Narrative:

Last week I was assigned to fly a segment in a boeing 767 aircraft. Upon reaching the cockpit to begin my preflight duties; I noted that the quick reference checklist had been replaced. In the chart holder next to my seat there was a large laminated; bound volume labeled 'quick reference handbook.' I had never seen this document before. Upon investigation; it appeared to contain a number of emergency and irregular checklists organized by component (i.e. Engines; hydraulics; pneumatics; etc.). During the previous month; we had been instructed by the company to watch a computer based video; which was of very poor quality and contained very little useful information; which ostensibly was our training for the use of this document. Over my aviation career; it has been standard practice; when confronted by a change of this magnitude; that the company would spend an inordinate amount of time and energy preparing us for the change. In this case; the change of an entire new set of checklists and procedures for any emergency encountered; was haphazardly presented in a video that was difficult to navigate and materials which in no way represented the type of change this new document contained. During preflight we encountered a mechanical and I had approximately one hour to familiarize myself with this document. I have never; in 16 years of flying been presented such a massive change to the standard or emergency procedures under which we operate with so little preparation. Equally disturbing was my flight two days later in a boeing 757 aircraft. Fifteen minutes prior to departure we discovered the new quick reference handbook and massive flight manual changes in our flight bags. The captain advised me that he had not flown with these changes and needed to take some time to familiarize himself with this new material. We encountered a delay until the captain could be assured that he could operate the flight safely. I cannot speak for the captain of this flight; but I immediately felt that csr supervisors and the assistant chief pilot began pressuring my captain; the next day my captain continued to receive messages from flight managers trying to make him feel guilty for the disruption this caused. He was then taken off his next trip and was advised he needed to make a special trip into the flight office. I believe this management's behavior is simply to intimidate pilots to follow their agenda no matter what the cost.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757/767 flight crew describes a departure delay to study new manuals and checklists which had not been previously issued and for which only online training had been received.

Narrative: Last week I was assigned to fly a segment in a Boeing 767 aircraft. Upon reaching the cockpit to begin my preflight duties; I noted that the Quick Reference Checklist had been replaced. In the chart holder next to my seat there was a large laminated; bound volume labeled 'Quick Reference Handbook.' I had never seen this document before. Upon investigation; it appeared to contain a number of emergency and irregular checklists organized by component (i.e. Engines; Hydraulics; Pneumatics; etc.). During the previous month; we had been instructed by the company to watch a computer based video; which was of very poor quality and contained very little useful information; which ostensibly was our training for the use of this document. Over my aviation career; it has been standard practice; when confronted by a change of this magnitude; that the company would spend an inordinate amount of time and energy preparing us for the change. In this case; the change of an entire new set of checklists and procedures for any emergency encountered; was haphazardly presented in a video that was difficult to navigate and materials which in no way represented the type of change this new document contained. During preflight we encountered a mechanical and I had approximately one hour to familiarize myself with this document. I have never; in 16 years of flying been presented such a massive change to the standard or emergency procedures under which we operate with so little preparation. Equally disturbing was my flight two days later in a Boeing 757 aircraft. Fifteen minutes prior to departure we discovered the new Quick Reference Handbook and massive Flight Manual changes in our flight bags. The Captain advised me that he had not flown with these changes and needed to take some time to familiarize himself with this new material. We encountered a delay until the Captain could be assured that he could operate the flight safely. I cannot speak for the Captain of this flight; but I immediately felt that CSR Supervisors and the assistant Chief Pilot began pressuring my Captain; the next day my Captain continued to receive messages from Flight Managers trying to make him feel guilty for the disruption this caused. He was then taken off his next trip and was advised he needed to make a special trip into the Flight Office. I believe this management's behavior is simply to intimidate pilots to follow their agenda no matter what the cost.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.