Narrative:

I was the first officer and pilot monitoring for the flight. Preflight; pre-departure; taxi out; takeoff and initial climb were all normal. Sometime during climbout; I noticed a very slight airframe vibration and an associated barely audible hum. I would guess this appeared in the 5000-10;000 msl range. All engine indications were in the normal range. We did notice the left engine vibration monitor showed 4.5-4.7 and was gray boxed. We subsequently noticed the left engine egt was approximately 60-70 degrees hotter than the right engine; but the left engine egt was well within the normal range. Approximately at that time; we received a call from a flight attendant regarding a vibration and noise being noticed at door 3R and 3L. The relief pilot left the cockpit to assess the vibration. The captain took control of the radios while I consulted the B777 flight manual regarding the vibration. A check of the limits section did not reveal any reference to the vibration monitor. The systems section of the manual only said that the range of the monitor is 0.0-5.0 and there was no reading that was considered abnormal. The relief pilot returned to the cockpit to relay that she too noticed the noise and vibration; although it was not very noticeable to the passengers. She did think it was abnormal. The captain decided then to call dispatch and phone patch through to maintenance. At this time; I took the aircraft and radios. I continued our climb with center; I believe the clearance was to climb and maintain FL280. Soon thereafter; the aircraft yawed noticeably to the left and back to the right; and we noticed the left engine gauges began to be unstable. The captain immediately took control of the aircraft and I grabbed the QRH and began to run the engine limit/surge/stall checklist. We completed the initial steps of the checklist when the aircraft yawed again and the left engine egt went into the red range. This was followed immediately by heavy acrid smoke in the cockpit. At that time the autopilot disengaged and the associated warning was sounding in the cockpit. We immediately donned our oxygen masks and established crew communication. The aircraft continued yawing back and forth; the smoke continued to increase in intensity; and the autopilot warning was still sounding. Considering we already had the left throttle at idle; we immediately recognized and announced severe engine damage. I made a transmission to ATC that we were an emergency aircraft; had smoke in the cockpit and requested an immediate descent and vector towards the airport. At this time; I went to run the QRH for severe engine damage. I could not find the QRH. The smoke was intensifying to the point of it being difficult to see the captain. If it continued to intensify; it would approach the point of beginning to obscure instrument visibility. The egt was in the red; the aircraft continued to yaw; and I believe the autopilot alarm continued to sound. I reverted to system knowledge for severe engine damage and confirmed the left fuel control switch and placed it in cutoff. Our attention as a crew immediately was drawn to the amount of smoke in the cockpit. It was heavy and acrid. I consulted the ecl [B777 electronic check list] and began to run the smoke/fumes/fire checklist. This checklist was not too difficult to find; but it did take some time. Once there; it took considerable time to complete and was very cumbersome. While running this checklist; the smoke finally began to dissipate. The checklist was completed. During all of my checklist running; the captain and relief pilot handled ATC and flight attendant coordination. By this time; we were nearing the airport. After consultation; we decided to land overweight instead of delaying our landing to dump fuel or complete checklists. We were not 100% sure our smoke source had been dealt with. I consulted the overweight landing checklist in the ecl. That checklist was completed. It was followedby the final descent checklist. We planned for and completed a flaps 20 approach and landing. Our ref speed was 161 and we used autobrakes 4. The ground prox flaps override switch was placed to override. The approach and landing were normal. Moderate braking was used. Upon stopping on the taxiway; we established communication with the emergency vehicles. They monitored our brake temperatures and used water to keep them cool. Since the smoke had begun to dissipate; we decided to not evacuate the aircraft. Passengers were eventually deplaned via mobile lounges. The crew remained with the aircraft until we were towed to a gate. Eventually during the final descent; the QRH was located between my seat and the center pedestal. I now realize it was dropped from my hands in my haste to don my oxygen mask. In the duress of the moment including the smoke and darkness; I was unable to locate the QRH. It was leaning vertically between the seat and pedestal and would be almost invisible considering the conditions we were in. During this entire incident; I do not recall any annunciated checklists that were priority in nature. That left me to search in the unannunciated section. I feel strongly that some sort of 'priority' section to the unannunciated checklists would have been helpful. One section that has just the high importance items would be nice. Things like severe damage; decompression; and smoke. Otherwise; we are left to search through numerous pages to find these important lists. And even once on the correct page; the lists in question are buried on that page. Not very easy to locate in the challenging situation we were presented with.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew reports an engine failure during climb that results in dense smoke in the cockpit and the inability to locate the QRH. The Left Engine Fuel Control switch is confirmed and placed to off using system knowledge. Some difficulties using the B777 ECL are also reported. The smoke begins to clear and a single engine overweight landing ensues. Procedures at this air carrier apparently do not include any immediate action items; the QRC is to be referenced in all cases.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and Pilot Monitoring for the flight. Preflight; pre-departure; taxi out; takeoff and initial climb were all normal. Sometime during climbout; I noticed a very slight airframe vibration and an associated barely audible hum. I would guess this appeared in the 5000-10;000 msl range. All engine indications were in the normal range. We did notice the left engine vibration monitor showed 4.5-4.7 and was gray boxed. We subsequently noticed the L engine EGT was approximately 60-70 degrees hotter than the R engine; but the L engine EGT was well within the normal range. Approximately at that time; we received a call from a Flight Attendant regarding a vibration and noise being noticed at door 3R and 3L. The Relief pilot left the cockpit to assess the vibration. The Captain took control of the radios while I consulted the B777 Flight Manual regarding the vibration. A check of the Limits section did not reveal any reference to the vibration monitor. The Systems section of the manual only said that the range of the monitor is 0.0-5.0 and there was no reading that was considered abnormal. The Relief pilot returned to the cockpit to relay that she too noticed the noise and vibration; although it was not very noticeable to the passengers. She did think it was abnormal. The Captain decided then to call Dispatch and phone patch through to Maintenance. At this time; I took the aircraft and radios. I continued our climb with Center; I believe the clearance was to climb and maintain FL280. Soon thereafter; the aircraft yawed noticeably to the left and back to the right; and we noticed the L engine gauges began to be unstable. The Captain immediately took control of the aircraft and I grabbed the QRH and began to run the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall checklist. We completed the initial steps of the checklist when the aircraft yawed again and the L engine EGT went into the RED range. This was followed IMMEDIATELY by heavy acrid smoke in the cockpit. At that time the autopilot disengaged and the associated warning was sounding in the cockpit. We immediately donned our oxygen masks and established crew communication. The aircraft continued yawing back and forth; the smoke continued to increase in intensity; and the autopilot warning was still sounding. Considering we already had the L throttle at idle; we immediately recognized and announced severe engine damage. I made a transmission to ATC that we were an emergency aircraft; had smoke in the cockpit and requested an immediate descent and vector towards the airport. At this time; I went to run the QRH for Severe Engine Damage. I could not find the QRH. The smoke was intensifying to the point of it being difficult to see the Captain. If it continued to intensify; it would approach the point of beginning to obscure instrument visibility. The EGT was in the RED; the aircraft continued to yaw; and I believe the autopilot alarm continued to sound. I reverted to system knowledge for severe engine damage and confirmed the L fuel control switch and placed it in Cutoff. Our attention as a crew immediately was drawn to the amount of smoke in the cockpit. It was heavy and acrid. I consulted the ECL [B777 Electronic Check List] and began to run the Smoke/Fumes/Fire checklist. This checklist was not too difficult to find; but it did take some time. Once there; it took considerable time to complete and was very cumbersome. While running this checklist; the smoke finally began to dissipate. The checklist was completed. During all of my checklist running; The Captain and Relief pilot handled ATC and flight attendant coordination. By this time; we were nearing the airport. After consultation; we decided to land overweight instead of delaying our landing to dump fuel or complete checklists. We were not 100% sure our smoke source had been dealt with. I consulted the overweight landing checklist in the ECL. That checklist was completed. It was followedby the Final Descent Checklist. We planned for and completed a Flaps 20 approach and landing. Our Ref speed was 161 and we used autobrakes 4. The ground prox flaps override switch was placed to override. The approach and landing were normal. Moderate braking was used. Upon stopping on the taxiway; we established communication with the emergency vehicles. They monitored our brake temperatures and used water to keep them cool. Since the smoke had begun to dissipate; we decided to not evacuate the aircraft. Passengers were eventually deplaned via mobile lounges. The crew remained with the aircraft until we were towed to a gate. Eventually during the final descent; the QRH was located between my seat and the center pedestal. I now realize it was dropped from my hands in my haste to don my oxygen mask. In the duress of the moment including the smoke and darkness; I was unable to locate the QRH. It was leaning vertically between the seat and pedestal and would be almost invisible considering the conditions we were in. During this entire incident; I do not recall any annunciated checklists that were priority in nature. That left me to search in the unannunciated section. I feel strongly that some sort of 'Priority' section to the unannunciated checklists would have been helpful. One section that has just the high importance items would be nice. Things like Severe Damage; Decompression; and Smoke. Otherwise; we are left to search through numerous pages to find these important lists. And even once on the correct page; the lists in question are buried on that page. Not very easy to locate in the challenging situation we were presented with.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.