Narrative:

I was the line check airman (lca) flying from the first officer seat for a new captain operating experience (oe). It was our first leg together; although the new captain had flown 4 other legs the day prior with another lca. The aircraft was put on a maintenance deferral for an unexplained proximity switch electronic unit (pseu) light on the inbound flight. During the departure brief; I mentioned to the captain that the pseu light can be related to the over-wing exit door locks; and that we might see the light again on this flight. Ground operations were uneventful up to the takeoff event. On takeoff roll immediately after I made the '80 KTS; throttle hold; power normal;' call we got a master caution light with a 'doors' light on the annunciator panel. I took control of the aircraft calling; 'abort; my aircraft;' and initiated the abort. We stopped quickly and were able to exit left on taxiway delta. We held between the runways on a taxiway to have the fire trucks look us over before taxiing to the gate. We did so because the tower called and said they saw some smoke coming from one of our tires during the abort. While waiting we accomplished the aborted takeoff considerations in the QRH and looked up our brake energy chart in the operations manual. The fire chief saw no damage nor did we have hot brakes. We then taxied to the gate uneventfully. The aircraft required a single tire change due to one tire locking up for a short time on the reject and having a spot worn through 2 layers of cord. Throughout the entire event I kept the passengers informed including making the 'discontinued takeoff' PA recommended in the fom. I believe it was between 90-100 KTS when I initiated the rejected takeoff (although I know that most of these events show them at a much higher speed than we think they occur!). I know this is higher than the 80 KTS called for in our company procedures; but in the heat of the moment I made this call. Factors that may have led me to this decision were the following: 1) unfamiliarity with the upgrading captain on one of his first takeoffs in the aircraft; with me being in the slightly unfamiliar first officer seat; 2) due to the light weight of the aircraft the fact that we were less than 2;000 ft down the 11;890 ft runway; 3) expecting a possible door problem with the unexplained pseu light; and 4) probably being too spring loaded to take the jet on the captain's first takeoff and not 'chair flying' these events enough before the takeoff roll started.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 Line Check Airman in the right seat rejected a takeoff while instructing a new Captain after the DOORS annunciator light illuminated at about 90 KTS.

Narrative: I was the Line Check Airman (LCA) flying from the First Officer seat for a new Captain operating experience (OE). It was our first leg together; although the new Captain had flown 4 other legs the day prior with another LCA. The aircraft was put on a maintenance deferral for an unexplained Proximity Switch Electronic Unit (PSEU) light on the inbound flight. During the departure brief; I mentioned to the Captain that the PSEU light can be related to the over-wing exit door locks; and that we might see the light again on this flight. Ground operations were uneventful up to the takeoff event. On takeoff roll immediately after I made the '80 KTS; throttle hold; power normal;' call we got a master caution light with a 'doors' light on the annunciator panel. I took control of the aircraft calling; 'Abort; my aircraft;' and initiated the abort. We stopped quickly and were able to exit left on Taxiway Delta. We held between the runways on a taxiway to have the fire trucks look us over before taxiing to the gate. We did so because the Tower called and said they saw some smoke coming from one of our tires during the abort. While waiting we accomplished the aborted takeoff considerations in the QRH and looked up our brake energy chart in the operations manual. The Fire Chief saw no damage nor did we have hot brakes. We then taxied to the gate uneventfully. The aircraft required a single tire change due to one tire locking up for a short time on the reject and having a spot worn through 2 layers of cord. Throughout the entire event I kept the passengers informed including making the 'discontinued takeoff' PA recommended in the FOM. I believe it was between 90-100 KTS when I initiated the RTO (although I know that most of these events show them at a much higher speed than we think they occur!). I know this is higher than the 80 KTS called for in our company procedures; but in the heat of the moment I made this call. Factors that may have led me to this decision were the following: 1) unfamiliarity with the upgrading Captain on one of his first takeoffs in the aircraft; with me being in the slightly unfamiliar First Officer seat; 2) due to the light weight of the aircraft the fact that we were less than 2;000 FT down the 11;890 FT runway; 3) expecting a possible door problem with the unexplained PSEU light; and 4) probably being too spring loaded to take the jet on the Captain's first takeoff and not 'chair flying' these events enough before the takeoff roll started.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.