Narrative:

I was pilot not flying. This was a day of an unusual snowstorm; low ceilings; and icing conditions up and down the east coast. After takeoff; after first officer (pilot flying) called for gear up; the gear failed to retract and continued to make a loud; unusual noise. Then; the master warning horn sounded and a master warning message of unsafe gear appeared. I instructed the first officer to continue flying the course and to handle radio communication while I ran the QRH procedures. The situation was not remedied by the QRH procedures and the procedure required landing at the nearest suitable airport. I advised the first officer I would retake the radios. I declared an emergency with ATC. I inquired as to departure airport weather and ATC said it was low IFR with 200 ft overcast and a 1/2 mile visibility. I then asked about a nearby divert weather and it was much better at 1;600 ft overcast with several miles visibility. The first officer concurred that the divert airport was better and I asked to divert; which was only 65 miles away right off the nose. We sent an ACARS message to the company advising of the emergency and diversion and attempted; with difficulty; to contact our company through the commercial radio. I spoke to the flight attendant and said that we had a landing gear problem and we would make a precautionary landing; but we did not expect to need an evacuation at this time; though the situation could change depending on whether we could get the gear properly down and locked. I asked her to immediately prepare the cabin for landing. I then made an appropriate PA to the passengers advising that there would be a precautionary landing. We also spoke very briefly to the station to expect our arrival. We received ACARS responses from the company indicating concurrence with our diversion. Thereafter; we requested from ATC that emergency equipment be present at the runway in case of gear collapse. We obtained 3 green down and locked indications once we put the gear down. We advised ATC that we would be able to taxi with those normal indications; but that the trucks should follow us to the gate. The assigned runway 9R provided an adequate 10;000 ft and the first officer made a very soft perfect landing. Based on the 3 green down and locked indications; we taxied to the gate with the emergency equipment following. We deplaned normally. There were no injuries.the most important and dangerous threat was the huge increase in workload due to two deferrals on this aircraft: APU deferred and normal anti-ice deferral. Maintenance has been; in my opinion; compromised for the last few months and this plane was received by the crew in this regrettable state of repair. These deferrals made operation in the day's snow and icing conditions extremely difficult. The standby icing system required that the first officer continue to operate that manually on and off while he flew the plane during the emergency. This was fatiguing and a huge distraction. The lack of the APU required depressurized takeoff and landing; which when coupled with the lack of normal anti-ice plus the landing gear emergency itself was a tremendous and compounding distraction. After landing and safely delivering all crew and passengers; I believe the crew was hounded by the company to go back to the plane and move it because of the inconvenience of it being at unscheduled gate. We declined to do so without a mechanic's inspection of the gear system. Further; the company failed for more than 4 hours to provide the crew with proper facilities for rest after the event. A hotel should have been promptly afforded. It was only after innumerable calls that; begrudgingly; a hotel was provided. The chief pilot could have handled this much; much better. Rather than congratulating us on a job well done; I felt he was mostly concerned with the removal of the airplane from the gate and not with the welfare of the crew. We were hounded by him and the gate people to move the plane. The chief pilot wanted to interrogate me on the failure mode of the gear to attempt to persuade us it was ok to move the plane. I told him I was not a hydraulic engineer and that we preferred not to move it after handling such an emergency. Ultimately; after my insistence for lodging; the chief pilot did intervene and obtain the hotel; but again it took more than 4 hours. Interestingly the next day; we flew the same plane with deferred APU; deferred anti-ice; deferred gear retraction; deferred over-water; and deferred category ii. The level of maintenance on the planes deserves a full safety investigation. The day after; I received yet another plane with deferred APU pneumatics; which makes it three planes in a row I flew (with two naps exception) with deferred APU engine start abilities.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ200 landing gear failed to retract after takeoff; so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport with suitable weather. The Captain noted increased workload due to aircraft maintenance deferrals.

Narrative: I was pilot not flying. This was a day of an unusual snowstorm; low ceilings; and icing conditions up and down the East Coast. After takeoff; after First Officer (pilot flying) called for gear up; the gear failed to retract and continued to make a loud; unusual noise. Then; the master warning horn sounded and a master warning message of unsafe gear appeared. I instructed the First Officer to continue flying the course and to handle radio communication while I ran the QRH procedures. The situation was not remedied by the QRH procedures and the procedure required landing at the nearest suitable airport. I advised the First Officer I would retake the radios. I declared an emergency with ATC. I inquired as to departure airport weather and ATC said it was low IFR with 200 FT overcast and a 1/2 mile visibility. I then asked about a nearby divert weather and it was much better at 1;600 FT overcast with several miles visibility. The First Officer concurred that the divert airport was better and I asked to divert; which was only 65 miles away right off the nose. We sent an ACARS message to the company advising of the emergency and diversion and attempted; with difficulty; to contact our company through the commercial radio. I spoke to the Flight Attendant and said that we had a landing gear problem and we would make a precautionary landing; but we did not expect to need an evacuation at this time; though the situation could change depending on whether we could get the gear properly down and locked. I asked her to immediately prepare the cabin for landing. I then made an appropriate PA to the passengers advising that there would be a precautionary landing. We also spoke very briefly to the station to expect our arrival. We received ACARS responses from the company indicating concurrence with our diversion. Thereafter; we requested from ATC that emergency equipment be present at the runway in case of gear collapse. We obtained 3 green down and locked indications once we put the gear down. We advised ATC that we would be able to taxi with those normal indications; but that the trucks should follow us to the gate. The assigned Runway 9R provided an adequate 10;000 FT and the First Officer made a very soft perfect landing. Based on the 3 green down and locked indications; we taxied to the gate with the emergency equipment following. We deplaned normally. There were no injuries.The most important and dangerous threat was the huge increase in workload due to two deferrals on this aircraft: APU deferred and normal anti-ice deferral. Maintenance has been; in my opinion; compromised for the last few months and this plane was received by the crew in this regrettable state of repair. These deferrals made operation in the day's snow and icing conditions extremely difficult. The standby icing system required that the First Officer continue to operate that manually on and off while he flew the plane during the emergency. This was fatiguing and a huge distraction. The lack of the APU required depressurized takeoff and landing; which when coupled with the lack of normal anti-ice plus the landing gear emergency itself was a tremendous and compounding distraction. After landing and safely delivering all crew and passengers; I believe the crew was hounded by the company to go back to the plane and move it because of the inconvenience of it being at unscheduled gate. We declined to do so without a Mechanic's inspection of the gear system. Further; the company failed for more than 4 hours to provide the crew with proper facilities for rest after the event. A hotel should have been promptly afforded. It was only after innumerable calls that; begrudgingly; a hotel was provided. The Chief Pilot could have handled this much; much better. Rather than congratulating us on a job well done; I felt he was mostly concerned with the removal of the airplane from the gate and not with the welfare of the crew. We were hounded by him and the gate people to move the plane. The Chief Pilot wanted to interrogate me on the failure mode of the gear to attempt to persuade us it was ok to move the plane. I told him I was not a hydraulic engineer and that we preferred not to move it after handling such an emergency. Ultimately; after my insistence for lodging; the Chief Pilot did intervene and obtain the hotel; but again it took more than 4 hours. Interestingly the next day; we flew the same plane with deferred APU; deferred anti-ice; deferred gear retraction; deferred over-water; and deferred Category II. The level of maintenance on the planes deserves a full safety investigation. The day after; I received yet another plane with deferred APU pneumatics; which makes it three planes in a row I flew (with two naps exception) with deferred APU engine start abilities.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.