37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 967305 |
Time | |
Date | 201108 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Wheels/Tires/Brakes |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Engineer Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52 Flight Crew Total 6300 Flight Crew Type 877 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Maintenance |
Narrative:
The tire pressure check and; therefore; the maintenance release was due to expire two hours and forty minutes prior to completing the second leg of our flight. During the scheduled turn the first officer and I were extremely busy. While completing the normal preflight duties I was dealing with additional airplane issues. The mechanic was trying to fix the sfcc computer (system #2 flap fault); and I was working the #1 yaw damper problem and having no luck re-initializing the circuit breaker for facility [flight augmentation computer] #1. With the #1 yaw damper deferred the MEL mandated a new lower altitude; requiring additional fuel and a new release.in an effort to expedite I was communicating with the dispatcher by cell phone. Expecting to have deferred autobrakes (previous write up); deferred system #2 flaps and deferred #1 yaw damper in addition to having weird experiences with this airplane; we were trying to be as vigilant as possible briefing all contingencies we could think of. By now we had flown this airplane 3 times. Our previous day's flight included write ups for randomly occurring triple click warning sounds at altitude (indicating a decrease in landing capability); an altitude sel knob that had randomly changed from FL340 to FL350 giving us a 'check altitude' indication on the FMS; and the system #2 flap fault that had been reset after the engines were started and subsequently faulted again after takeoff. The mechanic initially selected the MEL number that applied to the system #2 flap fault light. After correcting the MEL number the mechanic handed me the maintenance release with the operational considerations for our deferred items. I went over each item with him to ensure they were correct. I knew there was plenty of time remaining on the service check (seven days) but what I didn't do was review the tire pressure check expiration time nor did I ask to have a new maintenance release printed; which would have caught this error. These aircraft issues along with a spoiler 1 and 4 fault after engine start caused us to be over an hour late taking off.my first officer and I learned an important lesson. Increased vigilance on the part of both aircrew and maintenance will help prevent this from happening again.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An A300 Captain reported he inadvertently operated a delayed flight technically in violation of a required 24 hour tire pressure check. The need to resolve multiple; more significant; maintenance issues prior to departure were a distraction and contributed to the error.
Narrative: The tire pressure check and; therefore; the Maintenance release was due to expire two hours and forty minutes prior to completing the second leg of our flight. During the scheduled turn the First Officer and I were extremely busy. While completing the normal preflight duties I was dealing with additional airplane issues. The Mechanic was trying to fix the SFCC computer (System #2 Flap Fault); and I was working the #1 Yaw Damper problem and having no luck re-initializing the circuit breaker for FAC [Flight Augmentation Computer] #1. With the #1 yaw damper deferred the MEL mandated a new lower altitude; requiring additional fuel and a new release.In an effort to expedite I was communicating with the Dispatcher by cell phone. Expecting to have deferred autobrakes (previous write up); deferred system #2 flaps and deferred #1 yaw damper in addition to having weird experiences with this airplane; we were trying to be as vigilant as possible briefing all contingencies we could think of. By now we had flown this airplane 3 times. Our previous day's flight included write ups for randomly occurring triple click warning sounds at altitude (indicating a decrease in landing capability); an ALT SEL knob that had randomly changed from FL340 to FL350 giving us a 'check altitude' indication on the FMS; and the System #2 Flap Fault that had been reset after the engines were started and subsequently faulted again after takeoff. The mechanic initially selected the MEL number that applied to the system #2 Flap Fault Light. After correcting the MEL number the mechanic handed me the Maintenance Release with the operational considerations for our deferred items. I went over each item with him to ensure they were correct. I knew there was plenty of time remaining on the Service Check (seven days) but what I didn't do was review the tire pressure check expiration time nor did I ask to have a new Maintenance Release printed; which would have caught this error. These aircraft issues along with a Spoiler 1 and 4 Fault after engine start caused us to be over an hour late taking off.My First Officer and I learned an important lesson. Increased vigilance on the part of both aircrew and Maintenance will help prevent this from happening again.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.