Narrative:

Clearance delivery was very busy. There were many calls for clrncs and the controller's accent made for some long readouts and readbacks. I called for my clearance, was put on a list, and later, the controller issued me the following clearance. 'Laguardia one, whitestone climb, radar vectors pette, as filed, maintain 5000, expect FL350 10 mins after departure, departure frequency 120.4, squawk xxcd.' our company provides a general information page for the airport with the following special note. '1. Readback of fully understood departure clrncs consists of flight identify and transponder code. Use of this procedure is voluntary.' I wrote down in shorthand the above clearance and since I considered it to be 'fully understood,' my readback was, 'squawk xxcd, airline identify.' I used this abbreviated readback in what I thought was an effort to reduce radio congestion and to help reduce the controller workload. Flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 13 at laguardia. I was the pilot flying. The captain and I had reviewed the departure and confirmed to each other the 'whitestone climb.' I turned to 175 degree heading, climbed to 1500' and began a left turn to 040 degree heading, climbing to 5000'. The captain had called departure control and in the left turn to 040 degree, the controller issued, 'turn right to 350 degree.' the captain queried the controller on the right turn to 350 degree, since we were turning left. The controller responded, 'affirmative. Right turn to 350 degree. You were given the maspeth climb.' the controller must have noticed we were well into the left turn to 040 degree, reissued us a left turn to 340 degree and said that there was no problem, that he showed we were given the 'maspeth climb' and that the 'whitestone climb' is not given when jfk is in a specific traffic pattern. The controller gave us the 'left turn to 340 degree and climb to 15000'. After we had made our turn to a heading of 340 degree and when climbing through 7000', the controller reclred us to maintain 7000'. The captain replied we were already through 7000'. The controller reclred us to maintain 8000'. I don't know if this was related to the confusion on the departure. I assume that it was. We were subsequently reclred to a new heading and to 15000'. Out of 10000' we accelerated to climb speed and were handed off to another controller. The new controller gave us a turn for in trail sep and queried us about our speed. When we told him our speed, he became upset that the previous controller had not given us a speed restriction, as he had asked for it, gave us a turn and told us to slow to 270 KTS. We complied. Again, I don't know if this was related to the confusion on the departure, but I assume that it was. I think the frequent congestion on clearance delivery and the controller's accent were contributing to the initial event. I believe still, very strongly, that I was given the 'whitestone climb.' the importance of reading back clrncs should not be overlooked in the interest of expediting the process. If I was wrong in writing down the 'whitestone climb,' or if the controller had inadvertently given me the 'whitestone climb,' it very possibly could have been caught during the 'readback.' this seems to be an all too frequent problem. I am aware of it, yet I let myself get caught up in it. One problem that needs addressing, if the assignment of a different climb is so important to traffic sep between these 2 airports, why don't we have 2 distinctly named and numbered sids to assure no misunderstanding rather than a 'common departure' with too many options. Supplemental information from acn 96660. 1) first officer received clearance from lga to dtw during my absence from the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT DEVIATION FROM CLRNC ROUTE, NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC DISPUTED.

Narrative: CLRNC DELIVERY WAS VERY BUSY. THERE WERE MANY CALLS FOR CLRNCS AND THE CTLR'S ACCENT MADE FOR SOME LONG READOUTS AND READBACKS. I CALLED FOR MY CLRNC, WAS PUT ON A LIST, AND LATER, THE CTLR ISSUED ME THE FOLLOWING CLRNC. 'LAGUARDIA ONE, WHITESTONE CLB, RADAR VECTORS PETTE, AS FILED, MAINTAIN 5000, EXPECT FL350 10 MINS AFTER DEP, DEP FREQ 120.4, SQUAWK XXCD.' OUR COMPANY PROVIDES A GENERAL INFO PAGE FOR THE ARPT WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL NOTE. '1. READBACK OF FULLY UNDERSTOOD DEP CLRNCS CONSISTS OF FLT IDENT AND XPONDER CODE. USE OF THIS PROC IS VOLUNTARY.' I WROTE DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE ABOVE CLRNC AND SINCE I CONSIDERED IT TO BE 'FULLY UNDERSTOOD,' MY READBACK WAS, 'SQUAWK XXCD, AIRLINE IDENT.' I USED THIS ABBREVIATED READBACK IN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS AN EFFORT TO REDUCE RADIO CONGESTION AND TO HELP REDUCE THE CTLR WORKLOAD. FLT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 13 AT LAGUARDIA. I WAS THE PLT FLYING. THE CAPT AND I HAD REVIEWED THE DEP AND CONFIRMED TO EACH OTHER THE 'WHITESTONE CLB.' I TURNED TO 175 DEG HDG, CLBED TO 1500' AND BEGAN A LEFT TURN TO 040 DEG HDG, CLBING TO 5000'. THE CAPT HAD CALLED DEP CTL AND IN THE LEFT TURN TO 040 DEG, THE CTLR ISSUED, 'TURN RIGHT TO 350 DEG.' THE CAPT QUERIED THE CTLR ON THE RIGHT TURN TO 350 DEG, SINCE WE WERE TURNING LEFT. THE CTLR RESPONDED, 'AFFIRMATIVE. RIGHT TURN TO 350 DEG. YOU WERE GIVEN THE MASPETH CLB.' THE CTLR MUST HAVE NOTICED WE WERE WELL INTO THE LEFT TURN TO 040 DEG, REISSUED US A LEFT TURN TO 340 DEG AND SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PROB, THAT HE SHOWED WE WERE GIVEN THE 'MASPETH CLB' AND THAT THE 'WHITESTONE CLB' IS NOT GIVEN WHEN JFK IS IN A SPECIFIC TFC PATTERN. THE CTLR GAVE US THE 'LEFT TURN TO 340 DEG AND CLB TO 15000'. AFTER WE HAD MADE OUR TURN TO A HDG OF 340 DEG AND WHEN CLBING THROUGH 7000', THE CTLR RECLRED US TO MAINTAIN 7000'. THE CAPT REPLIED WE WERE ALREADY THROUGH 7000'. THE CTLR RECLRED US TO MAINTAIN 8000'. I DON'T KNOW IF THIS WAS RELATED TO THE CONFUSION ON THE DEP. I ASSUME THAT IT WAS. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY RECLRED TO A NEW HDG AND TO 15000'. OUT OF 10000' WE ACCELERATED TO CLB SPD AND WERE HANDED OFF TO ANOTHER CTLR. THE NEW CTLR GAVE US A TURN FOR IN TRAIL SEP AND QUERIED US ABOUT OUR SPD. WHEN WE TOLD HIM OUR SPD, HE BECAME UPSET THAT THE PREVIOUS CTLR HAD NOT GIVEN US A SPD RESTRICTION, AS HE HAD ASKED FOR IT, GAVE US A TURN AND TOLD US TO SLOW TO 270 KTS. WE COMPLIED. AGAIN, I DON'T KNOW IF THIS WAS RELATED TO THE CONFUSION ON THE DEP, BUT I ASSUME THAT IT WAS. I THINK THE FREQUENT CONGESTION ON CLRNC DELIVERY AND THE CTLR'S ACCENT WERE CONTRIBUTING TO THE INITIAL EVENT. I BELIEVE STILL, VERY STRONGLY, THAT I WAS GIVEN THE 'WHITESTONE CLB.' THE IMPORTANCE OF READING BACK CLRNCS SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDITING THE PROCESS. IF I WAS WRONG IN WRITING DOWN THE 'WHITESTONE CLB,' OR IF THE CTLR HAD INADVERTENTLY GIVEN ME THE 'WHITESTONE CLB,' IT VERY POSSIBLY COULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT DURING THE 'READBACK.' THIS SEEMS TO BE AN ALL TOO FREQUENT PROB. I AM AWARE OF IT, YET I LET MYSELF GET CAUGHT UP IN IT. ONE PROB THAT NEEDS ADDRESSING, IF THE ASSIGNMENT OF A DIFFERENT CLB IS SO IMPORTANT TO TFC SEP BETWEEN THESE 2 ARPTS, WHY DON'T WE HAVE 2 DISTINCTLY NAMED AND NUMBERED SIDS TO ASSURE NO MISUNDERSTANDING RATHER THAN A 'COMMON DEP' WITH TOO MANY OPTIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 96660. 1) F/O RECEIVED CLRNC FROM LGA TO DTW DURING MY ABSENCE FROM THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.