Narrative:

While on a vector to intercept the final approach course; the first officer answered a call from the a flight attendant indicating that he detected a dirty socks smell in the passenger cabin and that he was feeling dizzy and lightheaded as a result and was very concerned for his health. We declared a medical emergency; requested paramedics meet our flight; and expedited the approach; landing and taxi in. While on approach; the first officer donned his oxygen mask; then I donned my mask. I observed that the first officer was holding his mask to his face (upon debriefing; I learned that while the first officer's oxygen mask provided 100% oxygen; the retraction function of the head straps failed to release from the donning/straps pressurized mode). Upon arrival at the gate; both air conditioning packs were shut off. The a flight attendant called the cockpit asking if we wanted the cabin doors open; I responded yes as the jetway had been connected to the aircraft; the report was that the passengers were aware of the fumes yet calm; the engines were shut down; (the open cabin doors would facilitate purging the fumes from the cabin). The paramedics arrived and examined the a flight attendant (and the entire crew later) after the passengers had deplaned. The crew conferred with maintenance and the station supervisor in a nearby conference room. Then the crew was transported to a hospital emergency room for examination and treatment if necessary. After release from the emergency room several hours later; the crew overnighted at a hotel and dead headed home the following day. We do not know the cause; twelve minutes transpired from the time of the initial call from the a flight attendant until parked at the gate. We suspect; through post flight debriefing; that the air contamination was delivered through the air conditioning system; possibly from engine bleed air. An international group of aircraft manufacturers; airline pilot; flight attendant; and maintenance engineer representatives; and medical research specialists should be assembled to study cabin air contamination issues; develop general procedures for flight crews to address such issues and ultimately employ design changes and maintenance procedures to eliminate cabin air contamination. During this research time; the traveling public should be informed and advised of the known hazards. Perhaps the traveling public should be informed of the possibility that smoke hoods can be purchased and carried on board airliners as a precaution. Regarding the failure of the first officer's oxygen mask headbands; I would suggest a test of that function be included in maintenance routine check procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB190 Captain is informed by the A Flight Attendant that he detected a dirty socks smell in the passenger cabin and that he was feeling dizzy and lightheaded. A medical emergency is declared to expedite landing; and the crew was transported to a hospital emergency room for examination. The First Officer's oxygen mask head strap malfunctioned.

Narrative: While on a vector to intercept the final approach course; the First Officer answered a call from the A Flight Attendant indicating that he detected a dirty socks smell in the passenger cabin and that he was feeling dizzy and lightheaded as a result and was very concerned for his health. We declared a medical emergency; requested paramedics meet our flight; and expedited the approach; landing and taxi in. While on approach; the First Officer donned his oxygen mask; then I donned my mask. I observed that the First Officer was holding his mask to his face (upon debriefing; I learned that while the First Officer's Oxygen Mask provided 100% Oxygen; the retraction function of the head straps failed to release from the donning/straps pressurized mode). Upon arrival at the gate; both air conditioning packs were shut OFF. The A Flight Attendant called the cockpit asking if we wanted the cabin doors open; I responded yes as the jetway had been connected to the aircraft; the report was that the passengers were aware of the fumes yet calm; the engines were shut down; (the open cabin doors would facilitate purging the fumes from the cabin). The paramedics arrived and examined the A Flight Attendant (and the entire crew later) after the passengers had deplaned. The crew conferred with Maintenance and the Station Supervisor in a nearby conference room. Then the crew was transported to a hospital emergency room for examination and treatment if necessary. After release from the emergency room several hours later; the crew overnighted at a hotel and dead headed home the following day. We do not know the cause; twelve minutes transpired from the time of the initial call from the A Flight Attendant until parked at the gate. We suspect; through post flight debriefing; that the air contamination was delivered through the air conditioning system; possibly from engine bleed air. An international group of aircraft manufacturers; airline pilot; flight attendant; and maintenance engineer representatives; and medical research specialists should be assembled to study cabin air contamination issues; develop general procedures for flight crews to address such issues and ultimately employ design changes and maintenance procedures to eliminate cabin air contamination. During this research time; the traveling public should be informed and advised of the known hazards. Perhaps the traveling public should be informed of the possibility that smoke hoods can be purchased and carried on board airliners as a precaution. Regarding the failure of the First Officer's Oxygen mask headbands; I would suggest a test of that function be included in maintenance routine check procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.