Narrative:

During our pre departure briefing; the captain and I discussed our new procedures and their implementation. We agreed we were doing our best to adhere to the new procedures; although some parts still remained unclear. We agreed to discuss them enroute to be sure we were both on the same page. Once we reached cruise altitude; we began to discuss some of the changes which weren't obvious at first glance. We discussed that trying to keep track of all these changes while flying was a distraction; and could lead to bigger problems. The captain then said; 'well; if I don't remember the new stuff; I'll just do things the old way. That worked just fine.' I told him I was not comfortable with that philosophy. We have the new books with the new procedures in the cockpit. That is what we are supposed to be using. If we don't do that; we are violating fars. I told him I was not willing to put my license on the line; and that if he intentionally resorted to 'the old way' I would have to take myself off the trip when we landed. The captain acknowledged my position and continued to study the books. I asked the captain what his experience had been with other crews regarding the new procedures. He said that generally speaking; people were trying; but most did not know how much they did not know. He said the only reason he knew more than most was because he had a line check with a captain who was well-versed on many of the changes; and was able to point out a lot of things my captain had missed in the cbt training. The weather in jfk was IFR for our arrival. Storms had moved in and out and visibility had been up and down; with low level windshear advisories in effect. While in cruise; we discussed new procedures at length; including windshear recovery procedures; new go-around procedures and new autoland procedures; in addition to new required call outs on the ILS. On the arrival into jfk at about 0015 local; weather was IMC with a ceiling at about 500 AGL. Winds at the airport were reported light; about 120/8; however; low level windshear advisories were in effect. They were landing 4R. We were vectored to a downwind. The captain kept the speed up as we received no further direction. We got a 'slam dunk' right turn to base to intercept the ILS 4R. We were IMC the whole time. On final we had over 30 knots of tailwind. At 500 feet; we still had 30 knots of tailwind. We were not stabilized and our speed was high - so we went around. We later agreed we were both so distracted thinking of the new procedures we might possibly have to use on this approach--ILS callouts; go around; windshear recovery; autoland; etc.--that the bigger picture of where we were in relation to the airport was not in the forefront. IMC conditions did not help. The huge tailwind certainly did not help. The captain was the PF and executed a textbook go-around. He later said it was only because we had discussed it at such great length that he was able to do the go-around by the book. We queried tower on the surface winds again and they assured us the winds were less than 10 knots. They told us two other airplanes landed since our go-around. We tried the approach again. This time; we slowed down and configured early. Turning final at about 1500 feet; we had 47 knots of tailwind. At 500 feet; we had about 34 knots of tailwind. We continued as we were stabilized. The wind did not drop below 10 knots until we were less than 20 feet AGL. The captain did a nice landing with no problems. As we taxied into the gate; I realized I'd forgotten to make the required '50; 40; 30; 20; 10' calls for an IMC approach. I mentioned that to the captain and apologized for the oversight. I had been so focused on the tailwind factor and ensuring we did not exceed the 10K tailwind limit on touchdown; that I completely forgot those callouts. The captain did not realize it at the time either; and remarked he was glad I'd forgotten them as it wouldhave just been one more distraction. In our post-flight debrief; the captain and I discussed the approach. We agreed that there are a lot of seemingly little changes that can cause big distractions when flying an actual IFR approach in weather. It took up all our brain cells to do what we did. An actual emergency in the middle of all this could have tipped the scale over the other way. The training we have received as a pilot group for these changes has not been adequate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 First Officer detailed problems encountered flying a demanding approach while attempting to utilize newly implemented airline mandated procedures and call outs. Problems encountered included windshear; IMC; high tailwinds on approach; and unstabilized approach and an ensuing go-around. The reporter stated concerns over using the new procedures distracted the flight crew from the greater priorities involved in managing other distractions.

Narrative: During our pre departure briefing; the Captain and I discussed our new procedures and their implementation. We agreed we were doing our best to adhere to the new procedures; although some parts still remained unclear. We agreed to discuss them enroute to be sure we were both on the same page. Once we reached cruise altitude; we began to discuss some of the changes which weren't obvious at first glance. We discussed that trying to keep track of all these changes while flying was a distraction; and could lead to bigger problems. The Captain then said; 'Well; if I don't remember the new stuff; I'll just do things the old way. That worked just fine.' I told him I was not comfortable with that philosophy. We have the new books with the new procedures in the cockpit. That is what we are supposed to be using. If we don't do that; we are violating FARs. I told him I was not willing to put my license on the line; and that if he intentionally resorted to 'the old way' I would have to take myself off the trip when we landed. The Captain acknowledged my position and continued to study the books. I asked the Captain what his experience had been with other crews regarding the new procedures. He said that generally speaking; people were trying; but most did not know how much they did not know. He said the only reason he knew more than most was because he had a line check with a Captain who was well-versed on many of the changes; and was able to point out a lot of things my Captain had missed in the CBT training. The weather in JFK was IFR for our arrival. Storms had moved in and out and visibility had been up and down; with low level windshear advisories in effect. While in cruise; we discussed new procedures at length; including windshear recovery procedures; new go-around procedures and new Autoland procedures; in addition to new required call outs on the ILS. On the arrival into JFK at about 0015 local; weather was IMC with a ceiling at about 500 AGL. Winds at the airport were reported light; about 120/8; however; low level windshear advisories were in effect. They were landing 4R. We were vectored to a downwind. The Captain kept the speed up as we received no further direction. We got a 'slam dunk' right turn to base to intercept the ILS 4R. We were IMC the whole time. On final we had over 30 knots of tailwind. At 500 feet; we still had 30 knots of tailwind. We were not stabilized and our speed was high - so we went around. We later agreed we were both so distracted thinking of the new procedures we might possibly have to use on this approach--ILS callouts; go around; windshear recovery; autoland; etc.--that the bigger picture of where we were in relation to the airport was not in the forefront. IMC conditions did not help. The huge tailwind certainly did not help. The Captain was the PF and executed a textbook go-around. He later said it was only because we had discussed it at such great length that he was able to do the go-around by the book. We queried tower on the surface winds again and they assured us the winds were less than 10 knots. They told us two other airplanes landed since our go-around. We tried the approach again. This time; we slowed down and configured early. Turning final at about 1500 feet; we had 47 knots of tailwind. At 500 feet; we had about 34 knots of tailwind. We continued as we were stabilized. The wind did not drop below 10 knots until we were less than 20 feet AGL. The Captain did a nice landing with no problems. As we taxied into the gate; I realized I'd forgotten to make the REQUIRED '50; 40; 30; 20; 10' calls for an IMC approach. I mentioned that to the Captain and apologized for the oversight. I had been so focused on the tailwind factor and ensuring we did not exceed the 10K tailwind limit on touchdown; that I completely forgot those callouts. The Captain did not realize it at the time either; and remarked he was GLAD I'd forgotten them as it wouldhave just been one more distraction. In our post-flight debrief; the Captain and I discussed the approach. We agreed that there are a lot of seemingly little changes that can cause big distractions when flying an actual IFR approach in weather. It took up all our brain cells to do what we did. An actual emergency in the middle of all this could have tipped the scale over the other way. The training we have received as a pilot group for these changes has not been adequate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.