Narrative:

Passing approximately 10;000 ft we noticed an upper EICAS alert of rudder ratio and mach speed trim; these lights were also illuminated on the overhead caution light panel. The status page revealed an elevator asymmetry status message. The first officer (pilot flying) continued to fly and I passed the radio duties to him while I accessed the QRH and read the appropriate checklists. At this time the first officer attempted to engage the center auto-pilot that didn't work--- he also attempted the left and the right auto-pilot's no auto-pilot would engage. Made contact with dispatch and maintenance and asked them if they had any other ideas. By this time we had leveled off at FL350. We discussed the problem of being in rvsm airspace with no auto-pilot --- we descended to fl 270 to comply with the rvsm requirements talked to dispatch about the increased fuel burn and found out that the burn would take us down 2;000 pounds from our original fat fuel; thus eliminating one of the 2 alternates that we had flight planned for.we started discussing the pluses and minuses of continuing to destination. 1. We were limited to a 15 KT crosswind with the rudder ratio problem. 2. The increased fuel burn was eliminating the 2nd alternate. 3. Destination and remaining alternate both had the same forecast for thunderstorms probability and gusty winds. 4. Our destination could potentially be a problem with runway assignment and current winds being a very busy destination in thunderstorm conditions and needing a runway that perhaps might not be the runway that they would want to use (yes; I understand 'emergency authority') however; I also understand real world and the time it takes to perhaps make this all work out--- also the fact that now we would have been hand flying for at least 3 hours and 18 minutes and perhaps much longer with holding. 5. Another airport was a quicker solution with no thunderstorm activity forecast for our arrival time. Winds were trending to be steady out of the west with the landing runway being 26. Final landing runway was 34R with a wind of 020/12 KTS.6. We felt that continuing to the destination would be working ourselves into a box that would be perhaps hard to extricate ourselves from. Every accident/incident is preceded by a fairly long and obvious chain of events. With all of these links in the chain; we decided to divert and either get another aircraft or put people on other flights to make their destinations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain experiences simultaneous MACH/SPD TRIM and RUDDER RATIO advisories along with elevator asymmetry status message passing 10;000 FT during climb. Crew elects to descend out of RVSM airspace when autopilot will not engage and then to divert due to possible crosswind landing restrictions at destination.

Narrative: Passing approximately 10;000 FT we noticed an upper EICAS alert of Rudder Ratio and Mach Speed Trim; these lights were also illuminated on the overhead caution light panel. The status page revealed an Elevator Asymmetry status message. The First Officer (pilot flying) continued to fly and I passed the radio duties to him while I accessed the QRH and read the appropriate checklists. At this time the First Officer attempted to engage the center auto-pilot that didn't work--- he also attempted the left and the right auto-pilot's no auto-pilot would engage. Made contact with Dispatch and Maintenance and asked them if they had any other ideas. By this time we had leveled off at FL350. We discussed the problem of being in RVSM Airspace with no auto-pilot --- we descended to FL 270 to comply with the RVSM requirements talked to Dispatch about the increased fuel burn and found out that the burn would take us down 2;000 LBS from our original FAT fuel; thus eliminating one of the 2 alternates that we had flight planned for.We started discussing the pluses and minuses of continuing to destination. 1. We were limited to a 15 KT crosswind with the Rudder Ratio problem. 2. The increased fuel burn was eliminating the 2nd Alternate. 3. Destination and remaining alternate both had the same forecast for thunderstorms probability and gusty winds. 4. Our destination could potentially be a problem with runway assignment and current winds being a very busy destination in thunderstorm conditions and needing a runway that perhaps might not be the runway that they would want to use (yes; I understand 'emergency authority') however; I also understand real world and the time it takes to perhaps make this all work out--- also the fact that now we would have been hand flying for at least 3 hours and 18 minutes and perhaps much longer with holding. 5. Another airport was a quicker solution with no thunderstorm activity forecast for our arrival time. Winds were trending to be steady out of the west with the landing runway being 26. Final landing runway was 34R with a wind of 020/12 KTS.6. We felt that continuing to the destination would be working ourselves into a box that would be perhaps hard to extricate ourselves from. Every accident/incident is preceded by a fairly long and obvious chain of events. With all of these links in the chain; we decided to divert and either get another aircraft or put people on other flights to make their destinations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.