Narrative:

Flight pushed six minutes late from gate. Flight was climbing to FL320. One of the flight attendants called to the flight deck and notified us of two issues. Issue number one cabin press annunciation on door 2R was flashing. This indicates that 2R door handle is not in the full down and locked position. Issue number two; door 2R would not remain armed. Door 2R would only show remained armed as long as the slide arming handle was held in armed position. As pilots; both of us were concerned that the door handle was no longer in the full closed position. It was our understanding that if the cabin door is not closed then the cabin door will not arm. We questioned the aircraft integrity if we had a problem where the door could come open in flight. The flight attendant confirmed that the handle was down; but we had two separate indications that the door 2R security is now in question. If the door opened at any speed it would be devastating. Having the flight attendant adjust/move handles on the door would not be a safe course of action in case of malfunction with two separate indications showing door 2R not closed and secure. Dispatch contacted us regarding a joint dispatch/maintenance decision to return and land. They wanted us to return to the departure airport. In the following five minutes we received three ACARS messages to return. About ten minutes later we received an ECAM for brake system 1 fault. We notified dispatch and maintenance control. After that maintenance control still wanted us to land over weight. At this time with a brake system fault and a door security issue known; dispatch/maintenance still wanted us to land overweight. My concern as captain was the 'meta message' or what wasn't being said. Dispatch sent ACARS messages to us indicating that he was checking the QRH and penalties. A short time later we received the go ahead to land overweight after confirming with maintenance control. Again; my concern was that maintenance must be concerned about the aircraft if they still wanted us to land overweight with a brake fault. As pilots we entered a very high workload period. We received a clearance to return from ATC. Now we had a little more than 45 minutes to enter a new destination; runway; RNAV arrival; complete the brk system 1 fault QRH; verify all charts in QRH and pilot handbook; communicating with operations about a gate; notifying passengers about a return to the departure airport and keeping them updated; and keeping flight attendants and passengers informed about precautionary landing. On downwind we finally completed all QRH; checklist and ph section (as a precaution) about loss of all brakes; as noted in the QRH procedure. We then declared an emergency with ATC. We then re-verified that all charts and QRH checklist had been completed. Before touchdown we had door 2R issue and brakes system 1 fault. We landed with a touchdown of 100 FPM and monitoring brake temp did not exceed 800C. A max brake temperature of 545C was noted. After landing I was made aware that this aircraft had a history of door issues previously. This served to validate my concern at the time; that maintenance and dispatch had good reason to request that we get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible. I believe this event illustrates the relationship between dispatch; maintenance and pilots at this air carrier. As a pilot I try to get all of the information I can regarding a problem and then use my experience to find the safest solution to that problem. I don't have all of the answers and I rely on the expertise provided by the crews; dispatch; maintenance; operations; ATC; and my crew in the cabin. I relied heavily on the perception that maintenance and dispatch both wanted the aircraft back on the ground. Although the aircraft remained pressurized we felt that it was not a given that it would continue to remain pressurized. The decision (right or wrong) in our minds; after deciphering all of the other information presented; was the intent was to get theaircraft on the ground as soon as possible. There has been speculation that we should have burned down to landing weight before we landed. The first officer and I discussed this at length and attempted to sway dispatch/maintenance toward that end; to validate our concerns; at least twice. Instead our course of action was validated by the continued insistence that we continue and land overweight. Our reliance; especially on maintenance; to give us the information we need can be tainted by goals or objectives that don't match ours; from a pilot's perspective. For those that have the luxury of looking at these events after the fact and with the benefit of knowing the outcome; (myself included) it can appear pretty clear cut. This discussion would be completely different had the door come open while we were burning down to landing weight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A320 had a Main Cabin Door CABIN PRESS annunciation. The door would not remain armed. Returning to the departure station the ECAM alerted BRK SYS 1 FAULT. An emergency was declared and an over weight landing was made.

Narrative: Flight pushed six minutes late from gate. Flight was climbing to FL320. One of the Flight Attendants called to the flight deck and notified us of two issues. Issue number one CABIN PRESS annunciation on Door 2R was flashing. This indicates that 2R door handle is not in the full down and locked position. Issue number two; Door 2R would not remain armed. Door 2R would only show remained armed as long as the slide arming handle was held in armed position. As pilots; both of us were concerned that the door handle was no longer in the full closed position. It was our understanding that if the cabin door is not closed then the cabin door will not arm. We questioned the aircraft integrity if we had a problem where the door could come open in flight. The Flight Attendant confirmed that the handle was down; but we had two separate indications that the Door 2R security is now in question. If the door opened at any speed it would be devastating. Having the Flight Attendant adjust/move handles on the door would not be a safe course of action in case of malfunction with two separate indications showing Door 2R not closed and secure. Dispatch contacted us regarding a joint Dispatch/Maintenance decision to return and land. They wanted us to return to the departure airport. In the following five minutes we received three ACARS messages to return. About ten minutes later we received an ECAM for Brake SYS 1 Fault. We notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control. After that Maintenance Control still wanted us to land over weight. At this time with a Brake SYS fault and a Door security issue known; Dispatch/Maintenance still wanted us to land overweight. My concern as Captain was the 'meta message' or what wasn't being said. Dispatch sent ACARS messages to us indicating that he was checking the QRH and penalties. A short time later we received the go ahead to land overweight after confirming with Maintenance Control. Again; my concern was that Maintenance must be concerned about the aircraft if they still wanted us to land overweight with a Brake fault. As pilots we entered a very high workload period. We received a clearance to return from ATC. Now we had a little more than 45 minutes to enter a new destination; runway; RNAV arrival; complete the BRK SYS 1 FAULT QRH; verify all charts in QRH and Pilot handbook; communicating with Operations about a gate; notifying passengers about a return to the departure airport and keeping them updated; and keeping flight attendants and passengers informed about precautionary landing. On downwind we finally completed all QRH; Checklist and PH section (as a precaution) about Loss of All Brakes; as noted in the QRH procedure. We then declared an emergency with ATC. We then re-verified that all charts and QRH Checklist had been completed. Before touchdown we had Door 2R issue and Brakes SYS 1 fault. We landed with a touchdown of 100 FPM and monitoring brake temp did not exceed 800C. A max brake temperature of 545C was noted. After landing I was made aware that this aircraft had a history of door issues previously. This served to validate my concern at the time; that Maintenance and Dispatch had good reason to request that we get the aircraft on the ground ASAP. I believe this event illustrates the relationship between Dispatch; Maintenance and pilots at this Air Carrier. As a pilot I try to get all of the information I can regarding a problem and then use my experience to find the safest solution to that problem. I don't have all of the answers and I rely on the expertise provided by the Crews; Dispatch; Maintenance; Operations; ATC; and my crew in the cabin. I relied heavily on the perception that Maintenance and Dispatch both wanted the aircraft back on the ground. Although the aircraft remained pressurized we felt that it was not a given that it would continue to remain pressurized. The decision (right or wrong) in our minds; after deciphering all of the other information presented; was the intent was to get theaircraft on the ground ASAP. There has been speculation that we should have burned down to landing weight before we landed. The First Officer and I discussed this at length and attempted to sway Dispatch/Maintenance toward that end; to validate our concerns; at least twice. Instead our course of action was validated by the continued insistence that we continue and land overweight. Our reliance; especially on Maintenance; to give us the information we need can be tainted by goals or objectives that don't match ours; from a pilot's perspective. For those that have the luxury of looking at these events after the fact and with the benefit of knowing the outcome; (myself included) it can appear pretty clear cut. This discussion would be completely different had the door come open while we were burning down to landing weight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.