Narrative:

During approach into lax; we were on a vector for approach to a right parallel runway. Prior to turning base; we were advised that company traffic was on a straight-in approach to the adjacent left parallel runway. Approach control issued the next vector to the base leg. On the base leg; we were given the second turn to 230 degrees and 170 knots to intercept the final approach. We reported another company aircraft and the field in sight. We were cleared for a visual approach. During base leg; we were both monitoring the traffic display and the first officer said we are probably going to get a traffic advisory. I turned the aircraft further right to decrease the intercept angle; constantly looking over to the company traffic. We were switched to the tower and cleared to land on the right runway. The other company aircraft was cleared to land on the left runway. We were maintaining our gradual intercept angle slightly right of the centerline for the right runway. We continued monitoring the traffic display. I kept looking left and slightly back to maintain visual on the other company aircraft. At about 1600'; we received a TA with an aural 'climb' advisory. I disconnected the autopilot; began a further right turn; and began to pitch the nose up; still looking back at the other company aircraft. The aural warning stopped; and I continued the approach slightly offset; still looking left and back to keep the other company aircraft in sight and verify he was on the left runway. At this time; there was no more aural warning. With my concentration on visually monitoring the other company aircraft and accessing the approach; I failed to go back to the TCAS pitch cue and follow the guidance; which was still indicating a pitch up. Although I had the perceived conflict in sight; we had discussed the possible traffic alert in advance; and I made a correction that silenced the aural warning. I failed to exactly follow the guidance cue; which probably would have resulted in a go-around. Our landing on the right runway was about 1000' ahead of the other company aircraft landing on the left runway. I believe we should have taken a slightly later turn to base and final than originally assigned by ATC; as it put us nearly side by side on the approach. Our assigned speeds were matched; and we maintained only a small forward separation from the other company aircraft on approach; resulting in the 'climb' resolution. Again; while visually maintaining separation of the other company aircraft and making the correction; only to get the aural warning to stop; my concentration on monitoring the guidance cue was distracted. I failed to continue the climb and probable missed approach. Our discussion of the possible traffic advisory enhanced our awareness of the company traffic and our need to maintain visual separation; as well as the vectoring by approach and the clearance to land by tower; but we failed to discuss the go-around possibility; fixating our attention on visual separations. An additional factor playing into this was 5000 pounds of fuel remaining due to delayed vectoring on the flight and extensive traffic inbound. We should have discussed further what our actions were going to be; if or when we received the TA. Being aware; as you get fixated on a visual separation; it does not relieve you from going back to the guidance cue; as opposed to just stopping the aural warning. A review of breakout procedures might be a good resource for study and to learn from this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Air Carrier crew reported a TCAS TA on approach to LAX parallel runways but no action was taken because the traffic was in sight.

Narrative: During approach into LAX; we were on a vector for approach to a right parallel runway. Prior to turning base; we were advised that Company traffic was on a straight-in approach to the adjacent left parallel runway. Approach Control issued the next vector to the base leg. On the base leg; we were given the second turn to 230 degrees and 170 knots to intercept the final approach. We reported another Company aircraft and the field in sight. We were cleared for a visual approach. During base leg; we were both monitoring the traffic display and the First Officer said we are probably going to get a Traffic Advisory. I turned the aircraft further right to decrease the intercept angle; constantly looking over to the Company traffic. We were switched to the Tower and cleared to land on the right runway. The other Company aircraft was cleared to land on the left runway. We were maintaining our gradual intercept angle slightly right of the centerline for the right runway. We continued monitoring the traffic display. I kept looking left and slightly back to maintain visual on the other Company aircraft. At about 1600'; we received a TA with an aural 'climb' advisory. I disconnected the autopilot; began a further right turn; and began to pitch the nose up; still looking back at the other Company aircraft. The aural warning stopped; and I continued the approach slightly offset; still looking left and back to keep the other Company aircraft in sight and verify he was on the left runway. At this time; there was no more aural warning. With my concentration on visually monitoring the other Company aircraft and accessing the approach; I failed to go back to the TCAS pitch cue and follow the guidance; which was still indicating a pitch up. Although I had the perceived conflict in sight; we had discussed the possible traffic alert in advance; and I made a correction that silenced the aural warning. I failed to exactly follow the guidance cue; which probably would have resulted in a go-around. Our landing on the right runway was about 1000' ahead of the other Company aircraft landing on the left runway. I believe we should have taken a slightly later turn to base and final than originally assigned by ATC; as it put us nearly side by side on the approach. Our assigned speeds were matched; and we maintained only a small forward separation from the other Company aircraft on approach; resulting in the 'climb' resolution. Again; while visually maintaining separation of the other Company aircraft and making the correction; only to get the aural warning to stop; my concentration on monitoring the guidance cue was distracted. I failed to continue the climb and probable missed approach. Our discussion of the possible Traffic Advisory enhanced our awareness of the Company traffic and our need to maintain visual separation; as well as the vectoring by Approach and the clearance to land by Tower; but we failed to discuss the go-around possibility; fixating our attention on visual separations. An additional factor playing into this was 5000 pounds of fuel remaining due to delayed vectoring on the flight and extensive traffic inbound. We should have discussed further what our actions were going to be; if or when we received the TA. Being aware; as you get fixated on a visual separation; it does not relieve you from going back to the guidance cue; as opposed to just stopping the aural warning. A review of breakout procedures might be a good resource for study and to learn from this incident.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.