Narrative:

I filed an IFR flight plan from kent state airport (1g3). Due to the volume of training aircraft waiting to depart and the limited ramp/runup area; I elected to take off on runway 19 into VFR conditions and obtain my clearance in the air. After departure; once I was clear of the traffic pattern; I established 2-way radio communication with cak approach. Once I was climbing through approximately 3;000 ft MSL; I received a TCAS traffic advisory and then a resolution advisory for an aircraft immediately above me at approximately 4;000 ft MSL. I saw on the display that the traffic was to my right; so I leveled the airplane and began a turn to the left. After visually acquiring the aircraft overhead and passing to my left; I began a turn to the right. At that time; cak approach gave me a suggested turn to the right and an altitude of 4;000 ft. I was still VFR in VMC conditions at this time. After this occurrence; I was vectored to the west and eventually given my IFR clearance. The approach controller advised me that I had departed kent state into 'a bunch of regional jets' and he suggested that I not do that again. Upon landing; I contacted cak approach and had a conversation with a gentleman at that facility. He advised me that the runways at kent state and cak were aligned so that aircraft departing on runway 19 at kent state were in potential conflict with arriving traffic to runway 19 at cak. He mentioned that a remote had been installed at kent state to allow pilots to obtain clearances and avoid such conflicts. He suggested that whenever a remote was available that I utilize it to enhance safety. He also stated that it was a good idea to stay at a lower altitude after departure from the kent state airport's runway 19. He did indirectly acknowledge; however; that I had not violated any far's during the incident. Now that I have had a few hours to digest these events; I would like to share some thoughts and suggestions: as a professional aviator; I take pride in thoroughly preparing for each flight; including reviewing departure and arrival procedures; as well as all pertinent publications and websites for all airports that I use. At no point in my preparation did I find any information that alerted me to such a likely conflict; nor did I find any departure procedures that would have helped me to avoid this situation. Since this incident; I have attempted to locate such information and have still been unable to locate any guidance. The only departure instructions I located were for noise abatement. Upon examination of the sectional chart; and of the approach charts at cak; it is quite apparent that there is a huge potential for collision. However; runways and approaches at relatively distant airports have traditionally not been part of my preflight planning. My thought process upon departure was that if two way radio communications was not established within two miles of the departure end of the runway; I would turn to the west to avoid the class C airspace. Unfortunately; this plan was interrupted by the more immediate need to avoid the traffic. The installation of the remote at kent state is a good idea; but it is not a complete solution to this problem. In my experience; part 91 pilots will use the remote only when the weather is too low for a safe VFR departure. Otherwise; they will depart VFR and pick up the clearance in the air. Perhaps the addition of some information signs near the approach end of runway 19 at kent state and/or entries in the a/FD and terminal procedure charts would either encourage the pilots to obtain a clearance on the ground or at least to turn out of harm's way after departure. A note suggesting a lower altitude on departure might also be helpful. In addition; the approach controller's suggestion that I not launch into other aircraft was ridiculous. I don't believe that any aviator would intentionally launch into conflicting traffic. As previously stated; I had no way of knowing that there was a potential conflict until my TCAS gave me a traffic alert. Apparently; the controller is under the incorrect impression that pilots can see the traffic as well as he can. On departure; a flight deck is a very busy place and unfortunately; a small blip at the center of a screen is very easy to overlook when attention is divided between so many different elements. Giving such a 'suggestion' over the frequency is not helpful to say the least. Fortunately; both aircraft were equipped with TCAS and were able to avoid collision. If either aircraft had not been so equipped; I am afraid the outcome would have likely been much worse. Because my aircraft was approaching the regional jet from below visual avoidance would have been unlikely; if not impossible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Corporate pilot departed 1G3 on Runway 19 and had a TCAS RA generated by a CAK arrival. He did not know about the remote transmitter that would have allowed a clearance prior to departure for coordination with inbound CAK traffic.

Narrative: I filed an IFR flight plan from Kent State Airport (1G3). Due to the volume of training aircraft waiting to depart and the limited ramp/runup area; I elected to take off on Runway 19 into VFR conditions and obtain my clearance in the air. After departure; once I was clear of the traffic pattern; I established 2-way radio communication with CAK Approach. Once I was climbing through approximately 3;000 FT MSL; I received a TCAS traffic advisory and then a resolution advisory for an aircraft immediately above me at approximately 4;000 FT MSL. I saw on the display that the traffic was to my right; so I leveled the airplane and began a turn to the left. After visually acquiring the aircraft overhead and passing to my left; I began a turn to the right. At that time; CAK Approach gave me a suggested turn to the right and an altitude of 4;000 FT. I was still VFR in VMC conditions at this time. After this occurrence; I was vectored to the west and eventually given my IFR clearance. The Approach Controller advised me that I had departed Kent State into 'a bunch of regional jets' and he suggested that I not do that again. Upon landing; I contacted CAK Approach and had a conversation with a gentleman at that facility. He advised me that the runways at Kent State and CAK were aligned so that aircraft departing on Runway 19 at Kent State were in potential conflict with arriving traffic to Runway 19 at CAK. He mentioned that a remote had been installed at Kent State to allow pilots to obtain clearances and avoid such conflicts. He suggested that whenever a remote was available that I utilize it to enhance safety. He also stated that it was a good idea to stay at a lower altitude after departure from the Kent State airport's Runway 19. He did indirectly acknowledge; however; that I had not violated any FAR's during the incident. Now that I have had a few hours to digest these events; I would like to share some thoughts and suggestions: As a professional aviator; I take pride in thoroughly preparing for each flight; including reviewing departure and arrival procedures; as well as all pertinent publications and websites for all airports that I use. At no point in my preparation did I find any information that alerted me to such a likely conflict; nor did I find any departure procedures that would have helped me to avoid this situation. Since this incident; I have attempted to locate such information and have still been unable to locate any guidance. The only departure instructions I located were for noise abatement. Upon examination of the sectional chart; and of the approach charts at CAK; it is quite apparent that there is a huge potential for collision. However; runways and approaches at relatively distant airports have traditionally not been part of my preflight planning. My thought process upon departure was that if two way radio communications was not established within two miles of the departure end of the runway; I would turn to the west to avoid the Class C airspace. Unfortunately; this plan was interrupted by the more immediate need to avoid the traffic. The installation of the remote at Kent State is a good idea; but it is not a complete solution to this problem. In my experience; Part 91 pilots will use the remote only when the weather is too low for a safe VFR departure. Otherwise; they will depart VFR and pick up the clearance in the air. Perhaps the addition of some information signs near the approach end of Runway 19 at Kent State and/or entries in the A/FD and terminal procedure charts would either encourage the pilots to obtain a clearance on the ground or at least to turn out of harm's way after departure. A note suggesting a lower altitude on departure might also be helpful. In addition; the Approach Controller's suggestion that I not launch into other aircraft was ridiculous. I don't believe that any aviator would intentionally launch into conflicting traffic. As previously stated; I had no way of knowing that there was a potential conflict until my TCAS gave me a traffic alert. Apparently; the Controller is under the incorrect impression that pilots can see the traffic as well as he can. On departure; a flight deck is a very busy place and unfortunately; a small blip at the center of a screen is very easy to overlook when attention is divided between so many different elements. Giving such a 'suggestion' over the frequency is not helpful to say the least. Fortunately; both aircraft were equipped with TCAS and were able to avoid collision. If either aircraft had not been so equipped; I am afraid the outcome would have likely been much worse. Because my aircraft was approaching the regional jet from below visual avoidance would have been unlikely; if not impossible.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.