37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 974894 |
Time | |
Date | 201110 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215 Flight Crew Total 14100 Flight Crew Type 4000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
I just finished my first sequence of flights using our new manuals/procedures. Was I safe? Yes; but then again; I would be almost as safe being paired with a B777 crew from any major international carrier. With over 4000 hours in the B777 it would be hard not to be safe. I was given a complete new flight manual; flight operations manual; and worldwide operations manual. Recently we transitioned to a completely new flightplan format. Were there significant changes? Yes. Do I know what all of them are or completed the process of going from old procedures to new ones? No. I am sure that for a period of time I will have my own hybrid mix of procedures until the new ones have all been learned. [On our trip the flight crew was] like someone given a manual on how to fly; and had to have it out to reference what to do (like a cartoon of 'teach yourself to fly'). This is a distraction that I am afraid will be a root cause of an incident. For years we have been instructed on 'red flags'. Well; the path our company is currently going down is filled with 'red flags'. Too many changes all at once. [We've experienced] inadequate training or chances for consolidation of training and a lack of standardization as crews attempt to acquire the knowledge/information and apply it. Our only salvation is that our pilot group is highly experienced overall and on their individual pieces of equipment. We are so focused on compliance with new procedures that basic ones are perhaps neglected. For instance; we were not sure we had ever accomplished the parking checklist but we were sure that everything that needed to be done had been. We discussed at length under what circumstances we were to perform the 'termination' checklist but were not 100% sure when we were supposed to. In the end; we did what we knew was safe. Even if we did not know what the current procedures were or whether we were in compliance with them. That is not the way to operate a part 121 international air carrier at the 'highest level of safety'.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B777 First Officer described his first experience with new SOPs and Manuals developed for use by flight crews of a newly merged airline for which their training was exclusively home computer based and for which there was no 'hands on' simulator training. His conclusion was they were safe because they were all highly experienced and 'knew' that everything got done even though that surety was based on flight crew feelings rather than timely execution of the new procedures. Notwithstanding his confidence they were safe; he also stated he was afraid the distraction of flight crews' on the job acquaintance with them will be the root cause of an incident.
Narrative: I just finished my first sequence of flights using our new manuals/procedures. Was I safe? Yes; but then again; I would be almost as safe being paired with a B777 crew from any major international carrier. With over 4000 hours in the B777 it would be hard not to be safe. I was given a complete new Flight Manual; Flight Operations Manual; and Worldwide Operations Manual. Recently we transitioned to a completely new flightplan format. Were there significant changes? Yes. Do I know what all of them are or completed the process of going from old procedures to new ones? No. I am sure that for a period of time I will have my own hybrid mix of procedures until the new ones have all been learned. [On our trip the Flight Crew was] like someone given a manual on how to fly; and had to have it out to reference what to do (like a cartoon of 'teach yourself to fly'). This is a distraction that I am afraid will be a root cause of an incident. For years we have been instructed on 'Red Flags'. Well; the path our company is currently going down is filled with 'Red Flags'. Too many changes all at once. [We've experienced] inadequate training or chances for consolidation of training and a lack of standardization as crews attempt to acquire the knowledge/information and apply it. Our only salvation is that our pilot group is highly experienced overall and on their individual pieces of equipment. We are so focused on compliance with new procedures that basic ones are perhaps neglected. For instance; we were not sure we had ever accomplished the parking checklist but we were sure that everything that needed to be done had been. We discussed at length under what circumstances we were to perform the 'Termination' checklist but were not 100% sure when we were supposed to. In the end; we did what we knew was safe. Even if we did not know what the current procedures were or whether we were in compliance with them. That is not the way to operate a Part 121 International Air Carrier at the 'highest level of safety'.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.