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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 961623 |
Time | |
Date | 201107 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Route In Use | Visual Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Fire Extinguishing |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
We were on approach for 26 at our destination. We had a repetitive interruption caution message from an avionics bay door which was causing some distraction. We had been on duty for 15.5 hours and were at the end of a very difficult; stressful 4 day trip which included both late night flying and early morning flying as well as repetitive operations in extreme heat due to multiple aircraft with inoperative APU's. We had close traffic landing in front and behind us. I informed the captain that I would do a short field landing (intending to let him know that I would be spending minimal time on the runway so that the traffic behind us didn't have to go-around). The captain accidentally pushed in the left engine fire push switch (intending to hit the glide slope cancel button thinking I would be dipping below the glide slope). The left engine spooled down and the captain informed me of what was happening and told me to watch my airspeed. We were already over the runway when the engine shut down and I continued and the landing was uneventful. There is no doubt in my mind that the captain's mistake was made due to fatigue; even though he himself was not aware of the level of his fatigue. I have flown with this captain on more than one occasion and I have always found him to be very professional; competent and of sound judgment. In addition; he always goes above and beyond to help the operation stay on track. The only explanation for the captain action during this flight was fatigue; in my opinion. My suggestions are simple: 1) pilots should never be assigned pairings that operate late into the evening on one day and then early in the morning on another day as this interrupts circadian rhythms and makes it difficult for pilots to adequately rest. 2) pilots should never be allowed to work more than a 14 hour duty day regardless of the type of flying involved. Supposedly pilot work rules nation wide are being reviewed and should be amended. I truly hope this actually happens and it doesn't get hung up due to politics.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A fatigued CRJ900 Captain selected the FIRE PUSH button during an approach shutting the engine down when he actually intended to push a nearby GLIDE SLOPE button to cancel a low glide slow warning.
Narrative: We were on approach for 26 at our destination. We had a repetitive interruption caution message from an Avionics Bay Door which was causing some distraction. We had been on duty for 15.5 hours and were at the end of a very difficult; stressful 4 day trip which included both late night flying and early morning flying as well as repetitive operations in extreme heat due to multiple aircraft with inoperative APU's. We had close traffic landing in front and behind us. I informed the Captain that I would do a short field landing (intending to let him know that I would be spending minimal time on the runway so that the traffic behind us didn't have to Go-Around). The Captain accidentally pushed in the Left Engine Fire Push switch (intending to hit the glide slope cancel button thinking I would be dipping below the glide slope). The left engine spooled down and the Captain informed me of what was happening and told me to watch my airspeed. We were already over the runway when the engine shut down and I continued and the landing was uneventful. There is no doubt in my mind that the Captain's mistake was made due to fatigue; even though he himself was not aware of the level of his fatigue. I have flown with this Captain on more than one occasion and I have always found him to be very professional; competent and of sound judgment. In addition; he always goes above and beyond to help the operation stay on track. The only explanation for the Captain action during this flight was fatigue; in my opinion. My suggestions are simple: 1) Pilots should never be assigned pairings that operate late into the evening on one day and then early in the morning on another day as this interrupts circadian rhythms and makes it difficult for pilots to adequately rest. 2) Pilots should never be allowed to work more than a 14 hour duty day regardless of the type of flying involved. Supposedly pilot work rules nation wide are being reviewed and should be amended. I truly hope this actually happens and it doesn't get hung up due to politics.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.