Narrative:

After dropping on a fire and at cruise to the tanker base; a main system hydraulic failure occurred. I immediately turned toward a nearby airport while calling for emergency memory items. The first officer's visual inspection reported no fluid and my system pressure gauge read accumulator pressure. This was followed up with natops expanded checklist and company procedures. CRM was utilized heavily throughout the remainder of the flight I also briefed the first officer and he also briefed me. Additionally; we conferred with our maintenance personnel on the radio and dispatch. A later damage inspection revealed a filter bowl rupture below deck and massive leak with heavy mist/vapor. Landing gear was lowered about sixty miles from the airport in accordance with natops/checklists and company mechanic on radio as a back-up and witness to every step. Nose gear was pinned. Then; I had the astro hatch removed for vapor evacuation. We were unable contact with center or approach due to altitude. In order to streamline workload I later called the tower; bypassing approach control. I began to hear two-way radio on the tower frequency at about forty nautical miles. I told them we were 'tanker with a mayday!' after getting the tower's attention; I declared an emergency. The tower operator got us on radar soon after. Smoke and hydraulic fumes burned my eyes on final; my guess was that the hydraulic pumps were getting hot or burning. At some point I had briefed the possibility of fire in the accessory section to the first officer as well as alerting the ground equipment to through the tower. On base and on final I asked the first officer if he smelled smoke. He said no; but I could recognize the odor of burning fluid from previous airborne fires. I concluded that stopping immediately upon landing and exiting aircraft would be prudent. Told tower to update the winds and that we would be using runway 17 (10;000 ft). I briefed that we had fuel to loiter if the crosswinds got worse. We also checked another airport for a more favorable wind; just in case. But this airport had the best facilities for our emergency. About three miles out we were advised that the wind was 170 at 16 KTS and equipment standing by. We were cleared to land. Later tower reported nose gear did not appear fully extended so I had the first officer crawl back down into the nose tunnel to re-confirm. It was down and pinned; the tower was mistaken. The following probably took only a few seconds: the winds were straight down the runway at about 16 KTS. Maximum differential power was used for braking and steering (the aircraft initially drifted left; so I corrected with more right reverse and full rudder to track the centerline) down to approximately 40 KTS (or less; 16 KT head wind). It was very effective. We stayed on centerline to a very slow speed. I found it difficult to coordinate the hand brake and reversing so I immediately went to toe brakes and got the last of the accumulator pressure to stay on centerline. Also; emergency brake did not seem to effectively slow the aircraft. Applied foot brakes and held to slow down more. As pilot in command in an emergency with the presumed threat of fire; I feel that I did the right thing. There were no obstacles beside the runway for a quarter mile; just hard; flat; dry dirt. Since there was a possible fire as well as an explosion from fluid vapor; stopping was more important than staying on runway centerline. We exited runway at about the speed of a bicycle (or lawn mower). At about two to three mph; no further stopping action available; emergency brake handle was then all the way back to the stop; but we were still creeping along. So I shut down engines; we came to a stop. [I] commanded the first officer off aircraft with gear pins via rear bail out hatch. Secured fuel shutoffs; magnetos; and gang switch. [I] exited the rear of aircraft. We need to train a coordinated procedure utilizing the first officer.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A P2V hydraulic filter container burst causing a hydraulic pressure loss while at cruise. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport where braking and steering action were lost as the aircraft slowly rolled off the runway.

Narrative: After dropping on a fire and at cruise to the Tanker Base; a main system hydraulic failure occurred. I immediately turned toward a nearby airport while calling for emergency memory items. The First Officer's visual inspection reported no fluid and my system pressure gauge read accumulator pressure. This was followed up with NATOPS expanded checklist and Company procedures. CRM was utilized heavily throughout the remainder of the flight I also briefed the First Officer and he also briefed me. Additionally; we conferred with our Maintenance personnel on the radio and Dispatch. A later damage inspection revealed a filter bowl rupture below deck and massive leak with heavy mist/vapor. Landing gear was lowered about sixty miles from the airport in accordance with NATOPS/checklists and Company Mechanic on radio as a back-up and witness to every step. Nose gear was pinned. Then; I had the Astro hatch removed for vapor evacuation. We were unable contact with Center or Approach due to altitude. In order to streamline workload I later called the Tower; bypassing Approach Control. I began to hear two-way radio on the Tower frequency at about forty nautical miles. I told them we were 'Tanker with a Mayday!' After getting the Tower's attention; I declared an emergency. The Tower Operator got us on radar soon after. Smoke and hydraulic fumes burned my eyes on final; my guess was that the hydraulic pumps were getting hot or burning. At some point I had briefed the possibility of fire in the accessory section to the First Officer as well as alerting the ground equipment to through the Tower. On base and on final I asked the First Officer if he smelled smoke. He said no; but I could recognize the odor of burning fluid from previous airborne fires. I concluded that stopping immediately upon landing and exiting aircraft would be prudent. Told Tower to update the winds and that we would be using Runway 17 (10;000 FT). I briefed that we had fuel to loiter if the crosswinds got worse. We also checked another airport for a more favorable wind; just in case. But this airport had the best facilities for our emergency. About three miles out we were advised that the wind was 170 at 16 KTS and equipment standing by. We were cleared to land. Later Tower reported nose gear did not appear fully extended so I had the First Officer crawl back down into the nose tunnel to re-confirm. It was down and pinned; the Tower was mistaken. The following probably took only a few seconds: The winds were straight down the runway at about 16 KTS. Maximum differential power was used for braking and steering (the aircraft initially drifted left; so I corrected with more right reverse and full rudder to track the centerline) down to approximately 40 KTS (or less; 16 KT head wind). It was very effective. We stayed on centerline to a very slow speed. I found it difficult to coordinate the hand brake and reversing so I immediately went to toe brakes and got the last of the accumulator pressure to stay on centerline. Also; emergency brake did not seem to effectively slow the aircraft. Applied foot brakes and held to slow down more. As pilot in command in an emergency with the presumed threat of fire; I feel that I did the right thing. There were no obstacles beside the runway for a quarter mile; just hard; flat; dry dirt. Since there was a possible fire as well as an explosion from fluid vapor; stopping was more important than staying on runway centerline. We exited runway at about the speed of a bicycle (or lawn mower). At about two to three MPH; no further stopping action available; Emergency brake handle was then all the way back to the stop; but we were still creeping along. So I shut down engines; we came to a stop. [I] commanded the First Officer off aircraft with gear pins via rear bail out hatch. Secured fuel shutoffs; magnetos; and gang switch. [I] exited the rear of aircraft. We need to train a coordinated procedure utilizing the First Officer.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.