Narrative:

The PA44 was on a straight-in to runway 01; on about a 1 1/2 mile final. The helicopter was doing left traffic pattern work to the intersecting runway; runway 03; but he was only using half the runway and was holding short of runway 01. At the moment of the erroneous conflict alert; the helicopter was on a down wind for runway 03 and abeam the numbers. This means that he was at least 2 miles laterally from the PA44; and this distance was increasing. The computer did not know the helicopter would soon turn base; so there's no reason for the computer to even think that the aircraft were a factor for each other at all. Good grief; 2 miles and increasing; 300 ft and increasing; and then the ca/ca goes off? And on another day targets will merge with a scant 100 ft and an 'I got him in sight' and the alarm will never go off. The ca/ca in the terminal environment is completely useless. I cannot remember if mci called on this one or not. Sometimes they call; sometimes they don't. At this point it doesn't matter whether they do or not because we know they're required to; so we're anticipating the call every time the MSAW or ca/ca sounds; and anticipating having to answer it so they'll shut up. Therefore; the mental distraction occurs by default either way. It's just worse when they call; because then they also step over live traffic. Recommendation; 1) the centers have an awesome ca/ca system. Why can't we have a program like that one? It works great; with only a couple very rare situations that generate anomalies. 2) the mci SOP paragraph 2-1-6; sentence 2; which requires mci controllers to call mkc on the shout line every single time one of these erroneous alarms occurs; is an unsafe and uselessly distracting requirement; and needs to be stricken immediately. Think of it; it's the best of both worlds: controllers aren't distracted by shout line clutter on mkc's end; and controllers aren't required to make what they know are stupid shout line calls on mci's end; and the management folks get to 'err on the side of safety' over and over again. What could be better? Seriously; you guys should have them try this out for 30 days. We'll see just how committed they are to 'safety.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MKC Controller voiced concern regarding the Conflict Alert (CA/CA) and it's viability; noting distractions caused by constant unnecessary alerts.

Narrative: The PA44 was on a straight-in to Runway 01; on about a 1 1/2 mile final. The helicopter was doing left traffic pattern work to the intersecting runway; Runway 03; but he was only using half the runway and was holding short of Runway 01. At the moment of the erroneous Conflict Alert; the helicopter was on a down wind for Runway 03 and abeam the numbers. This means that he was at least 2 miles laterally from the PA44; and this distance was increasing. The computer did not know the helicopter would soon turn base; so there's no reason for the computer to even think that the aircraft were a factor for each other at all. Good grief; 2 miles and increasing; 300 FT and increasing; and then the CA/CA goes off? And on another day targets will merge with a scant 100 FT and an 'I got him in sight' and the alarm will never go off. The CA/CA in the terminal environment is completely useless. I cannot remember if MCI called on this one or not. Sometimes they call; sometimes they don't. At this point it doesn't matter whether they do or not because we know they're required to; so we're anticipating the call every time the MSAW or CA/CA sounds; and anticipating having to answer it so they'll shut up. Therefore; the mental distraction occurs by default either way. It's just worse when they call; because then they also step over live traffic. Recommendation; 1) The Centers have an awesome CA/CA system. Why can't we have a program like that one? It works great; with only a couple very rare situations that generate anomalies. 2) The MCI SOP paragraph 2-1-6; sentence 2; which requires MCI controllers to call MKC on the shout line every single time one of these erroneous alarms occurs; is an unsafe and uselessly distracting requirement; and needs to be stricken immediately. Think of it; it's the best of both worlds: controllers aren't distracted by shout line clutter on MKC's end; and controllers aren't required to make what they know are stupid shout line calls on MCI's end; and the management folks get to 'err on the side of safety' over and over again. What could be better? Seriously; you guys should have them try this out for 30 days. We'll see just how committed they are to 'safety.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.