Narrative:

We had just finished deviating through a line of thunderstorms east of ZZZ and were still climbing on our way to ZZZ1 and in ZZZ2 center airspace. We got the fire bell and ECAM smoke warning (red) which quickly went away. Twenty five minutes later we got a total of five simultaneous smoke fwd cargo smoke and smoke aft cargo smoke ECAM warnings accompanied by the fire bell. We decided to divert to ZZZ2 since we were closer and the bad weather was between us and ZZZ; though dispatch sent us a message indicating their desire for us to return. This is not a warning to be ignored; though both of us felt it was likely a faulty indication. There was no smoke or odor anywhere in the cabin or flight deck at any time; and because the warnings occurred simultaneously in both compartments. Nevertheless; we at least had a bad warning system and if in fact there were to be an actual fire/smoke condition we would possibly never know. Best to sort that out on the ground. We completed all required QRH/ECAM procedures; and overweight landing procedures. We used the landing distance chart and determined that flaps 3 would give us adequate go-around performance. We selected med autobrakes and planned a visual approach; with tower informing us that the actual winds were less than on ATIS information. The flight attendants were informed immediately of the ECAM situation; and advised to plan a precautionary landing--no brace--in about 15 minutes. A PA was also made by me saying about the same thing. Passengers remained calm. I must say for the record that this flight attendant crew did an outstanding job both in the air and on the ground throughout this scenario. They greatly deserve to be commended. We landed at 179;200 pounds and about 150 FPM without incident and made a normal turnoff and taxi-in. We communicated directly with crash fire rescue equipment and explained that we did not suspect an actual fire but to be prepared. We discussed our hot brakes (675 on #1 was the hottest they got) with crash fire rescue equipment. We also instructed operations and crash fire rescue equipment that the bins were not to be opened until the aircraft was deplaned. The jetway driver was not present when we arrived and that process (deplaning) took longer than it should have; prompting crash fire rescue equipment to ask if I were considering an evacuation. I told him no. The bins were subsequently opened prior to the aircraft being fully deplaned. By who and how that happened I do not know. Crash fire rescue equipment was present when the bins were opened. There was no damage or signs of smoke/fire in either bin. Contract maintenance arrived promptly and meled the bins and accomplished the overweight landing inspection per maintenance control. We waited about 5 hours for a 320 to be ferried in. We learned later that this aircraft had a history of this fault. Time to get that fixed. Maintenance is expensive and decisions must be made; I truly understand; but I would avoid 'kicking the can down the road' where truly serious warning systems are concerned. It seems to me from a line pilot perspective only that sometimes the better course is to fix a problem system and not just do another bite test or reset. (I say that in ignorance of the full background of this aircraft).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain experiences apparently false simultaneous SMOKE FWD CARGO SMOKE and SMOKE AFT CARGO SMOKE ECAM warnings accompanied by the fire bell in cruise. After some discussion the crew elects to divert to a suitable airport for an over weight landing. It is later learned that the aircraft has a history of false cargo smoke warnings.

Narrative: We had just finished deviating through a line of thunderstorms east of ZZZ and were still climbing on our way to ZZZ1 and in ZZZ2 Center airspace. We got the fire bell and ECAM smoke warning (red) which quickly went away. Twenty five minutes later we got a total of five simultaneous SMOKE FWD CARGO SMOKE and SMOKE AFT CARGO SMOKE ECAM warnings accompanied by the fire bell. We decided to divert to ZZZ2 since we were closer and the bad weather was between us and ZZZ; though Dispatch sent us a message indicating their desire for us to return. This is not a warning to be ignored; though both of us felt it was likely a faulty indication. There was no smoke or odor anywhere in the cabin or flight deck at any time; and because the warnings occurred simultaneously in both compartments. Nevertheless; we at least had a bad warning system and if in fact there were to be an actual fire/smoke condition we would possibly never know. Best to sort that out on the ground. We completed all required QRH/ECAM Procedures; and Overweight Landing Procedures. We used the Landing Distance Chart and determined that flaps 3 would give us adequate go-around performance. We selected MED autobrakes and planned a Visual Approach; with Tower informing us that the actual winds were less than on ATIS information. The flight attendants were informed immediately of the ECAM situation; and advised to plan a precautionary landing--no brace--in about 15 minutes. A PA was also made by me saying about the same thing. Passengers remained calm. I must say for the record that this flight attendant crew did an OUTSTANDING job both in the air and on the ground throughout this scenario. They greatly deserve to be commended. We landed at 179;200 LBS and about 150 FPM without incident and made a normal turnoff and taxi-in. We communicated directly with CFR and explained that we did not suspect an actual fire but to be prepared. We discussed our hot brakes (675 on #1 was the hottest they got) with CFR. We also instructed Operations and CFR that the bins were not to be opened until the aircraft was deplaned. The jetway driver was not present when we arrived and that process (deplaning) took longer than it should have; prompting CFR to ask if I were considering an evacuation. I told him no. The bins were subsequently opened prior to the aircraft being fully deplaned. By who and how that happened I do not know. CFR was present when the bins were opened. There was no damage or signs of smoke/fire in either bin. Contract Maintenance arrived promptly and MELed the bins and accomplished the overweight landing inspection per Maintenance Control. We waited about 5 hours for a 320 to be ferried in. We learned later that this aircraft had a history of this fault. Time to get that fixed. Maintenance is expensive and decisions must be made; I truly understand; but I would avoid 'kicking the can down the road' where truly serious warning systems are concerned. It seems to me from a line pilot perspective only that sometimes the better course is to fix a problem system and not just do another bite test or reset. (I say that in ignorance of the full background of this aircraft).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.