 |
37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Following the failure of the adp shortly after takeoff on a 120 minute ETOPS flight; the flight crew of a B767-300 struggled to obtain--and barely received--basic MEL information from dispatch and maintenance control prior to entering ETOPS airspace. After exiting ETOPS a review of associated mels by the flight crew illuminated numerous operational issues about which they were not advised that would have been pertinent were subsequent system failures to occur.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 964771 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201108 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | ZZZZ.Airport |
| State Reference | FO |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Component | |
| Aircraft Component | Hydraulic System Pump |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain Check Pilot Pilot Flying |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240 Flight Crew Total 15000 Flight Crew Type 5200 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural MEL Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Maintenance |
Narrative:
We were on a 138 minute westbound ETOPS flight from ZZZZ2. Our adp [air driven (hydraulic) pump] failed in both auto and on positions after gear retraction. I sent an ACARS message to maintenance asking for relevant information regarding this write up; but received no reply! After asking dispatch twice before ETOPS entry; he called maintenance and replied back: 'maintenance control said 'if both engine and APU generators are ok; you're good''. Almost 6 hours after the failure (after exiting ETOPS airspace); I asked maintenance for MEL numbers for the adp inoperative and hmg [hydraulic motor (driven) generator] inoperative so that we could review them. The hmg inoperative MEL stated that APU must be operated in ETOPS airspace for +120 minute ETOPS dispatch; along with the center IRS; and the captain's RDMI information if all AC power failed. The adp inoperative MEL warns about slow gear/flap extension and retraction times (up to 30% slower!); and cautions pilots to avoid simultaneous operation of flaps; slats; speed brakes and the landing gear. There is a lot of important operational information that was not provided to the flight crew that could affect safety even though we asked for it five different times.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Following the failure of the ADP shortly after takeoff on a 120 minute ETOPS flight; the Flight Crew of a B767-300 struggled to obtain--and barely received--basic MEL information from Dispatch and Maintenance Control prior to entering ETOPS airspace. After exiting ETOPS a review of associated MELs by the Flight Crew illuminated numerous operational issues about which they were not advised that would have been pertinent were subsequent system failures to occur.
Narrative: We were on a 138 minute Westbound ETOPS flight from ZZZZ2. Our ADP [Air Driven (hydraulic) Pump] failed in both Auto and On positions after gear retraction. I sent an ACARS message to Maintenance asking for relevant information regarding this write up; but received no reply! After asking Dispatch twice before ETOPS entry; he called maintenance and replied back: 'Maintenance Control said 'if both Engine and APU Generators are OK; you're good''. Almost 6 hours after the failure (After exiting ETOPS airspace); I asked maintenance for MEL numbers for the ADP INOP and HMG [Hydraulic Motor (driven) Generator] INOP so that we could review them. The HMG INOP MEL stated that APU must be operated in ETOPS airspace for +120 minute ETOPS dispatch; along with the Center IRS; and the Captain's RDMI information if all AC power failed. The ADP INOP MEL warns about slow Gear/Flap Extension and Retraction times (Up to 30% slower!); and cautions pilots to avoid simultaneous operation of flaps; Slats; Speed Brakes and the Landing Gear. There is a lot of important operational information that was not provided to the Flight Crew that could affect safety even though we asked for it five different times.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.