Narrative:

Three hours prior to departure I called the dispatcher for a brief concerning typhoon status in hkg. I receive 'pushback' on my required fuel; but he says it won't pass muster with his boss. I tell him that we're the bosses; we have the tickets to lose. To achieve schedule integrity; we'll either require 37;000 lbs at arrival/no cargo; or full passenger and cargo with an enroute tech stop; within contracted duty time. Several hours later I receive in ops a flight plan with arrival fuel 30;000 lbs. I tell him no dice; but I'll horse trade and take 34;000 lbs with a likely stop in pek. Pressure from dispatch and a phone call from the acp; on a weekend morning requesting more data re my decision. Pilot pushing? This in the middle of our attempt at getting the flight out somewhat on schedule. I climbed out of my seat to waste valuable time rebuilding a fuel scenario for the acp. Departed with 35;000 lbs in accordance with our flight plan; and entered the polar region down 2;000 lbs. Informed new dispatcher of fuel status and new .85m polar crossing dictated by russian airspace. Fuel status stabilized; arrived at siera intx down 2000 lbs. Normal vectoring in a typhoon in hkg on the siera placed us low on fuel for this flight plan. Shut down with 26;000 lbs; 9000 lbs under plan; 20% below our flight plan required of 35;000lbs. No options for a go around of FM 7000 lbs; alternate 9000lbs; and landing with enough fuel for contingency at alternate (can). Blatant disregard for regs requiring known ATC delays in 45k arrival winds and known windshear; in addition to fraudulent flight plan allowing only 1800 lbs. Over 30 miles from siera intx to 7R OM. The flight planning computer needs more reliable descent flight plan skills to make these fuel critical missions less dangerous. Twenty five percent bracketing ability is unacceptable and I would recommend 10;000 lbs additional fuel added to all hkg flights until dispatch management can fine tune within more respectable parameters.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 Captain reports requesting additional fuel for a long range flight with high forecast winds at destination and meets resistance from the Dispatcher. Flight eventually blocks out with 4000 pounds of additional fuel and blocks in with 2600 pounds.

Narrative: Three hours prior to departure I called the Dispatcher for a brief concerning typhoon status in HKG. I receive 'pushback' on my required fuel; but he says it won't pass muster with his boss. I tell him that we're the bosses; we have the tickets to lose. To achieve schedule integrity; we'll either require 37;000 lbs at arrival/no cargo; or full PAX and cargo with an enroute tech stop; within contracted duty time. Several hours later I receive in ops a Flight Plan with arrival fuel 30;000 lbs. I tell him no dice; but I'll horse trade and take 34;000 lbs with a likely stop in PEK. Pressure from Dispatch and a phone call from the ACP; on a weekend morning requesting more data re my decision. Pilot pushing? This in the middle of our attempt at getting the flight out somewhat on schedule. I climbed out of my seat to waste valuable time rebuilding a fuel scenario for the ACP. Departed with 35;000 lbs IAW our flight plan; and entered the polar region down 2;000 lbs. Informed new Dispatcher of fuel status and new .85m polar crossing dictated by Russian airspace. Fuel status stabilized; arrived at SIERA intx down 2000 lbs. Normal vectoring in a typhoon in HKG on the SIERA placed us low on fuel for this flight plan. Shut down with 26;000 lbs; 9000 lbs under plan; 20% below our flight plan required of 35;000lbs. No options for a go around of FM 7000 lbs; alternate 9000lbs; and landing with enough fuel for contingency at alternate (CAN). Blatant disregard for regs requiring KNOWN ATC delays in 45k arrival winds and known windshear; in addition to fraudulent flight plan allowing only 1800 lbs. over 30 miles from SIERA INTX to 7R OM. The flight planning computer needs more reliable descent flight plan skills to make these fuel critical missions less dangerous. Twenty five percent bracketing ability is unacceptable and I would recommend 10;000 lbs additional fuel added to all HKG flights until dispatch management can fine tune within more respectable parameters.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.