the aircraft accelerated rapidly as we were very light. The flight director was trying to give me a hard turn to the right which I knew was not correct as per the SID. I asked the captain to verify the SID. I also called for flaps up at this time but it may have gone unheard since we had red lights flashing on the panel for hgs fail. I engaged the 'B' autopilot at this point to allow me to better assess the departure. The autopilot almost immediately kicked off because it was MEL'ed. We momentarily had the autopilot disengage horn which added to the confusion. This added to the brief task saturation of both of us. ATC then asked if we were going to rejoin the SID and I believe I answered him and said yes. I clicked on the 'a' autopilot and saw we were in heading mode. At this point; ATC gave us a clearance to a fix and the captain entered it in the box. This is when the captain realized we still had the flaps set at 1. We exceeded the flap limitation speed. The captain notified maintenance upon our arrival of the flap overspeed. The hgs flashing on the panel was an immediate distraction for both of us on departure. If the circuit breaker would have been pulled; we would not have had a red flashing light at an important phase of flight distracting us. Anytime you see a red light your eyes are immediately drawn to it. I also selected an inoperative autopilot. I knew it was MEL'ed; but it is not normal to be MEL'ed and it was part of my habit pattern to reach for the 'B' autopilot. Better monitoring did play a role. We did; however; follow all company procedures; including briefings. I should have concentrated on my primary duty of flying and let the captain deal with the monitoring and then I would not have oversped the flaps.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Crew departed without the FMC programmed for the SID which resulted in a track deviation; a flap overspeed while troubleshooting an inoperative autopilot and a flashing red HUD inoperative annunciation.

Narrative: This flight was running late and we had already worked three legs. The aircraft had two MELS: one for the 'B' autopilot and one for the HGS (HUD). I was the Pilot Flying. At the gate; I briefed the departure SID off of the commercial chart page with the Captain. I was familiar with the SID and waypoints. We got to the end of the runway. I did a runway update and we had the FMS on the Takeoff page. At 400' I called for LNAV. At 1000' I called; 'Set speed flaps 1; climb thrust.' The aircraft accelerated rapidly as we were very light. The Flight Director was trying to give me a hard turn to the right which I knew was not correct as per the SID. I asked the Captain to verify the SID. I also called for flaps up at this time but it may have gone unheard since we had red lights flashing on the panel for HGS fail. I engaged the 'B' autopilot at this point to allow me to better assess the departure. The autopilot almost immediately kicked off because it was MEL'ed. We momentarily had the Autopilot Disengage horn which added to the confusion. This added to the brief task saturation of both of us. ATC then asked if we were going to rejoin the SID and I believe I answered him and said yes. I clicked on the 'A' autopilot and saw we were in Heading mode. At this point; ATC gave us a clearance to a fix and the Captain entered it in the box. This is when the Captain realized we still had the flaps set at 1. We exceeded the flap limitation speed. The Captain notified Maintenance upon our arrival of the flap overspeed. The HGS flashing on the panel was an immediate distraction for both of us on departure. If the circuit breaker would have been pulled; we would not have had a red flashing light at an important phase of flight distracting us. Anytime you see a red light your eyes are immediately drawn to it. I also selected an inoperative autopilot. I knew it was MEL'ed; but it is not normal to be MEL'ed and it was part of my habit pattern to reach for the 'B' autopilot. Better monitoring did play a role. We did; however; follow all Company procedures; including briefings. I should have concentrated on my primary duty of flying and let the Captain deal with the monitoring and then I would not have oversped the flaps.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	957870
Time
Date	201107
Local Time Of Day	0601-1200
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Climb
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	FMS/FMC
Person 1
Function	First Officer Pilot Flying
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192 Flight Crew Type 5000
Person 2
Function	Captain Pilot Not Flying
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 171
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Speed All Types Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

A B737 crew departed without the FMC programmed for the SID which resulted in a track deviation; a flap overspeed while troubleshooting an inoperative autopilot and a flashing red HUD inoperative annunciation.