Narrative:

This report deals with the new QRH and the lack of safety in the daily operation of the 757/767 fleet at our airline. I am studying for my upcoming annual check and have been looking closely at the QRH; the new flight manual and the associated company bulletins. Besides the lack of training in the use of the new QRH and flight manual; the real problem in the implementation is the variety of aircraft types that are referred to in these new documents. Bulletin xyz is meant to call attention to this problem but glosses over its true nature. I am beginning to find this out on my own but do my peers know about this subtle nest egg lurking in the QRH and flight manual?I cannot say if anyone else knows how difficult it is to find the correct checklist in the QRH and neither can the company because there has been no formal training dealing with this problem. Simple words in a politically correct; sterile bulletin cannot take the place of training in a simulator with an instructor dealing with the actual implementation of the QRH. To say it can is to mock the absolute foundations of safe aviation. The subtle difference between these checklists is going to cause a uas [undesired aircraft state] at the least and the worst case could be a hull loss. During today's flight; while at cruise altitude; I had time to study the QRH. I found the distinction between AC bus off checklists for two of our 757 models to be very difficult to determine. I am self taught in the subtle problems with the QRH and I still got the wrong checklist. The fact is that the difference between getting the right checklist for this problem and getting the wrong one is difficult to ascertain at a glance. You cannot tell me that in the heat of an emergency they are not likely to be confused. There is only one character [number/letter] difference in the designation of these two models but I bet there is a world of difference between the aircraft. I don't know because I have never even been in the cockpit of the second type. It turns out in this instance that I should have gone to a different QRH page. Maybe all the possible model variations should be placarded in each cockpit? I am not qualified to fly four of our models. So why am a carrying checklists for them? Why do I have to deal with that distraction on top of all the other distractions that are around me every day that I report to work? In my career all safety offices; military and commercial; have always wanted the everyday line pilot's opinion for the potential cause of the next hull loss. This is that problem! This subtle difference in searching for the correct checklist is the safety threat that will cause a crew error and potentially exacerbate an existing problem. The positive resolution of this hypothetical situation will be left to luck because our pilots will have no practical experience in avoiding this type of problem and may not even be able to recognize the situation itself. In the case of the AC bus off situation referred to above; the error would be assuming this model 757 would be able to remain airborne for 90 minutes and not the correct amount of 30 minutes. This error would definitely lead to a hull loss.how can this problem be solved? Immediately remove the checklists for these models from the QRH and the flight manual. Then; as the merger process completes and we truly become one airline; the 757 fleet must be separated from the 767 fleet. With so many variations of these aircraft in one airline; relying on dual qualified pilots will no longer be safe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier pilot addressed shortcomings he believes exists in his company's training regimen with respect to new SOPs and emergency response checklists. The difficulties stem from the need to integrate the operating cultures of two recently merged pilot work forces.

Narrative: This report deals with the new QRH and the lack of safety in the daily operation of the 757/767 fleet at our airline. I am studying for my upcoming annual check and have been looking closely at the QRH; the new Flight Manual and the associated company bulletins. Besides the lack of training in the use of the new QRH and Flight Manual; the real problem in the implementation is the variety of aircraft types that are referred to in these new documents. Bulletin XYZ is meant to call attention to this problem but glosses over its true nature. I am beginning to find this out on my own but do my peers know about this subtle nest egg lurking in the QRH and Flight Manual?I cannot say if anyone else knows how difficult it is to find the correct checklist in the QRH and neither can the company because there has been no formal training dealing with this problem. Simple words in a politically correct; sterile bulletin cannot take the place of training in a simulator with an instructor dealing with the actual implementation of the QRH. To say it can is to mock the absolute foundations of safe aviation. The subtle difference between these checklists is going to cause a UAS [Undesired Aircraft State] at the least and the worst case could be a hull loss. During today's flight; while at cruise altitude; I had time to study the QRH. I found the distinction between AC Bus Off checklists for two of our 757 models to be very difficult to determine. I am self taught in the subtle problems with the QRH and I STILL got the wrong checklist. The fact is that the difference between getting the right checklist for this problem and getting the wrong one is difficult to ascertain at a glance. You cannot tell me that in the heat of an emergency they are not likely to be confused. There is only one character [number/letter] difference in the designation of these two models but I bet there is a world of difference between the aircraft. I don't know because I have never even been in the cockpit of the second type. It turns out in this instance that I should have gone to a different QRH page. Maybe all the possible model variations should be placarded in each cockpit? I am not qualified to fly four of our models. So why am a carrying checklists for them? Why do I have to deal with that distraction on top of all the other distractions that are around me every day that I report to work? In my career all safety offices; military and commercial; have always wanted the everyday line pilot's opinion for the potential cause of the next hull loss. THIS IS THAT PROBLEM! This subtle difference in searching for the correct checklist is the safety threat that will cause a crew error and potentially exacerbate an existing problem. The positive resolution of this hypothetical situation will be left to luck because our pilots will have no practical experience in avoiding this type of problem and may not even be able to recognize the situation itself. In the case of the AC Bus Off situation referred to above; the error would be assuming this model 757 would be able to remain airborne for 90 minutes and not the correct amount of 30 minutes. This error would definitely lead to a hull loss.How can this problem be solved? Immediately remove the checklists for these models from the QRH and the Flight Manual. Then; as the merger process completes and we truly become one airline; the 757 fleet MUST be separated from the 767 fleet. With so many variations of these aircraft in one airline; relying on dual qualified pilots will no longer be safe.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.