Narrative:

Our new scap (standardized computerized aircraft performance) data is difficult to defend or explain; evidence of insufficient training and analysis. Although not a wet runway condition for our trip; the wet ACARS performance printout again had a V1 speed of 115 KTS. If you consider that we call out V1 five knots early and the winds were 10-20 KTS; the winter months ahead will mean some dangerous V1 obligated takeoff scenarios facing crews. Airspeed callouts are indicated airspeeds-not ground speeds. A combined headwind of 10-20 KTS; a common condition at all our hubs; could mean the ground speed of the aircraft might be 25 KTS or more below the indicated airspeed at V1. Do you really want crews to not abort at such low ground speeds i.e. 90 KTS? Committing an aircraft to continue the takeoff at such a low ground speed is ludicrous; on a wet or dry runway. Wheel brakes do not care about indicated airspeed. The scap procedure demands a continued takeoff with engine fires; engine losses; windshear; or runway incursions down field at dramatically low V1 speeds. Apparently the company feels that a low speed rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) is more difficult to accomplish than the series of maneuvers; the challenges of aircraft control; the execution of any number of aircraft checklists; and the demands on crew coordination that a continued takeoff present-all with the distraction an emergency. If a pilot cannot be trusted to accomplish a successful rejected takeoff; what is the logic in forcing him to accomplish the far more demanding procedures and decisions that await him? The recently distributed; unsigned and undated; company ''computerized' flightplan manager' handout demonstrates the confusion that scap causes. No one seems to want to take responsibility for this publication. It states: 'it appears V1 is getting confused with refusal speed. We have never provided pilots with refusal speed. Refusal speed is generally used on aircraft that behave very badly with the loss of an engine'. What? The military have traditionally used refusal speed and it applies to all their single and multi-engine aircraft; in reference to balanced field computations. Single engine aircraft only use refusal speed since there is no option with an engine failure. Civilian and commercial multiengine aircraft have a choice; facing the decision of go/no-go and are concerned with asymmetric thrust related to vmcg; vmca; vcef and V1. Procedurally; the pilot not flying (PNF) calls out V1 five knots early in accordance with boeing recommendations to allow for the decision and actions required in advance of the committed airspeed. The captain removes his hands from the power levers to avoid an inappropriate response at V1. We have practiced these procedures for years; institutionalizing a V1 as the refusal speed. Denying that V1 has been and continues to be a refusal speed is to ignore existing procedure. It is a distinction without a difference. Unsuccessful rejected takeoff (rejected takeoff) accidents are a rare event in the industry; but a non-event in my 30+ years with the company. Most of the elements to avoid them are already incorporated in our company procedures or equipment. Rejected takeoff training; brake wear pins on aircraft wheels; auto-throttles; auto-brakes; auto-speed brakes; low and high speed regime categories; five knot early V1 callout; and other procedures all exist to reduce the possibility of an rejected takeoff accident here. Technology has removed the pilot from the landing; but not the takeoff - as yet. That is why it is normal to find the takeoff minimums higher than the landing minimums in visibility and ceiling. In all likelihood; committing so early to a takeoff means returning to that same runway; far later; after a considerable complex series of aviation challenges when they were so unnecessary. Why give the emergency vehicles such a large head start? In reality; the standards; calculations; and procedures we use to establish a V1 speed are academic if we neverhave to use them. But on the occasion when an emergency or weather threatens the aircraft; low speed commitment to continuing a takeoff is the more dangerous and expensive choice. Scap needs an overhaul.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 Captain expressed his concern regarding wet runway V1 speeds calculated by the newly inaugurated SCAP (Standardized Computerized Aircraft Performance) ACARS system in use at his airline.

Narrative: Our new SCAP (Standardized Computerized Aircraft Performance) data is difficult to defend or explain; evidence of insufficient training and analysis. Although not a wet runway condition for our trip; the WET ACARS performance printout again had a V1 speed of 115 KTS. If you consider that we call out V1 five knots early and the winds were 10-20 KTS; the winter months ahead will mean some dangerous V1 obligated takeoff scenarios facing crews. Airspeed callouts are INDICATED airspeeds-not GROUND speeds. A combined headwind of 10-20 KTS; a common condition at all our hubs; could mean the GROUND speed of the aircraft might be 25 KTS or more below the INDICATED airspeed at V1. Do you really want crews to NOT abort at such low ground speeds i.e. 90 KTS? Committing an aircraft to continue the takeoff at such a low GROUND speed is ludicrous; on a wet or dry runway. Wheel brakes do not care about indicated airspeed. The SCAP procedure demands a continued takeoff with engine fires; engine losses; windshear; or runway incursions down field at dramatically low V1 speeds. Apparently the company feels that a low speed Rejected Takeoff (RTO) is more difficult to accomplish than the series of maneuvers; the challenges of aircraft control; the execution of any number of aircraft checklists; and the demands on crew coordination that a continued takeoff present-all with the distraction an emergency. If a pilot cannot be trusted to accomplish a successful RTO; what is the logic in forcing him to accomplish the far more demanding procedures and decisions that await him? The recently distributed; unsigned and undated; company ''Computerized' FLIGHTPLAN MANAGER' handout demonstrates the confusion that SCAP causes. No one seems to want to take responsibility for this publication. It states: 'It appears V1 is getting confused with refusal speed. We have never provided pilots with refusal speed. Refusal speed is generally used on aircraft that behave very badly with the loss of an engine'. What? The military have traditionally used refusal speed and it applies to all their single and multi-engine aircraft; in reference to balanced field computations. SINGLE engine aircraft ONLY use refusal speed since there is no option with an engine failure. Civilian and commercial MULTIENGINE aircraft have a choice; facing the decision of GO/NO-GO and are concerned with asymmetric thrust related to Vmcg; Vmca; Vcef and V1. Procedurally; the pilot not flying (PNF) calls out V1 five knots early in accordance with Boeing recommendations to allow for the decision and actions required in advance of the committed airspeed. The Captain removes his hands from the power levers to avoid an inappropriate response at V1. We have practiced these procedures for years; institutionalizing a V1 as the refusal speed. Denying that V1 has been and continues to be a refusal speed is to ignore existing procedure. It is a distinction without a difference. Unsuccessful rejected takeoff (RTO) accidents are a rare event in the industry; but a non-event in my 30+ years with the company. Most of the elements to avoid them are already incorporated in our company procedures or equipment. RTO training; brake wear pins on aircraft wheels; auto-throttles; auto-brakes; auto-speed brakes; low and high speed regime categories; five knot early V1 callout; and other procedures all exist to reduce the possibility of an RTO accident here. Technology has removed the pilot from the landing; but not the takeoff - as yet. That is why it is normal to find the takeoff minimums higher than the landing minimums in visibility and ceiling. In all likelihood; committing so early to a takeoff means returning to that same runway; far later; after a considerable complex series of aviation challenges when they were so unnecessary. Why give the emergency vehicles such a large head start? In reality; the standards; calculations; and procedures we use to establish a V1 speed are academic if we neverhave to use them. But on the occasion when an emergency or weather threatens the aircraft; low speed commitment to continuing a takeoff is the more dangerous and expensive choice. SCAP needs an overhaul.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.