Narrative:

I was cleared to land on runway 4 at melbourne. At approximately 1/4-1/2 mi I noticed an aircraft on the runway, although I had been cleared to land. At that instant I was told to go around. The aircraft on the runway was on the takeoff roll. I initiated my go around and was gaining on the small aircraft fast. As the small aircraft started to climb, the tower again cleared me to land giving me the option. At this time I had already used up 1/3 of the runway with the small aircraft in front of me. I elected to land on the remaining runway. I pulled the power, lowered the flaps, keeping a constant vigil on the small aircraft and the end of the runway coming up. Needless to say, I did not put my gear down on the second clearance to land. I believe the controller exercised extremely poor judgement from beginning to end and led me down the path to a text book set up for an accident. (Incidentally, this occurrence is classified as an incident.) it seems to me the only corrective action would be better controller training as not to put the pilot in a situation where his attns are necessarily diverted (traffic on runway, cleared to land 1/3 down runway in the go around mode and confign). The action to initiate the go around and the inaction to not return to the landing confign coupled with poor judgement on the part of the controller caused this incident. It was late in the day, but I was not particularly tired. I have been flying for 26 yrs and have 13000 hours, 9000 MEL PIC. I think complacency probably was a factor, although I still use a checklist. Under the circumstances I did not have time to re-use the checklist. The controller was a definite contributing factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GA SMA GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 4 AT MELBOURNE. AT APPROX 1/4-1/2 MI I NOTICED AN ACFT ON THE RWY, ALTHOUGH I HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. AT THAT INSTANT I WAS TOLD TO GO AROUND. THE ACFT ON THE RWY WAS ON THE TKOF ROLL. I INITIATED MY GO AROUND AND WAS GAINING ON THE SMA FAST. AS THE SMA STARTED TO CLB, THE TWR AGAIN CLRED ME TO LAND GIVING ME THE OPTION. AT THIS TIME I HAD ALREADY USED UP 1/3 OF THE RWY WITH THE SMA IN FRONT OF ME. I ELECTED TO LAND ON THE REMAINING RWY. I PULLED THE PWR, LOWERED THE FLAPS, KEEPING A CONSTANT VIGIL ON THE SMA AND THE END OF THE RWY COMING UP. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I DID NOT PUT MY GEAR DOWN ON THE SECOND CLRNC TO LAND. I BELIEVE THE CTLR EXERCISED EXTREMELY POOR JUDGEMENT FROM BEGINNING TO END AND LED ME DOWN THE PATH TO A TEXT BOOK SET UP FOR AN ACCIDENT. (INCIDENTALLY, THIS OCCURRENCE IS CLASSIFIED AS AN INCIDENT.) IT SEEMS TO ME THE ONLY CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD BE BETTER CTLR TRNING AS NOT TO PUT THE PLT IN A SITUATION WHERE HIS ATTNS ARE NECESSARILY DIVERTED (TFC ON RWY, CLRED TO LAND 1/3 DOWN RWY IN THE GO AROUND MODE AND CONFIGN). THE ACTION TO INITIATE THE GO AROUND AND THE INACTION TO NOT RETURN TO THE LNDG CONFIGN COUPLED WITH POOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PART OF THE CTLR CAUSED THIS INCIDENT. IT WAS LATE IN THE DAY, BUT I WAS NOT PARTICULARLY TIRED. I HAVE BEEN FLYING FOR 26 YRS AND HAVE 13000 HRS, 9000 MEL PIC. I THINK COMPLACENCY PROBABLY WAS A FACTOR, ALTHOUGH I STILL USE A CHKLIST. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO RE-USE THE CHKLIST. THE CTLR WAS A DEFINITE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.