Narrative:

Departed hnl for sfo at XA48 am, 10/mon/88. At 110 KTS on takeoff roll aircraft yawed abruptly--almost felt like engine loss. All instruments normal--flight was resumed normally. At 1:17 into flight my F/east reported rapid loss of fuel #2 tank. After observing fluctuations on #2 fuel gauge we suspected #1 inoperative fuel gauge or #2 fuel leak between xfeed valve and #2 engine. Unable to control either one. Engine flamed out at XD30. Since we suspected fuel leak on #2 system, decided to proceed tank to engine on remaining 3 engines. 2 hours and 7 mins later arrived sfo west/O incident. Sfo agents nor my company flight control in houston were aware of our problem, even though I declared an emergency. After mechanics in sfo were unable to find fuel leak, the most gruesome discovery was made: an erroneous fuel load out of hnl which amounted to 19000# of fuel imbalance between #2 and #3 fuel tanks. The #2 gauge read 39000# on takeoff when in fact only had 20000#. This explained the yawing experienced on takeoff and of course the engine flame out. I sincerely believe after having experienced this problem and after discussing it with my crew, the following recommendation should be considered: due to the fact that the person now responsible for documented stick readings is not part of the flight crew, human error is more apt to occur. I feel that the F/east should be present at the time the stick readings are taken and fuel load verified at this time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB HAD AN ENGINE FLAME OUT ENROUTE HNL-SFO.

Narrative: DEPARTED HNL FOR SFO AT XA48 AM, 10/MON/88. AT 110 KTS ON TKOF ROLL ACFT YAWED ABRUPTLY--ALMOST FELT LIKE ENG LOSS. ALL INSTRUMENTS NORMAL--FLT WAS RESUMED NORMALLY. AT 1:17 INTO FLT MY F/E RPTED RAPID LOSS OF FUEL #2 TANK. AFTER OBSERVING FLUCTUATIONS ON #2 FUEL GAUGE WE SUSPECTED #1 INOP FUEL GAUGE OR #2 FUEL LEAK BTWN XFEED VALVE AND #2 ENG. UNABLE TO CONTROL EITHER ONE. ENG FLAMED OUT AT XD30. SINCE WE SUSPECTED FUEL LEAK ON #2 SYSTEM, DECIDED TO PROCEED TANK TO ENG ON REMAINING 3 ENGS. 2 HRS AND 7 MINS LATER ARRIVED SFO W/O INCIDENT. SFO AGENTS NOR MY COMPANY FLT CTL IN HOUSTON WERE AWARE OF OUR PROB, EVEN THOUGH I DECLARED AN EMER. AFTER MECHS IN SFO WERE UNABLE TO FIND FUEL LEAK, THE MOST GRUESOME DISCOVERY WAS MADE: AN ERRONEOUS FUEL LOAD OUT OF HNL WHICH AMOUNTED TO 19000# OF FUEL IMBALANCE BTWN #2 AND #3 FUEL TANKS. THE #2 GAUGE READ 39000# ON TKOF WHEN IN FACT ONLY HAD 20000#. THIS EXPLAINED THE YAWING EXPERIENCED ON TKOF AND OF COURSE THE ENG FLAME OUT. I SINCERELY BELIEVE AFTER HAVING EXPERIENCED THIS PROB AND AFTER DISCUSSING IT WITH MY CREW, THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED: DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE PERSON NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR DOCUMENTED STICK READINGS IS NOT PART OF THE FLT CREW, HUMAN ERROR IS MORE APT TO OCCUR. I FEEL THAT THE F/E SHOULD BE PRESENT AT THE TIME THE STICK READINGS ARE TAKEN AND FUEL LOAD VERIFIED AT THIS TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.