Narrative:

I radar contacted the PA28 off of cape may county airport (wwd). Immediately after aircraft was radar identification'd and climbed to 7;000; direct smyrna VOR (eno); I called dover approach (dov) to point-out the PA28; which they approved to climb to 7;000; eventually to 8;000 with washington center; and direct to eno. Within a few minutes I noticed that the DHC8 was inbound to my airspace level at 7;000. I called dov and asked for control of the DHC8 reference 'the aircraft I pointed out to you'; again; they approved. On initial contact with the DHC8; in the vicinity of waterloo VOR (ATR); I descended them to 4;000 maybe 5;000; not a factor. Just to keep everyone moving I asked the PA28 to climb at best rate; and the pilot said they were climbing at 1;100 ft-per-minute; their best rate. As the PA28 was climbing out of approximately 4;700 ft; I noticed a target level at 5;000 ft level; about 12 o'clock and approximately 15-20 miles. As soon as I noticed this I asked my flight data controller to full route (fr) the code and he told me it was a heavy (KC35). Before I called dov to ask what was happening. I called the traffic to the PA28; and turned him to a 360 degree heading to avoid the 'nose-to-nose'; and the PA28 reported traffic in sight. PDT4584 was at 6;200 at this point and had to be stopped abruptly at 6;000 due to the heavy off of their left side heading towards them. The DHC8 went below 6;000 initially; down to 5;800; but climbed up as soon as they could; level off at 6;000. At this point dov was calling and I asked another controller to answer the line because I wanted to make sure that the situation was handled properly on my end. The controller who answered said dov's fix was to 'make sure the DHC8 stayed on their filed route to leeah.' this would not have fixed the scenario as only turns and altitudes were proper methods to ensuring separation. I apologized to both the PA28 and the DHC8 for the abrupt changes in their flights; and after I observed [the KC35] in a tight; right westbound turn; I continued everyone to their proper altitudes and routes. I never spoke to dov on a land line; myself; about the situation; as I was very upset about what had just transpired. [I] recommend proper coordination on dover approach's end. Either disapproves my request for a 'point-out' and 'control'; or pass applicable traffic when approving either or both of the requests.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACY Controller described a developing conflict event resulting from a flawed coordination with DOV RAPCON; the reporter noting DOV Controller should be precise in what actions are approved/coordinated.

Narrative: I RADAR contacted the PA28 off of Cape May County Airport (WWD). Immediately after aircraft was RADAR ID'd and climbed to 7;000; direct Smyrna VOR (ENO); I called Dover Approach (DOV) to point-out the PA28; which they approved to climb to 7;000; eventually to 8;000 with Washington Center; and direct to ENO. Within a few minutes I noticed that the DHC8 was inbound to my airspace level at 7;000. I called DOV and asked for control of the DHC8 reference 'the aircraft I pointed out to you'; again; they approved. On initial contact with the DHC8; in the vicinity of Waterloo VOR (ATR); I descended them to 4;000 maybe 5;000; not a factor. Just to keep everyone moving I asked the PA28 to climb at best rate; and the pilot said they were climbing at 1;100 FT-per-minute; their best rate. As the PA28 was climbing out of approximately 4;700 FT; I noticed a target level at 5;000 FT level; about 12 o'clock and approximately 15-20 miles. As soon as I noticed this I asked my Flight Data Controller to full route (FR) the code and he told me it was a heavy (KC35). Before I called DOV to ask what was happening. I called the traffic to the PA28; and turned him to a 360 degree heading to avoid the 'nose-to-nose'; and the PA28 reported traffic in sight. PDT4584 was at 6;200 at this point and had to be stopped abruptly at 6;000 due to the heavy off of their left side heading towards them. The DHC8 went below 6;000 initially; down to 5;800; but climbed up as soon as they could; level off at 6;000. At this point DOV was calling and I asked another controller to answer the line because I wanted to make sure that the situation was handled properly on my end. The controller who answered said DOV's fix was to 'make sure the DHC8 stayed on their filed route to LEEAH.' This would not have fixed the scenario as only turns and altitudes were proper methods to ensuring separation. I apologized to both the PA28 and the DHC8 for the abrupt changes in their flights; and after I observed [the KC35] in a tight; right westbound turn; I continued everyone to their proper altitudes and routes. I never spoke to DOV on a land line; myself; about the situation; as I was very upset about what had just transpired. [I] recommend proper coordination on Dover Approach's end. Either disapproves my request for a 'point-out' and 'control'; or pass applicable traffic when approving either or both of the requests.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.