Narrative:

The captain acting as the pilot flying was descending to menlo on the tip toe visual to 28L and was high and fast at menlo (about 6;200 ft and 240 KIAS). I had asked the captain if he wanted me to tell ATC that we are going to be high at menlo. The published altitude on this visual approach is 5;000 ft MSL and I was using my best CRM to encourage the captain to descend for the approach. His response was 'that is a minimum altitude.' I then told him 'we need to get down.' the captain then repeated 'that is a minimum altitude and well talk about it on the ground.' the captain completely ignored my input and failed to get down and 'near' on speed. The captain briefed a flaps four/full configuration and at 500 ft AGL and flaps three and 35 KIAS fast I called for a 'go around speed.' the go-around was a mess and I had to call out the memory items to get things going. The captain nearly (and may actually have) over-sped the flaps. After I stated 'watch your airspeed' the captain aggressively increased aircraft pitch (we were exactly at the barber pole). This was very unsettling as we had VFR nearby at 500 ft above our cleared altitude. During the tower direct go-around; while still in the climb (not yet 'feet wet'); the captain directed me to make a PA announcement to the passengers. At the time; tower was calling out traffic and it was absolutely not the time to do anything but look for traffic and fly the aircraft. Two aircraft; one which passed 500 ft above us; made the situation 'tense.' I told the captain that I did not have time to make an announcement. It was a very clear day in sfo and there were numerous VFR targets enjoying the day. On downwind; the captain made a PA announcement to the passengers. Again; it was not a good time with the current situation. Second approach - the captain was cleared for the approach to 28L and tower changed our runway to 28R. Not a big deal and we were plenty far out to adjust (1;000 ft AGL). On approach to 28R the captain descended low on glide path (4 red) and I called 'you're low.' the captain over corrected and went to high (all white) and we landed long (2;000 ft down). Airspeed was under control and the taxi in was uneventful. After completing the parking checklist; the captain did say 'yea I was high and I should have been lower.' the captain then stopped talking and started to clean up his area (charts and such). I then asked the captain if he wanted to talk about what happened his response was 'yes.' I started to talk about the 5;000 ft altitude and the tail winds we had approaching menlo and the captain interrupted me and began talking over me. I then remained silent until he quit speaking and asked him if I could speak. At this same time external power was connected to the aircraft and the captain then devoted his attention to the ground power and APU. I told the captain that I will not speak if he interrupts me and focuses on other tasks 'this is serious!' I told the captain that he completely discounted and disregarded what I said about having to descend during the approach. I told the captain that asking me to make a PA announcement to the passengers as we are executing a go-around with the dense VFR traffic; 'rapid fire' ATC radio calls and the bad/improper go around procedures was absolutely the wrong time to devote my attention to a PA announcement! I told the captain that his flying skills are not good enough to be safe and fly as little as he does. I told the captain that in the 'old days' first officers were looked down upon but today we have CRM to help us operate a safer airline. I asked if he was going to fill out a report and he said whatever I was going to fill out he would do the same. As I got up to do the aircraft walk around the captain asked me what I as going to do and I replied I would have to 'cool off a bit.' the captain replied 'I want to get home.' as I entered the jetway I stood there a few moments and decided that the safety of this airline was more important than me getting home (this was the last day; last leg; of a four day trip) and after hearing the captain's statement 'I want to get home' I felt he did not have an appreciation for what transpired. I then called the duty manager and the base chief pilot. The duty manager (was very understanding of the situation) came up with a plan to do a first officer swap. I asked why they don't replace the captain now that I identified an issue with the captain and he informed that it is SOP just to replace the first officer. I will say that the duty manager had a good grasp of the situation. I spoke discreetly (out of ear and eyes of our passengers) with my replacement first officer after he approached me in the jetway and asked what happened. After our discussion and my understanding he was a former instructor I felt comfortable that the captain could safely get the flight to his home base (no weather involved). Along the same line; on this same trip; the captain was attempting to do a comm out/visual signal push and he did not know the procedures. The captain responded to the lead push persons' brake release signal with the brake release signal. As this person went under the nose of our aircraft; the captain got upset about not having sight of him (there was another spotter at the 10 o'clock position) so the captain did not release the brakes. A few moments later; this same person came from underneath our aircraft and again gave the release bakes signal. The captain once again gave the release brakes signal and once again the 'pusher' went under the nose of the aircraft to initiate the push. The captain became even more irate and began to yell at me with spittle coming out of his mouth. The 'pusher' then came out again and I tried to tell the captain that we need to get push clearance before we give the 'pusher' the release brakes signal. The captain then asked for the fom and began finding the procedures. The end result was I did get push clearance and we did successfully push. When I asked the captain if he was going to do an ops report or some kind of report; his comment was 'why should I put my license on the line?' perplexed; I told him the 'pusher' may fill out a report and state that we did not know how to properly/safely accomplish a comm out push. The captain needs a 'refresher.' practice basic go-around procedures. The captain needs to fly more than one trip a month. The captain needs to talk to someone that will help him better prioritize. The captain should not ignore/discount/blow-off his first officer. The captain needs to learn some CRM skills. The captain needs to reconstruct the events in his mind (chair fly) and figure out what he would do better. The captain needs to learn the visual hand signals and procedures for a 'comm out' push. The captain should not fly with an inexperienced first officer. As I write this in flight operations; on day 5 of a 4 day trip; at zero TAS and having time to reflect I will not allow my family to fly on the captain's aircraft. I respectfully ask that management pull the voice and aircraft recorders for this flight and carefully reconstruct the last 25 minutes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer criticized his Captain for not following SOP; flying an unstabilized approach and executing a poor go around then not practicing CRM during the debrief. The First Officer was removed from the trip while the Captain admitted minor errors and criticized the First Officer.

Narrative: The Captain acting as the pilot flying was descending to MENLO on the Tip Toe Visual to 28L and was high and fast at MENLO (about 6;200 FT and 240 KIAS). I had asked the Captain if he wanted me to tell ATC that we are going to be high at MENLO. The published altitude on this visual approach is 5;000 FT MSL and I was using my best CRM to encourage the Captain to descend for the approach. His response was 'that is a minimum altitude.' I then told him 'we need to get down.' The Captain then repeated 'that is a minimum altitude and well talk about it on the ground.' The Captain completely ignored my input and failed to get down and 'near' ON SPEED. The Captain briefed a flaps four/full configuration and at 500 FT AGL and flaps THREE and 35 KIAS fast I called for a 'GO AROUND SPEED.' The go-around was a mess and I had to call out the memory items to get things going. The Captain nearly (and may actually have) over-sped the flaps. After I stated 'watch your airspeed' the Captain aggressively increased aircraft pitch (we were exactly at the barber pole). This was very unsettling as we had VFR nearby at 500 FT above our cleared altitude. During the Tower direct go-around; while still in the climb (not yet 'feet wet'); the Captain directed me to make a PA announcement to the passengers. At the time; Tower was calling out traffic and it was absolutely not the time to do ANYTHING but look for traffic and fly the aircraft. Two aircraft; one which passed 500 FT above us; made the situation 'tense.' I told the Captain that I did not have time to make an announcement. It was a very clear day in SFO and there were numerous VFR targets enjoying the day. On downwind; the Captain made a PA announcement to the passengers. Again; it was not a good time with the current situation. Second approach - the Captain was cleared for the approach to 28L and Tower changed our runway to 28R. Not a big deal and we were plenty far out to adjust (1;000 FT AGL). On approach to 28R the Captain descended low on glide path (4 red) and I called 'you're low.' The Captain over corrected and went to high (all white) and we landed long (2;000 FT down). Airspeed was under control and the taxi in was uneventful. After completing the Parking checklist; the Captain did say 'yea I was high and I should have been lower.' The Captain then stopped talking and started to clean up his area (charts and such). I then asked the Captain if he wanted to talk about what happened his response was 'yes.' I started to talk about the 5;000 FT altitude and the tail winds we had approaching MENLO and the Captain interrupted me and began talking over me. I then remained silent until he quit speaking and asked him if I could speak. At this same time external power was connected to the aircraft and the Captain then devoted his attention to the ground power and APU. I told the Captain that I will not speak if he interrupts me and focuses on other tasks 'this is serious!' I told the Captain that he completely discounted and disregarded what I said about having to descend during the approach. I told the Captain that asking me to make a PA announcement to the passengers as we are executing a go-around with the dense VFR traffic; 'rapid fire' ATC radio calls and the bad/improper go around procedures was absolutely the wrong time to devote my attention to a PA announcement! I told the Captain that his flying skills are not good enough to be safe and fly as little as he does. I told the Captain that in the 'old days' first officers were looked down upon but today we have CRM to help us operate a safer airline. I asked if he was going to fill out a report and he said whatever I was going to fill out he would do the same. As I got up to do the aircraft walk around the Captain asked me what I as going to do and I replied I would have to 'cool off a bit.' The Captain replied 'I want to get home.' As I entered the jetway I stood there a few moments and decided that the safety of this airline was more important than me getting home (this was the last day; last leg; of a four day trip) and after hearing the Captain's statement 'I want to get home' I felt he did NOT have an appreciation for what transpired. I then called the Duty Manager and the base Chief Pilot. The Duty Manager (was very understanding of the situation) came up with a plan to do a First Officer swap. I asked why they don't replace the Captain now that I identified an issue with the Captain and he informed that it is SOP just to replace the first officer. I will say that the Duty Manager had a good grasp of the situation. I spoke discreetly (out of ear and eyes of our passengers) with my replacement First Officer after he approached me in the jetway and asked what happened. After our discussion and my understanding he was a former Instructor I felt comfortable that the Captain could safely get the flight to his home base (no weather involved). Along the same line; on this same trip; the Captain was attempting to do a comm out/visual signal push and he did not know the procedures. The Captain responded to the lead push persons' brake release signal with the brake release signal. As this person went under the nose of our aircraft; the Captain got upset about not having sight of him (there was another spotter at the 10 o'clock position) so the Captain did not release the brakes. A few moments later; this same person came from underneath our aircraft and again gave the release bakes signal. The Captain once again gave the release brakes signal and once again the 'pusher' went under the nose of the aircraft to initiate the push. The Captain became even more irate and began to yell at me with spittle coming out of his mouth. The 'pusher' then came out again and I tried to tell the Captain that we need to get push clearance before we give the 'pusher' the release brakes signal. The Captain then asked for the FOM and began finding the procedures. The end result was I did get push clearance and we did successfully push. When I asked the Captain if he was going to do an Ops Report or some kind of report; his comment was 'why should I put my license on the line?' Perplexed; I told him the 'pusher' may fill out a report and state that we did not know how to properly/safely accomplish a comm out push. The Captain needs a 'refresher.' Practice basic go-around procedures. The Captain needs to fly more than one trip a month. The Captain needs to talk to someone that will help him better prioritize. The Captain should not ignore/discount/blow-off his First Officer. The Captain needs to learn some CRM skills. The Captain needs to reconstruct the events in his mind (chair fly) and figure out what he would do better. The Captain needs to learn the visual hand signals and procedures for a 'comm out' push. The Captain should not fly with an inexperienced first officer. As I write this in Flight Operations; on day 5 of a 4 day trip; at zero TAS and having time to reflect I will not allow my family to fly on the Captain's aircraft. I respectfully ask that management pull the Voice and Aircraft recorders for this flight and carefully reconstruct the last 25 minutes.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.