Narrative:

While on the RNAV arrival; the mode control panel completely failed and froze up at approximately 28;000 ft MSL. At the time of system failure; we were cleared direct to an RNAV waypoint and to cross at 250/10;000 ft. There were thunderstorms on the arrival requiring small deviations and changes in descent rate to avoid storms. While descending to cross the waypoint; the mode control panel and flight director failed; and I was forced to raw data; hand fly the RNAV arrival; approach; and landing to runway 8. Some of the hand flown portion of the arrival was while penetrating and maneuvering around the thunderstorms and associated clouds. The failure of the MCP first became apparent to us when we attempted to change the runway of the arrival from the previous loaded runway 26 to the actual cleared runway 8. This loading of runway 8 was occurring very close (approximately ten miles) from the waypoint; the branch point on the arrival for westbound versus eastbound landings; as we had been given direct previously. We were very rushed to enter this new routing as the branch point was quickly approaching. Initially; we had been unable to identify why entering the new routing did not prompt an execute option and would not execute. Then; it became clear there was more happening than just inability to execute routing as the MCP functions did not work. We had no access to flight director function/display; could not vertically navigate by any vertical mode (it was stuck in VNAV and could not be deselected or changed to another vertical mode); and could not set any altitudes in the altitude alerter (it was stuck at 12;000; the previous altitude given to cross the waypoint before the failure). Although the heading bug scrolled around; the display in the MCP panel did not work and the captain's course selector was frozen. The course selector on my side did work. At this point; I disconnected the autopilot and raw data; hand flew to the waypoint as the lateral navigation appeared to still be working. Crew communication at this point began to break down. At this time; things were very hectic as we had just fully become aware of the extent of our equipment failure. ATC was now actively clearing us for the runway 8 transition (that the FMC would not accept while fast approaching the branch point). The captain was running the checklist for MCP lockout; which included resetting circuit breakers; and I was engrossed with raw data hand flying an RNAV arrival. As the captain was reading back the ATC instructions including; 'fly xx heading after point xx;' (a bit of a non standard expectation on the this RNAV) he was forced to read it back several times as the initial read back was not to ATC's liking; further reducing inter crew communication. The problem with this clearance was that we could not accept it as the points to fly to could not be loaded into the FMC; but the captain did not immediately realize this. With the branch point almost upon us; I interjected and asked the captain to just inform ATC that we are unable to navigate by the RNAV arrival and that we would like vectors. He appeared wanting to continue to follow the RNAV routing because he was resistant to just getting vectors from or informing ATC of our navigation failures. He was very busy talking to ATC; running checklists; pulling breakers; and he told me abruptly to be quiet; albeit somewhat understandably considering the workload. I was now at the waypoint with incorrect routing in the FMC. I raised my voice and strongly informed him; 'the problem is I am unable to fly a xx heading off point xx because I have no idea where point xx is; I need vectors.' he now realized the navigation problem. He requested and we received vectors. I suggested we inform ATC of our navigation failures; but he refused. Upon the request; ATC gave us vectors and asked no further question nor did they inquire if we had anything wrong. During this whole event; the descent checklist was not completed untillevel at 10;000 ft. We did set local altimeters passing FL180 so no altitudes were broken. We eventually did the checklist while at 10;000 ft. By now; we were fully aware of the extent of our malfunction; unable to rectify it; and on ATC vectors to runway 8. At some point during this event; I realized that the cws autopilot mode was operating. This allowed some piloting relief. Our crew interaction became mutually hurried and abrupt at the moment described above as we were approaching the branch point and the captain was resisting vectors. This interaction is to be expected and is understood considering the amount of workload at the time; but further CRM issues developed after we arrived at the gate. At the gate; maintenance reset the aircraft power and the malfunction immediately rectified itself. I indicated that I was going to do a safety report about this event. The captain immediately resisted; insisting we had done nothing wrong and had not busted any ATC clearances. I agreed; but felt the event was unique enough and had some items of interest to the safety program that I would do a safety report. Plus; you never know! He attempted to talk me out of it. At one point he appeared to realize he was not going to influence me not to submit so he betrayed his ignorance of the safety program and said; 'now; what is the safety report thing again? How does it work?' some additional observations: raw data step downs with the altitude selector frozen on 12;000 ft is very distracting. It made me realize how often I look at the altitude alerter as a mental; cleared to altitude reminder. As a result; we began writing down all altitudes as a reminder. Every time ATC issued a heading or new altitude; muscle memory ensured that we interfaced through the MCP but of course; it did not work. At no time; do I believe we missed a speed/crossing restriction or busted any ATC assigned altitude or clearances. I believe we should have informed ATC sooner of our navigation failures and requested vectors sooner during the event. This would have alleviated a lot of workload and distraction. Don't be afraid to lean on ATC. Personally; I make full use of the safety reporting system and am not afraid of it; and I am utterly dismayed and offended that a fellow pilot would lobby me so hard over not submitting a safety report; making me out to be the bad guy. I ran into a similar attempt at dissuasion by a captain once before several years ago; albeit not as aggressive as this time. In that previous situation; the captain chose not to submit a safety report. I always inform the other crew member when I do a safety report out of courtesy. If at any time a concurrent report is not received; it is because they have forgotten or refused; not because I submitted without telling them. My experience indicates that when resistance is received; it is almost always from very senior captains as with this case. I believe that the safety program managers need to do more education to alleviate the fear and reluctance by some pilots of submitting a safety report. It needs to be made clear that intimidation of other pilots to not submit is unethical and will not be tolerated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 Mode Control Panel failed on a RNAV arrival but the Captain did not inform ATC about the navigation failure which lead to heated discussions about CRM and safety reports.

Narrative: While on the RNAV Arrival; the Mode Control Panel completely failed and froze up at approximately 28;000 FT MSL. At the time of system failure; we were cleared direct to an RNAV Waypoint and to cross at 250/10;000 FT. There were thunderstorms on the arrival requiring small deviations and changes in descent rate to avoid storms. While descending to cross the waypoint; the Mode Control Panel and Flight Director failed; and I was forced to raw data; hand fly the RNAV arrival; approach; and landing to Runway 8. Some of the hand flown portion of the arrival was while penetrating and maneuvering around the thunderstorms and associated clouds. The failure of the MCP first became apparent to us when we attempted to change the runway of the arrival from the previous loaded Runway 26 to the actual cleared Runway 8. This loading of Runway 8 was occurring very close (approximately ten miles) from the waypoint; the branch point on the arrival for westbound versus eastbound landings; as we had been given direct previously. We were very rushed to enter this new routing as the branch point was quickly approaching. Initially; we had been unable to identify why entering the new routing did not prompt an execute option and would not execute. Then; it became clear there was more happening than just inability to execute routing as the MCP functions did not work. We had no access to Flight Director function/display; could not vertically navigate by any vertical mode (it was stuck in VNAV and could not be deselected or changed to another vertical mode); and could not set any altitudes in the altitude alerter (it was stuck at 12;000; the previous altitude given to cross the waypoint before the failure). Although the heading bug scrolled around; the display in the MCP panel did not work and the Captain's Course Selector was frozen. The Course Selector on my side did work. At this point; I disconnected the autopilot and raw data; hand flew to the waypoint as the lateral navigation appeared to still be working. Crew communication at this point began to break down. At this time; things were very hectic as we had just fully become aware of the extent of our equipment failure. ATC was now actively clearing us for the Runway 8 transition (that the FMC would not accept while fast approaching the branch point). The Captain was running the checklist for MCP lockout; which included resetting circuit breakers; and I was engrossed with raw data hand flying an RNAV Arrival. As the Captain was reading back the ATC instructions including; 'Fly xx heading after point xx;' (a bit of a non standard expectation on the this RNAV) he was forced to read it back several times as the initial read back was not to ATC's liking; further reducing inter crew communication. The problem with this clearance was that we could not accept it as the points to fly to could not be loaded into the FMC; but the Captain did not immediately realize this. With the branch point almost upon us; I interjected and asked the Captain to just inform ATC that we are unable to navigate by the RNAV Arrival and that we would like vectors. He appeared wanting to continue to follow the RNAV routing because he was resistant to just getting vectors from or informing ATC of our navigation failures. He was very busy talking to ATC; running checklists; pulling breakers; and he told me abruptly to be quiet; albeit somewhat understandably considering the workload. I was now at the waypoint with incorrect routing in the FMC. I raised my voice and strongly informed him; 'The problem is I am unable to fly a XX heading off point XX because I have no idea where point XX is; I need vectors.' He now realized the navigation problem. He requested and we received vectors. I suggested we inform ATC of our navigation failures; but he refused. Upon the request; ATC gave us vectors and asked no further question nor did they inquire if we had anything wrong. During this whole event; the Descent Checklist was not completed untillevel at 10;000 FT. We did set local altimeters passing FL180 so no altitudes were broken. We eventually did the checklist while at 10;000 FT. By now; we were fully aware of the extent of our malfunction; unable to rectify it; and on ATC vectors to Runway 8. At some point during this event; I realized that the CWS Autopilot mode was operating. This allowed some piloting relief. Our Crew interaction became mutually hurried and abrupt at the moment described above as we were approaching the branch point and the Captain was resisting vectors. This interaction is to be expected and is understood considering the amount of workload at the time; but further CRM issues developed after we arrived at the gate. At the gate; Maintenance reset the aircraft power and the malfunction immediately rectified itself. I indicated that I was going to do a safety report about this event. The Captain immediately resisted; insisting we had done nothing wrong and had not busted any ATC clearances. I agreed; but felt the event was unique enough and had some items of interest to the safety program that I would do a safety report. Plus; you never know! He attempted to talk me out of it. At one point he appeared to realize he was not going to influence me not to submit so he betrayed his ignorance of the safety program and said; 'Now; what is the safety report thing again? How does it work?' Some additional observations: Raw data step downs with the Altitude Selector frozen on 12;000 FT is very distracting. It made me realize how often I look at the Altitude alerter as a mental; cleared to altitude reminder. As a result; we began writing down all altitudes as a reminder. Every time ATC issued a heading or new altitude; muscle memory ensured that we interfaced through the MCP but of course; it did not work. At no time; do I believe we missed a speed/crossing restriction or busted any ATC assigned altitude or clearances. I believe we should have informed ATC sooner of our navigation failures and requested vectors sooner during the event. This would have alleviated a lot of workload and distraction. Don't be afraid to lean on ATC. Personally; I make full use of the safety reporting system and am not afraid of it; and I am utterly dismayed and offended that a fellow Pilot would lobby me so hard over not submitting a safety report; making me out to be the bad guy. I ran into a similar attempt at dissuasion by a Captain once before several years ago; albeit not as aggressive as this time. In that previous situation; the Captain chose not to submit a safety report. I always inform the other Crew Member when I do a safety report out of courtesy. If at any time a concurrent report is not received; it is because they have forgotten or refused; not because I submitted without telling them. My experience indicates that when resistance is received; it is almost always from very senior captains as with this case. I believe that the Safety Program Managers need to do more education to alleviate the fear and reluctance by some pilots of submitting a safety report. It needs to be made clear that intimidation of other pilots to not submit is unethical and will not be tolerated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.