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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 97586 |
Time | |
Date | 198811 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hou airport : sat |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : mli |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 230 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 2800 |
ASRS Report | 97586 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 10000 |
ASRS Report | 97594 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : unspecified |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Airport |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
Prior to departure from hou-sat on a normal scheduled flight it was noted that a maintenance entry re: #2 engine thrust reverser had been inoperative. However, a discrepancy between the actual writeup and placards on the aircraft. While attempting to verify the discrepancy shortly before departure from the gate (approximately 15 mins) an FAA safety inspector boarded the aircraft. I was asked to produce my certificates and examination of flight manuals for currency. During this period the second officer neglected to contact maintenance re: the above discrepancy. We departed hou with the safety inspector on board and proceeded to sat. During the flight, #2 reverser light flickered on, whereby the FAA inspector requested to view our maintenance log. The writeup indicated the reverser was ok (not what the release said, but that the light was inoperative only). However a log book entry had been made that the placard should have been removed. Upon landing at sat, I selected thrust reverse on all 3 engine's. The inspector indicated that procedure might not have been conducive to good practices because there was the possibility that thrust was being produced in #2 engine west/O the reverse clam shell/cascade being in the proper position. I feel maintenance personnel created the problem (not doing the proper entries in the log book) leaving some doubt as to exactly what our situation was! I also feel that the FAA inspector was in our best interest, however, the FAA inspectors should present themselves in a more timely and professional manner (and possibly on flts that have more than 30 mins before departure!!). The FAA inspector showed up late and interrupted our required checks while asking questions of the crew!!! It takes all of the 30 mins prior to determine to conduct our required checks while asking questions of the crew!!! All necessary operational requirements and even the most unintentional interruption can cause something to be overlooked!! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: first officer confirmed that the thrust reverser was working and a log book entry had been made but it was not signed and dated as required. The flight crew tried to get the aci to wait until they had completed their preflight checks before producing the requested certificates, but he demanded to see them right away. Very unprofessional attitude by aci. First officer believes aci will take action against airline maintenance or airline management. Supplemental information from acn 97594: release showed '#2 thrust reverser inoperative.' talked to a mechanic, he said the thrust is 'locked forward.' my error was not to brief the landing (first officer making landing) in the use of #2 thrust reverser or not to use the #2 thrust reverser on landing. Mechanic log book write up could have been more definite and used proper terms. 'Locked forward' vs 'stowed in the forward position' or 'operations normal-light inoperative.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT CREW CRITICIZED BY ACI FOR USING 3 ENGINE REVERSE WHEN #2 ENGINE HAD A PLACARD INDICATING REVERSE INOPERATIVE. ACI ALSO ENTERED COCKPIT LATE AND HAD DEMANDS TO SEE FLT CREW CERTIFICATES, THUS INTERRUPTING CHECKLIST AND COCKPIT ROUTINE.
Narrative: PRIOR TO DEP FROM HOU-SAT ON A NORMAL SCHEDULED FLT IT WAS NOTED THAT A MAINT ENTRY RE: #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER HAD BEEN INOP. HOWEVER, A DISCREPANCY BTWN THE ACTUAL WRITEUP AND PLACARDS ON THE ACFT. WHILE ATTEMPTING TO VERIFY THE DISCREPANCY SHORTLY BEFORE DEP FROM THE GATE (APPROX 15 MINS) AN FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR BOARDED THE ACFT. I WAS ASKED TO PRODUCE MY CERTIFICATES AND EXAMINATION OF FLT MANUALS FOR CURRENCY. DURING THIS PERIOD THE S/O NEGLECTED TO CONTACT MAINT RE: THE ABOVE DISCREPANCY. WE DEPARTED HOU WITH THE SAFETY INSPECTOR ON BOARD AND PROCEEDED TO SAT. DURING THE FLT, #2 REVERSER LIGHT FLICKERED ON, WHEREBY THE FAA INSPECTOR REQUESTED TO VIEW OUR MAINT LOG. THE WRITEUP INDICATED THE REVERSER WAS OK (NOT WHAT THE RELEASE SAID, BUT THAT THE LIGHT WAS INOP ONLY). HOWEVER A LOG BOOK ENTRY HAD BEEN MADE THAT THE PLACARD SHOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED. UPON LNDG AT SAT, I SELECTED THRUST REVERSE ON ALL 3 ENG'S. THE INSPECTOR INDICATED THAT PROC MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN CONDUCIVE TO GOOD PRACTICES BECAUSE THERE WAS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THRUST WAS BEING PRODUCED IN #2 ENG W/O THE REVERSE CLAM SHELL/CASCADE BEING IN THE PROPER POS. I FEEL MAINT PERSONNEL CREATED THE PROB (NOT DOING THE PROPER ENTRIES IN THE LOG BOOK) LEAVING SOME DOUBT AS TO EXACTLY WHAT OUR SITUATION WAS! I ALSO FEEL THAT THE FAA INSPECTOR WAS IN OUR BEST INTEREST, HOWEVER, THE FAA INSPECTORS SHOULD PRESENT THEMSELVES IN A MORE TIMELY AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER (AND POSSIBLY ON FLTS THAT HAVE MORE THAN 30 MINS BEFORE DEP!!). THE FAA INSPECTOR SHOWED UP LATE AND INTERRUPTED OUR REQUIRED CHKS WHILE ASKING QUESTIONS OF THE CREW!!! IT TAKES ALL OF THE 30 MINS PRIOR TO DETERMINE TO CONDUCT OUR REQUIRED CHKS WHILE ASKING QUESTIONS OF THE CREW!!! ALL NECESSARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND EVEN THE MOST UNINTENTIONAL INTERRUPTION CAN CAUSE SOMETHING TO BE OVERLOOKED!! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: F/O CONFIRMED THAT THE THRUST REVERSER WAS WORKING AND A LOG BOOK ENTRY HAD BEEN MADE BUT IT WAS NOT SIGNED AND DATED AS REQUIRED. THE FLT CREW TRIED TO GET THE ACI TO WAIT UNTIL THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR PREFLT CHKS BEFORE PRODUCING THE REQUESTED CERTIFICATES, BUT HE DEMANDED TO SEE THEM RIGHT AWAY. VERY UNPROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE BY ACI. F/O BELIEVES ACI WILL TAKE ACTION AGAINST AIRLINE MAINT OR AIRLINE MGMNT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 97594: RELEASE SHOWED '#2 THRUST REVERSER INOP.' TALKED TO A MECH, HE SAID THE THRUST IS 'LOCKED FORWARD.' MY ERROR WAS NOT TO BRIEF THE LNDG (F/O MAKING LNDG) IN THE USE OF #2 THRUST REVERSER OR NOT TO USE THE #2 THRUST REVERSER ON LNDG. MECH LOG BOOK WRITE UP COULD HAVE BEEN MORE DEFINITE AND USED PROPER TERMS. 'LOCKED FORWARD' VS 'STOWED IN THE FORWARD POS' OR 'OPS NORMAL-LIGHT INOP.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.