Narrative:

I was working R20 with a d-side that had limited radar certifications. There was weather in the northwest and northeast corners and along the southern boundary of my airspace. Many; if not all; aircraft were deviating. With the complexity of the aircraft deviating for the weather and the heavy traffic volume the traffic was becoming unmanageable. I asked for a tracker or some form of help at least twice. The supervisor in charge was standing behind me and said; 'you're fine.' I replied; 'no; I'm not.' he continued to stand behind me and watch but did not attempt to get me any help. Checked on frequency at FL370. I turned aircraft X left to go behind aircraft Z; also level at FL370. By this point the data blocks of the 20+ aircraft on my scope were overlapping and I had decreased the range so that I could see better. This; in turn; limited the view of aircraft approaching my airspace. Aircraft Z could not take a left turn due to the weather so I had to turn aircraft X even further to the left; heading northwest bound. Aircraft Y was southeast bound from denver center level at FL370. Shortly after aircraft Y checked on; I turned him right to avoid aircraft X. The conflict alert went off for aircraft Y and aircraft X. I turned aircraft Y further right (twice). I started turning aircraft X to the right as much as possible to peel him away from aircraft Y; but couldn't turn him on course yet because of the aircraft Z. Aircraft X reported he was responding to an RA and was descending. Shortly after that aircraft X reported level at FL370 again. With all the aircraft involved in this; FL360 and FL380 were not options due to other traffic in the vicinity at those altitudes. There was a loss of separation between aircraft X and aircraft Y. I feel like the system; as a whole; broke down. The amount of traffic going into the sector with all the weather deviations should never have been allowed. The tmu should have rerouted aircraft around the sector when the sector was coded red. The supervisor should have paid more attention to the tsd that predicted the amount of traffic that was going to be in sector and staffed the position appropriately. As the radar controller; I should not have had to ask for help (i.e. Tracker; reroute aircraft; etc.); but when I did; the supervisor should have immediately paged someone back to be a tracker. The supervisor should have also called tmu and/or adjacent sectors and asked them to reroute some of the aircraft around my sector. The supervisor also should have put in a d-side that had a lot more experience. Putting in a d-side only controller to help in a situation that was so complex and so saturated with traffic was unfair to both the d-side and the r-side. If staffing was the issue; the FAA/government needs to figure something out to hire more controllers or use overtime. Any and/or all of those things; would have given me a better chance to ensure the safety and separation of aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event during a high volume traffic period complicated by weather factors; the reporter indicating assistance was requested but the supervisor failed to provide same.

Narrative: I was working R20 with a D-Side that had limited RADAR certifications. There was weather in the Northwest and Northeast corners and along the Southern boundary of my airspace. Many; if not all; aircraft were deviating. With the complexity of the aircraft deviating for the weather and the heavy traffic volume the traffic was becoming unmanageable. I asked for a tracker or some form of help at least twice. The supervisor in charge was standing behind me and said; 'you're fine.' I replied; 'no; I'm not.' He continued to stand behind me and watch but did not attempt to get me any help. checked on frequency at FL370. I turned Aircraft X left to go behind Aircraft Z; also level at FL370. By this point the Data Blocks of the 20+ aircraft on my scope were overlapping and I had decreased the range so that I could see better. This; in turn; limited the view of aircraft approaching my airspace. Aircraft Z could not take a left turn due to the weather so I had to turn Aircraft X even further to the left; heading Northwest bound. Aircraft Y was Southeast bound from Denver Center level at FL370. Shortly after Aircraft Y checked on; I turned him right to avoid Aircraft X. The Conflict Alert went off for Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. I turned Aircraft Y further right (twice). I started turning Aircraft X to the right as much as possible to peel him away from Aircraft Y; but couldn't turn him on course yet because of the Aircraft Z. Aircraft X reported he was responding to an RA and was descending. Shortly after that Aircraft X reported level at FL370 again. With all the aircraft involved in this; FL360 and FL380 were not options due to other traffic in the vicinity at those altitudes. There was a loss of separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I feel like the system; as a whole; broke down. The amount of traffic going into the sector with all the weather deviations should never have been allowed. The TMU should have rerouted aircraft around the sector when the sector was coded red. The Supervisor should have paid more attention to the TSD that predicted the amount of traffic that was going to be in sector and staffed the position appropriately. As the RADAR controller; I should not have had to ask for help (i.e. tracker; reroute aircraft; etc.); but when I did; the supervisor should have immediately paged someone back to be a tracker. The supervisor should have also called TMU and/or adjacent sectors and asked them to reroute some of the aircraft around my sector. The Supervisor also should have put in a D-Side that had a lot more experience. Putting in a D-Side only controller to help in a situation that was so complex and so saturated with traffic was unfair to both the D-Side and the R-Side. If staffing was the issue; the FAA/government needs to figure something out to hire more controllers or use overtime. Any and/or all of those things; would have given me a better chance to ensure the safety and separation of aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.