Narrative:

As we approached sfo on the runway 28 profile descent near the menlo intersection, I was talking to bay approach control on 135.65 at about XX47 GMT. The ATIS WX was reporting 900' scattered and 7 mi visibility. The controller asked us to call the airport in sight several times for a visual approach to runway 28L, but although I could clearly see the bay shoreline, the san mateo bridge and foster city, I could not yet see the airport. The first officer (PF) thought that he could see some of the airport bldgs, but the runways were certainly not in sight at that time. The controller then descended us to 4000' and again asked us to call the airport and visual contact with some other aircraft ahead of us. It then became obvious to me that there was a layer of clouds east of the airport on the approach path and that they were obscuring the approach end of the runways from our position. I told the controller that the airport was not in sight, but because I thought that I would be able to make a rapid visual descent east of the clouds and fly the airplane in visually to the airport below the glide path, I requested a contact approach. The controller refused to clear us for the contact approach and by that time we were still at or above 4000' and quite high on the G/south and we could see the airport. The first officer told me that he could only remain visual by doing a steep 40 degree flap power off descent to the runway after passing over the clouds on the normal 3.00 degree approach profile and I agreed with his assessment. The controller then turned us on final to the runway and cleared us to 2000', and again asked us to call the airport in sight. As we descended and about an altitude of 2200', and approaching the G/south, it because obvious to us that we would not be able to remain visual and a visual approach would not be legal. I then informed the controller that I would have to abandon the approach and we made a go around about XX53 GMT. We were vectored straight ahead and climbed out and then turned left for a downwind leg for another approach, changing frequencys 2 or 3 times. I anticipated that we would then receive a clearance for a full instrument ILS approach to runway 28R, but as we passed by the airport eastbound the controller told us to expect another visual approach to runway 28L. I told him that we had already tried that once and that I requested a full instrument approach to the airport. As we passed east of the san mateo bridge, the controller then turned us northbound and called out traffic to us that was at our altitude, (I believe we were about 4000' at that time) which appeared to be heading straight at us with landing lights on bright. We told him that we had the aircraft in sight and then he told us to maintain visual sep with the traffic and that he would call the turn on final for us. I still insisted on the full ILS approach and we were eventually cleared for an ILS to runway 28L. However, on the base leg, I felt very uncomfortable being vectored directly into another aircraft coming straight at us and being told both to maintain our sep and at the same time maintain the vector heading until told. My instincts were to make a sharp left turn and descent toward the airport much sooner than when the controller finally issued the turn. As we approached brijj LOM the controller switched us over to the tower. We continued the approach and on the G/south we were through a broken layer of clouds between about 1100 and 800'. When we broke out of the clouds we had a clear view of the airport. At about 500' I noticed an medium large transport descending on a steeper glide path and slightly higher speed and right on our wingtip (about 500-600') on the final approach to runway 28R. The second officer told me that he had been there during most of the approach at a slightly lower altitude on our wingtip, but I do not recall seeing him there since all of my attention was concentrated on making the instrument approach through the cloud layer. I was quite started to see him there because I assumed that they could not conduct parallel visual apches in what really was IFR WX and I don't know how he could have maintained a visual contact with us as we went through the clouds. We landed west/O further incident. When we arrived at the gate I called bay approach and asked for the supervisor. Before I even idented myself the person I spoke with told me 'you were on large transport X, weren't you?' he gave me his name and I talked with him at about XY15-XY20 GMT. I told him about my concern for flying visual approachs in IFR WX and that I could not imagine that it was a safe operation to have a wingman on a visual approach while I was flying an instrument approach. The supervisor told me that it is legal for 1 aircraft to be on an instrument approach and a second aircraft on a visual approach if he can maintain visual contact with the first. He did not explain to me how it was legal for any aircraft to fly any visual approach through clouds on final or to maintain visual contact with the first when in the clouds. Sfo went IFR shortly after that. I think the whole operation was very unsafe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT MADE MISSED APCH AND THEN REFUSED A SECOND VISUAL APCH BECAUSE OF WX.

Narrative: AS WE APCHED SFO ON THE RWY 28 PROFILE DSCNT NEAR THE MENLO INTXN, I WAS TALKING TO BAY APCH CTL ON 135.65 AT ABOUT XX47 GMT. THE ATIS WX WAS RPTING 900' SCATTERED AND 7 MI VIS. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CALL THE ARPT IN SIGHT SEVERAL TIMES FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L, BUT ALTHOUGH I COULD CLEARLY SEE THE BAY SHORELINE, THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE AND FOSTER CITY, I COULD NOT YET SEE THE ARPT. THE F/O (PF) THOUGHT THAT HE COULD SEE SOME OF THE ARPT BLDGS, BUT THE RWYS WERE CERTAINLY NOT IN SIGHT AT THAT TIME. THE CTLR THEN DSNDED US TO 4000' AND AGAIN ASKED US TO CALL THE ARPT AND VISUAL CONTACT WITH SOME OTHER ACFT AHEAD OF US. IT THEN BECAME OBVIOUS TO ME THAT THERE WAS A LAYER OF CLOUDS E OF THE ARPT ON THE APCH PATH AND THAT THEY WERE OBSCURING THE APCH END OF THE RWYS FROM OUR POS. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT THE ARPT WAS NOT IN SIGHT, BUT BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE A RAPID VISUAL DSCNT E OF THE CLOUDS AND FLY THE AIRPLANE IN VISUALLY TO THE ARPT BELOW THE GLIDE PATH, I REQUESTED A CONTACT APCH. THE CTLR REFUSED TO CLR US FOR THE CONTACT APCH AND BY THAT TIME WE WERE STILL AT OR ABOVE 4000' AND QUITE HIGH ON THE G/S AND WE COULD SEE THE ARPT. THE F/O TOLD ME THAT HE COULD ONLY REMAIN VISUAL BY DOING A STEEP 40 DEG FLAP PWR OFF DSCNT TO THE RWY AFTER PASSING OVER THE CLOUDS ON THE NORMAL 3.00 DEG APCH PROFILE AND I AGREED WITH HIS ASSESSMENT. THE CTLR THEN TURNED US ON FINAL TO THE RWY AND CLRED US TO 2000', AND AGAIN ASKED US TO CALL THE ARPT IN SIGHT. AS WE DSNDED AND ABOUT AN ALT OF 2200', AND APCHING THE G/S, IT BECAUSE OBVIOUS TO US THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO REMAIN VISUAL AND A VISUAL APCH WOULD NOT BE LEGAL. I THEN INFORMED THE CTLR THAT I WOULD HAVE TO ABANDON THE APCH AND WE MADE A GO AROUND ABOUT XX53 GMT. WE WERE VECTORED STRAIGHT AHEAD AND CLBED OUT AND THEN TURNED LEFT FOR A DOWNWIND LEG FOR ANOTHER APCH, CHANGING FREQS 2 OR 3 TIMES. I ANTICIPATED THAT WE WOULD THEN RECEIVE A CLRNC FOR A FULL INSTRUMENT ILS APCH TO RWY 28R, BUT AS WE PASSED BY THE ARPT EBND THE CTLR TOLD US TO EXPECT ANOTHER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 28L. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD ALREADY TRIED THAT ONCE AND THAT I REQUESTED A FULL INSTRUMENT APCH TO THE ARPT. AS WE PASSED E OF THE SAN MATEO BRIDGE, THE CTLR THEN TURNED US NBOUND AND CALLED OUT TFC TO US THAT WAS AT OUR ALT, (I BELIEVE WE WERE ABOUT 4000' AT THAT TIME) WHICH APPEARED TO BE HEADING STRAIGHT AT US WITH LNDG LIGHTS ON BRIGHT. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND THEN HE TOLD US TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEP WITH THE TFC AND THAT HE WOULD CALL THE TURN ON FINAL FOR US. I STILL INSISTED ON THE FULL ILS APCH AND WE WERE EVENTUALLY CLRED FOR AN ILS TO RWY 28L. HOWEVER, ON THE BASE LEG, I FELT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE BEING VECTORED DIRECTLY INTO ANOTHER ACFT COMING STRAIGHT AT US AND BEING TOLD BOTH TO MAINTAIN OUR SEP AND AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAIN THE VECTOR HDG UNTIL TOLD. MY INSTINCTS WERE TO MAKE A SHARP LEFT TURN AND DSCNT TOWARD THE ARPT MUCH SOONER THAN WHEN THE CTLR FINALLY ISSUED THE TURN. AS WE APCHED BRIJJ LOM THE CTLR SWITCHED US OVER TO THE TWR. WE CONTINUED THE APCH AND ON THE G/S WE WERE THROUGH A BROKEN LAYER OF CLOUDS BTWN ABOUT 1100 AND 800'. WHEN WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS WE HAD A CLEAR VIEW OF THE ARPT. AT ABOUT 500' I NOTICED AN MLG DSNDING ON A STEEPER GLIDE PATH AND SLIGHTLY HIGHER SPD AND RIGHT ON OUR WINGTIP (ABOUT 500-600') ON THE FINAL APCH TO RWY 28R. THE S/O TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN THERE DURING MOST OF THE APCH AT A SLIGHTLY LOWER ALT ON OUR WINGTIP, BUT I DO NOT RECALL SEEING HIM THERE SINCE ALL OF MY ATTN WAS CONCENTRATED ON MAKING THE INSTRUMENT APCH THROUGH THE CLOUD LAYER. I WAS QUITE STARTED TO SEE HIM THERE BECAUSE I ASSUMED THAT THEY COULD NOT CONDUCT PARALLEL VISUAL APCHES IN WHAT REALLY WAS IFR WX AND I DON'T KNOW HOW HE COULD HAVE MAINTAINED A VISUAL CONTACT WITH US AS WE WENT THROUGH THE CLOUDS. WE LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. WHEN WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE I CALLED BAY APCH AND ASKED FOR THE SUPVR. BEFORE I EVEN IDENTED MYSELF THE PERSON I SPOKE WITH TOLD ME 'YOU WERE ON LGT X, WEREN'T YOU?' HE GAVE ME HIS NAME AND I TALKED WITH HIM AT ABOUT XY15-XY20 GMT. I TOLD HIM ABOUT MY CONCERN FOR FLYING VISUAL APCHS IN IFR WX AND THAT I COULD NOT IMAGINE THAT IT WAS A SAFE OPERATION TO HAVE A WINGMAN ON A VISUAL APCH WHILE I WAS FLYING AN INSTRUMENT APCH. THE SUPVR TOLD ME THAT IT IS LEGAL FOR 1 ACFT TO BE ON AN INSTRUMENT APCH AND A SECOND ACFT ON A VISUAL APCH IF HE CAN MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE FIRST. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN TO ME HOW IT WAS LEGAL FOR ANY ACFT TO FLY ANY VISUAL APCH THROUGH CLOUDS ON FINAL OR TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE FIRST WHEN IN THE CLOUDS. SFO WENT IFR SHORTLY AFTER THAT. I THINK THE WHOLE OPERATION WAS VERY UNSAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.