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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 980018 |
Time | |
Date | 201111 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | SFO.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A320 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | Other LDA PRM RY28R |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Departure Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
We were doing simultaneous offset instrument approach (soia) operations to runways 28L and 28R. A320 was on the lda prm runway 28R. I was working the monitor prm position. When A320 was about 2 miles from the ntz; he turned into it. I told him to turn immediately to the right to return to the localizer. A320 didn't respond. I again keyed up and told A320 to turn right immediately and return to the localizer. He may have responded; I don't recall. The aircraft didn't turn; he continued and entered the ntz. The other monitor position didn't seem to take any action; so I canceled A320 approach clearance and gave him heading 280 and 3;000. He read it back. Shortly thereafter the pilot asked what his assigned altitude was. He seemed confused and disorientated. The foster controller answered and gave him 3;000 again. After the go-around A320 went NORDO while he was on the downwind. Controllers tried to reach him on guard without luck. Controllers had to coordinate with adjacent sectors because the A320 was entering their airspace. None of this would have been necessary if A320 was attentive to the frequency. Recommendation; I believe A320 was not adequately prepared for the approach. The approach chart emphasizes the requirement to pilot to immediately comply with breakout instructions. The pilot didn't seem to do this. I believe A320 had stated that he saw the parallel traffic. At that time the controller working foster told A320 to remain on the localizer until darne. This was a good practice by the controller. The approach also tells pilots to do this. Visual separation was not applied as is the common practice when soia is in use. Separation was lost when A320 entered the ntz. It would be helpful if the rules were changed to allow us to ignore a blundering aircraft if the pilot states; prior to blundering; that he sees the traffic. This would require a national rule change or a waiver.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: NCT Controller described a loss of separation event during SOIA operations when a participating aircraft entered the NTZ and failed to respond to ATC instructions to turn.
Narrative: We were doing Simultaneous Offset Instrument Approach (SOIA) operations to Runways 28L and 28R. A320 was on the LDA PRM Runway 28R. I was working the monitor PRM position. When A320 was about 2 miles from the NTZ; he turned into it. I told him to turn immediately to the right to return to the localizer. A320 didn't respond. I again keyed up and told A320 to turn right immediately and return to the localizer. He may have responded; I don't recall. The aircraft didn't turn; he continued and entered the NTZ. The other monitor position didn't seem to take any action; so I canceled A320 approach clearance and gave him heading 280 and 3;000. He read it back. Shortly thereafter the pilot asked what his assigned altitude was. He seemed confused and disorientated. The Foster Controller answered and gave him 3;000 again. After the go-around A320 went NORDO while he was on the downwind. Controllers tried to reach him on guard without luck. Controllers had to coordinate with adjacent sectors because the A320 was entering their airspace. None of this would have been necessary if A320 was attentive to the frequency. Recommendation; I believe A320 was not adequately prepared for the approach. The approach chart emphasizes the requirement to pilot to immediately comply with breakout instructions. The pilot didn't seem to do this. I believe A320 had stated that he saw the parallel traffic. At that time the Controller working Foster told A320 to remain on the localizer until DARNE. This was a good practice by the Controller. The approach also tells pilots to do this. Visual separation was not applied as is the common practice when SOIA is in use. Separation was lost when A320 entered the NTZ. It would be helpful if the rules were changed to allow us to ignore a blundering aircraft if the pilot states; prior to blundering; that he sees the traffic. This would require a national rule change or a waiver.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.