Narrative:

During departure on the ruddy 3 out of teterboro; nj; we retracted the flaps at 400 ft AGL then I announced and engaged the flight director navigation function so that it would track and join the FMS departure. The captain; while still hand-flying; noticed the light on the navigation button itself did not illuminate and began pushing the navigation button and heading buttons. I became fixated on his button pushing and forgot to look at the altitude. He caught the deviation at about 1;700 ft MSL and immediately corrected to descend the 200 ft back to the published altitude of 1;500 ft. We checked in with ny departure control while descending through 1;600 ft. I told them we were at 1;600 ft and descending back to 1;500 ft. The controller responded something along the lines of; 'okay.' he then gave us a heading and a climb to 3;000 ft. I do not believe a loss of separation occurred on any of the newark arrivals.several things went wrong on this departure. We did not brief when the flight director would be switched to navigation mode. I normally do this at flap retraction on this specific departure; but it was not something that was discussed. The captain should have also turned on the autopilot at the earliest opportunity. Things happen quickly on this departure and we do not have time try and divide our attention between hand-flying and maintaining situational awareness. I should have asked him about this during the takeoff safety briefing. Once he started pushing buttons on the flight director I should have asked him what he wanted while simultaneously paying close attention to our altitude. I should not have allowed him to mess with the flight director while he was hand-flying. Also; I had it in my head that we should be first concerned about getting on the right course (getting the flight director in navigation mode); but on this departure in particular; I should know that altitude is the primary concern and I should have kept a much closer eye on that. We could have avoided this altitude deviation by performing a much better takeoff briefing; engaging the autopilot much earlier and not fixating on a simple inoperative light (especially when the pfd annunciations are what really matter) in a high workload; fast-paced environment. I think; having done this departure so many times and the weather being VFR; I had a more relaxed attitude than normal. In the future; I will endeavor to always give or be sure I receive a very thorough briefing on all the teterboro departures; especially as these are perennial hot topics.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CE560 First Officer reports confusion during the RUUDY 3 departure when the flight director NAV light does not illuminate when the button is pushed; resulting in an altitude deviation.

Narrative: During departure on the RUDDY 3 out of Teterboro; NJ; we retracted the flaps at 400 FT AGL then I announced and engaged the flight director NAV function so that it would track and join the FMS departure. The Captain; while still hand-flying; noticed the light on the NAV button itself did not illuminate and began pushing the NAV button and HDG buttons. I became fixated on his button pushing and forgot to look at the altitude. He caught the deviation at about 1;700 FT MSL and immediately corrected to descend the 200 FT back to the published altitude of 1;500 FT. We checked in with NY Departure Control while descending through 1;600 FT. I told them we were at 1;600 FT and descending back to 1;500 FT. The Controller responded something along the lines of; 'okay.' He then gave us a heading and a climb to 3;000 FT. I do not believe a loss of separation occurred on any of the Newark arrivals.Several things went wrong on this departure. We did not brief when the flight director would be switched to NAV mode. I normally do this at flap retraction on this specific departure; but it was not something that was discussed. The Captain should have also turned on the autopilot at the earliest opportunity. Things happen quickly on this departure and we do not have time try and divide our attention between hand-flying and maintaining situational awareness. I should have asked him about this during the takeoff safety briefing. Once he started pushing buttons on the flight director I should have asked him what he wanted while simultaneously paying close attention to our altitude. I should not have allowed him to mess with the flight director while he was hand-flying. Also; I had it in my head that we should be first concerned about getting on the right course (getting the flight director in NAV mode); but on this departure in particular; I should know that altitude is the primary concern and I should have kept a much closer eye on that. We could have avoided this altitude deviation by performing a much better takeoff briefing; engaging the autopilot much earlier and not fixating on a simple inoperative light (especially when the PFD annunciations are what really matter) in a high workload; fast-paced environment. I think; having done this departure so many times and the weather being VFR; I had a more relaxed attitude than normal. In the future; I will endeavor to always give or be sure I receive a very thorough briefing on all the Teterboro departures; especially as these are perennial hot topics.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.