Narrative:

A flight of two F16's [were] inbound. The first F16 declared emergency [due to an] engine problem. [Both] F16's execute visual approach where #1 (emergency) landed straight-in without incident and cleared runway. #2 went around entering the pattern and landed without incident. The issue is the runway was closed to all aircraft except the emergency from when [the] aircraft is 5 mile final to when airport operations reopens the runway. I treated the flight as one and allowed the second to land before airport operations said runway was reopened. Communication with ground control (who is in contact with emergency vehicles) was poor and unclear. Ground controller was a training failure who [was] eligible to work ground control. Ground controller could not get a hold of operations [in a] timely [manner]. I attribute the incident to myself as I was controller in charge. However; I never got a final answer from ground control as to whether the runway was reopened and made the decision to allow #2 to land. Recommendation; more training on emergencies! Training failures should not be allowed to work on position previously checked out on. This is all too common; when a developmental barely gets checked out on data or ground control and then fails local or approach. Permanent termination of training should mean termination on all control positions. Something needs to be done about this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Tower Controller allowed the second aircraft in a military flight of two to land after the first declared an emergency and landed straight-in; unsure if the runway was officially closed due to the emergency.

Narrative: A flight of two F16's [were] inbound. The first F16 declared emergency [due to an] engine problem. [Both] F16's execute visual approach where #1 (emergency) landed straight-in without incident and cleared runway. #2 went around entering the pattern and landed without incident. The issue is the runway was closed to all aircraft except the emergency from when [the] aircraft is 5 mile final to when Airport Operations reopens the runway. I treated the flight as one and allowed the second to land before airport Operations said runway was reopened. Communication with Ground Control (who is in contact with emergency vehicles) was poor and unclear. Ground Controller was a training failure who [was] eligible to work Ground Control. Ground Controller could not get a hold of Operations [in a] timely [manner]. I attribute the incident to myself as I was Controller in Charge. However; I never got a final answer from Ground Control as to whether the runway was reopened and made the decision to allow #2 to land. Recommendation; more training on emergencies! Training failures should not be allowed to work on position previously checked out on. This is all too common; when a developmental barely gets checked out on Data or Ground Control and then fails Local or Approach. Permanent termination of training should mean termination on all control positions. Something needs to be done about this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.