Narrative:

On initial climb first officer noted unusually high #1 engine oil temperature. We monitored over several minutes and it looked like it was going to climb past red line. During this time we reviewed the emergency checklist. The engine temperature appeared to stabilize at 105. I was not at all confident how long it would be stabilized or if it would continue past 107. I had in my head that we should return to the departure airport; but we seemed to have some time and I wanted to avoid a hasty decision (thinking about the well publicized incorrect engine shutdown by another pilot several years ago-I elected to get buy-in from the company). I transferred aircraft control to the first officer along with ATC which he was already doing. I contacted maintenance control. After two minutes maintenance control indicated that we needed to return to field. I concurred (this is what I wanted to hear); and had the first officer continue with flying and #1 radio while I spoke with dispatch; notified the flight attendants; and briefed the passengers. When these duties were complete; I assumed control from the first officer and we continued the diversion to the departure airport with myself the flying pilot and the first officer the monitoring pilot. The engine was stable at 105C for about 7 minutes and the temperature reduced from 105 but remained a little high on the descent and landing. On taxi in; the temp trended up again to about 99 and stabilized at about 98 degrees. Operations had earlier recommended a ramp transfer of the passengers which I vetoed. It was clearly a bad idea-or a least a not thought out idea. We did normal deplaning and normal duties associated with leaving this aircraft; documenting the issue for maintenance; and getting a second aircraft ready for passengers. I am just really pleased with the professionalism of everyone involved with this incident from the first officer to the flight attendants to maintenance control to dispatch to the ramp workers to ZZZ operations and including the duty officer. After the event; I have not followed up with maintenance and do not know which component malfunctioned. It could be anything from an indication error to being very lucky not to have had an engine failure and probably something in between. I checked human factors boxes to indicate human factor issues affecting me (issues to overcome) after the event began; but which in no way caused the event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC8-400's #1 engine oil temperature indicated up to 105 degrees after takeoff so the aircraft was returned to the departure airport as a precaution.

Narrative: On initial climb First Officer noted unusually high #1 engine oil temperature. We monitored over several minutes and it looked like it was going to climb past red line. During this time we reviewed the emergency checklist. The engine temperature appeared to stabilize at 105. I was not at all confident how long it would be stabilized or if it would continue past 107. I had in my head that we should return to the departure airport; but we seemed to have some time and I wanted to avoid a hasty decision (thinking about the well publicized incorrect engine shutdown by another pilot several years ago-I elected to get buy-in from the company). I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer along with ATC which he was already doing. I contacted maintenance control. After two minutes maintenance control indicated that we needed to return to field. I concurred (this is what I wanted to hear); and had the First Officer continue with flying and #1 radio while I spoke with dispatch; notified the flight attendants; and briefed the passengers. When these duties were complete; I assumed control from the First Officer and we continued the diversion to the departure airport with myself the flying pilot and the First Officer the monitoring pilot. The engine was stable at 105C for about 7 minutes and the temperature reduced from 105 but remained a little high on the descent and landing. On taxi in; the temp trended up again to about 99 and stabilized at about 98 degrees. OPS had earlier recommended a ramp transfer of the passengers which I vetoed. It was clearly a bad idea-or a least a not thought out idea. We did normal deplaning and normal duties associated with leaving this aircraft; documenting the issue for maintenance; and getting a second aircraft ready for passengers. I am just really pleased with the professionalism of everyone involved with this incident from the First Officer to the Flight Attendants to Maintenance Control to Dispatch to the ramp workers to ZZZ OPS and including the duty officer. After the event; I have not followed up with maintenance and do not know which component malfunctioned. It could be anything from an indication error to being very lucky not to have had an engine failure and probably something in between. I checked human factors boxes to indicate human factor issues affecting me (issues to overcome) after the event began; but which in no way caused the event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.