Narrative:

While descending for arrival the 'right fadec' caution illuminated. We followed the QRH procedures (which included shutting down the #2 engine) but only after reviewing the procedure and agreeing that the procedure did indeed require that the engine be shut down. Once the QRH procedure was complete we had switched from center to approach and I informed them that we were now in a single engine configuration; that we were declaring an emergency and that we were requesting that crash fire rescue equipment stand by for our landing. We were given priority handling and the remainder of the approach and landing on runway xxc was as normal as any single engine approach and landing could be. Our training made this procedure just another day at work.the QRH procedure for a left/right fadec caution message is somewhat confusing. We had to read the procedure several times just to make sure that we were required to shut the engine down. The procedure calls for shutting down the engine 'prior to landing' if all other indications are 'normal' but that is poorly defined. Doing the shut down right away obviously isn't required but should you wait until short final or further out? In the end we elected to shut the engine down as we made our descent and were probably still 20 miles or more from the field. This gave us time to review the procedure for single engine landing; make out PA announcement; talk to the flight attendants; coordinate with approach; etc. Also; while the 'no' side of the checklist leads you to the single engine approach and landing abnormal checklist the 'yes' side does not. And yet the 'yes' side still requires that the engine be shut down so it would seem only logical that the single engine checklist be performed in that case as well. I think that not requiring the single engine checklist when performing the 'yes' side of the procedure is the wrong way to conduct this abnormal procedure.upon further review of the QRH it has come to my attention that the procedure for a fadec caution; when all other engine indications are normal; was not completed correctly. I misread one of the steps in the procedure that called for the thrust reverser to be turned off and instead read it as though the thrust lever should be shut off; in the end having the engine shut off instead of at idle as the QRH called for made little difference in the outcome. I think the procedure is; as I stated [before]; somewhat confusing and tends to lead one to the conclusion that the engine should be shut down. That certainly doesn't make what happened any less wrong; but looking back I can see how I read what I thought I should read instead of actually taking the time to read the procedure correctly. Since the failure happened just as we were being switched from center to approach we were somewhat rushed but; again; that is no excuse for not taking the time to follow the procedure correctly. In the notes of the procedure there are what seem to be dire warnings about erratic engine operations with this failure. In retrospect; given the nature of the warning notes; I might have elected to secure the engine anyway. But; of course; that opinion is with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. At any rate; I now am fully aware that with all other engine indications being normal; I erred in shutting the engine down.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When utilizing the emergency checklist for a R FADEC warning the flight crew of a CRJ-900 was confused as to why the checklist would direct them to the Single Engine landing checklist if they chose to shut the engine down immediately but not if they chose to wait and shut it down prior to landing.

Narrative: While descending for arrival the 'R FADEC' caution illuminated. We followed the QRH procedures (which included shutting down the #2 engine) but only after reviewing the procedure and agreeing that the procedure did indeed require that the engine be shut down. Once the QRH procedure was complete we had switched from Center to Approach and I informed them that we were now in a single engine configuration; that we were declaring an emergency and that we were requesting that CFR stand by for our landing. We were given priority handling and the remainder of the approach and landing on runway XXC was as normal as any single engine approach and landing could be. Our training made this procedure just another day at work.The QRH procedure for a L/R FADEC caution message is somewhat confusing. We had to read the procedure several times just to make sure that we were required to shut the engine down. The procedure calls for shutting down the engine 'prior to landing' if all other indications are 'normal' but that is poorly defined. Doing the shut down right away obviously isn't required but should you wait until short final or further out? In the end we elected to shut the engine down as we made our descent and were probably still 20 miles or more from the field. This gave us time to review the procedure for single engine landing; make out PA announcement; talk to the flight attendants; coordinate with Approach; etc. Also; while the 'NO' side of the checklist leads you to the Single Engine Approach and Landing abnormal checklist the 'YES' side does not. And yet the 'YES' side still requires that the engine be shut down so it would seem only logical that the Single Engine checklist be performed in that case as well. I think that not requiring the Single Engine checklist when performing the 'YES' side of the procedure is the wrong way to conduct this abnormal procedure.Upon further review of the QRH it has come to my attention that the procedure for a FADEC caution; when all other engine indications are normal; was not completed correctly. I misread one of the steps in the procedure that called for the thrust REVERSER to be turned off and instead read it as though the THRUST LEVER should be shut off; in the end having the engine shut off instead of at idle as the QRH called for made little difference in the outcome. I think the procedure is; as I stated [before]; somewhat confusing and tends to lead one to the conclusion that the engine should be shut down. That certainly doesn't make what happened any less wrong; but looking back I can see how I read what I thought I should read instead of actually taking the time to read the procedure correctly. Since the failure happened just as we were being switched from Center to Approach we were somewhat rushed but; again; that is no excuse for not taking the time to follow the procedure correctly. In the notes of the procedure there are what seem to be dire warnings about erratic engine operations with this failure. In retrospect; given the nature of the warning notes; I might have elected to secure the engine anyway. But; of course; that opinion is with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. At any rate; I now am fully aware that with all other engine indications being normal; I erred in shutting the engine down.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.