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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 968639 |
Time | |
Date | 201109 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | DCA.Airport |
State Reference | DC |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Other Noise Abatement Procedure |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Compass (HSI/ETC) |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Flight Engineer Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195 Flight Crew Total 14900 Flight Crew Type 15 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230 Flight Crew Total 10500 Flight Crew Type 15 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Airspace Violation All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
We were dispatched with an MEL item that rendered the VNAV inoperative. Heavy rains showers at departure time were moving through the dca area. As we pushed back; a rain shower came over the field; but it stopped raining before our takeoff. At takeoff time; the weather was reported as 1;500 ft ovc with surface winds out of the east. No thunderstorms existed within three miles of the field; but a line of weather was west to northwest of dca. At the gate prior to push back; we planned a departure on dca runway 01. We discussed the airline's specific departure procedure for both VMC and IMC. During that briefing (approximately 30 minutes before push back); the weather was good enough to follow the airline's specific VMC procedure and follow the river visually; and if VMC is lost; to follow the dca XXX radial to 2.7 DME; then turn to intercept the dca 328 radial. However; we did reiterate; in the pre-departure briefing that if we went IMC; we would pick up the appropriate radials and continue with the procedure based on the radials. In preparation for departure; we tuned the dca VOR. The first officer was pilot flying; so we put the XXX radial on the first officer side; and we put the 328 radial on the captain (pilot not flying) side. We set the heading indicator to 330. I selected arc mode; but failed to notice that the pilot flying was still in map mode; and therefore unable to see the radials on his navigation display. There were many threats to this departure which we briefed. The runway is short and was reported wet. P56 needed to be avoided. Neither of us had flown the airline's new specific departure procedure utilizing the XXX radial to 2.7 DME. The aircraft was heavy. The VNAV was inoperative; requiring us to utilize an alternate climb out process on the digital flight guidance control panel which we don't often use. Heavy rain showers were in the departure area; requiring us to use the weather radar on departure. Neither of us has used this weather radar before (due to low time in this model md 90). Although I thought we were thoroughly briefed for the departure; the pilot flying failed to select arc mode when we were planning to use raw data to accomplish departure procedure. Therefore; he could not monitor the necessary radials. I failed to notice that mistake. I also incorrectly assumed; based on our pre-departure briefing that the first officer was planning on intercepting the XXX radial rather than attempting to visually track the river. Neither of us comprehended the distraction that would be caused by simultaneously entering the unexpected cloud layer and having to accomplish the 'alternate' clean up procedure on the digital flight guidance control panel due to VNAV being inoperative. Although the airline's departure procedures discuss 'VMC procedure' and 'IMC procedure'; they do not talk about specific weather to define 'VMC' and 'IMC'. Since the weather was reported as 1;500 ft ovc; the pilot flying initiated the 'VMC' procedure and was planning to track the river visually; at least initially. I; on the other hand; knew that we would enter the clouds quickly on climb out; so I was expecting to turn to intercept the XXX radial without much concern for visually following the river. The combination of VNAV inoperative; unexpected low ceilings at the departure end and an unfamiliar (new to us) airline departure procedure lead to our deviation. However; it appears that intercepting the XXX radial set us up very close to P56 with little room for error. In the future; I will do the following to avoid this mistake.-prior to takeoff; make sure we clarify with each other whether we are visually following the river; or turning to intercept the radial without concern for the river.-assure both pilots are in arc mode with the pilot flying on XXX course; and the heading bug on an appropriate heading to intercept.-if VNAV is inoperative; prior to takeoff (while taxiing); I will verbally review step-by-step the things that we needto accomplish to simultaneously clean up while intercepting the radial. I believe the airline should delete the use of the XXX radial and reinstate the airline's old procedures using the 328 radial. The current use of the XXX radial leaves little room for error; and it does not agree with the commercial chart procedure; which still just talks about intercepting the 328 radial (with no mention of the XXX radial). If the airline insists on using the XXX radial; I think the airline should rewrite the airline-specific pages to include specific weather criteria. I suggest; when ceilings are below 3;000 ft; follow the IMC procedure. I think we should rewrite the 'IMC procedure' to eliminate the separate 'all engine' category. The IMC procedure page should read; 'all engine/engine out'. I suggest that when the weather is reported below 3;000 ft ceilings; the pilots should not plan on following the river visually at all. Instead; pilots should plan on immediately turning to intercept the XXX radial. Also; we should define the airline's 'IMC procedure' by a specific weather criteria; I suggest 'when weather is below 3;000 ft ceilings and/or below three miles visibility'. On our flight; because the weather at our departure was reported as VFR; we followed the 'VMC procedure'. But when we unexpectedly entered the clouds at 700 ft; we got behind in our attempt to track the XXX radial; which led to our deviation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An MD90 flight crew reported a possible P56 incursion during departure from Runway 01 at DCA. New procedures and a lower than expected ceiling led to the deviation.
Narrative: We were dispatched with an MEL item that rendered the VNAV inoperative. Heavy rains showers at departure time were moving through the DCA area. As we pushed back; a rain shower came over the field; but it stopped raining before our takeoff. At takeoff time; the weather was reported as 1;500 FT OVC with surface winds out of the east. No thunderstorms existed within three miles of the field; but a line of weather was west to northwest of DCA. At the gate prior to push back; we planned a departure on DCA Runway 01. We discussed the airline's specific departure procedure for both VMC and IMC. During that briefing (approximately 30 minutes before push back); the weather was good enough to follow the airline's specific VMC procedure and follow the river visually; and if VMC is lost; to follow the DCA XXX radial to 2.7 DME; then turn to intercept the DCA 328 radial. However; we did reiterate; in the pre-departure briefing that if we went IMC; we would pick up the appropriate radials and continue with the procedure based on the radials. In preparation for departure; we tuned the DCA VOR. The First Officer was pilot flying; so we put the XXX radial on the First Officer side; and we put the 328 radial on the Captain (pilot not flying) side. We set the heading indicator to 330. I selected ARC mode; but failed to notice that the pilot flying was still in map mode; and therefore unable to see the radials on his NAV display. There were many threats to this departure which we briefed. The runway is short and was reported wet. P56 needed to be avoided. Neither of us had flown the airline's new specific departure procedure utilizing the XXX radial to 2.7 DME. The aircraft was heavy. The VNAV was inoperative; requiring us to utilize an alternate climb out process on the Digital Flight Guidance Control panel which we don't often use. Heavy rain showers were in the departure area; requiring us to use the weather radar on departure. Neither of us has used this weather radar before (due to low time in this model MD 90). Although I thought we were thoroughly briefed for the departure; the pilot flying failed to select ARC mode when we were planning to use raw data to accomplish departure procedure. Therefore; he could not monitor the necessary radials. I failed to notice that mistake. I also incorrectly assumed; based on our pre-departure briefing that the First Officer was planning on intercepting the XXX radial RATHER than attempting to visually track the river. Neither of us comprehended the distraction that would be caused by simultaneously entering the unexpected cloud layer AND having to accomplish the 'alternate' clean up procedure on the Digital Flight Guidance Control Panel due to VNAV being inoperative. Although the airline's departure procedures discuss 'VMC procedure' and 'IMC procedure'; they do not talk about specific weather to define 'VMC' and 'IMC'. Since the weather was reported as 1;500 FT OVC; the pilot flying initiated the 'VMC' procedure and was planning to track the river visually; at least initially. I; on the other hand; knew that we would enter the clouds quickly on climb out; so I was expecting to turn to intercept the XXX radial without much concern for visually following the river. The combination of VNAV INOP; unexpected low ceilings at the departure end and an unfamiliar (new to us) airline departure procedure lead to our deviation. HOWEVER; it appears that intercepting the XXX radial set us up very close to P56 with little room for error. In the future; I will do the following to avoid this mistake.-Prior to takeoff; make sure we clarify with each other whether we are visually following the river; or turning to intercept the radial without concern for the river.-Assure both pilots are in ARC mode with the pilot flying on XXX course; and the heading bug on an appropriate heading to intercept.-If VNAV is inoperative; prior to takeoff (while taxiing); I will verbally review step-by-step the things that we needto accomplish to simultaneously clean up while intercepting the radial. I believe the airline should delete the use of the XXX radial and reinstate the airline's old procedures using the 328 radial. The current use of the XXX radial leaves little room for error; and it does not agree with the Commercial Chart Procedure; which still just talks about intercepting the 328 radial (with no mention of the XXX radial). If the airline insists on using the XXX radial; I think the airline should rewrite the airline-specific pages to include specific weather criteria. I suggest; when ceilings are below 3;000 FT; follow the IMC procedure. I think we should rewrite the 'IMC procedure' to eliminate the separate 'All Engine' category. The IMC procedure page should read; 'All Engine/Engine Out'. I suggest that when the weather is reported below 3;000 FT ceilings; the pilots should not plan on following the river visually at all. Instead; pilots should plan on immediately turning to intercept the XXX radial. Also; we should define the airline's 'IMC procedure' by a specific weather criteria; I suggest 'when weather is below 3;000 FT ceilings and/or below three miles visibility'. On our flight; because the weather at our departure was reported as VFR; we followed the 'VMC procedure'. But when we unexpectedly entered the clouds at 700 FT; we got behind in our attempt to track the XXX radial; which led to our deviation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.