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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 984915 |
Time | |
Date | 201112 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A330 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Mininum Equipment List (MEL) |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Powerplant Maintenance Airframe |
Experience | Maintenance Technician 27 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural MEL |
Narrative:
I was assigned the task by my lead to replace the fuel control and monitoring computer (fcmc-2) on an A330 aircraft due to [discrepancy] history. The aircraft was scheduled for routine over-night (ron) maintenance and a work [paper] package was assigned. An MEL was written against the [horizontal stabilizer] trim tank inlet valve; but I wasn't aware that this was partly due to the fcmc. A [previous] MEL maintenance procedure (mp) to place [install] the trim tank inlet valve actuator locking plate was not reversed [removed] and a 'dummy' plug was not removed.there wasn't any indication that the [MEL] maintenance procedure had been complied with and the [fcmc] system tested ok. Another aviation maintenance technician (amt) that was more familiar with the pre-merger paperwork for that aircraft informed me that the item was written against an MEL. I did not see any MEL that involved the fcmc; but he told me that the MEL that was on the aircraft needed to be cleared since I changed out the fcmc. I cleared the MEL. I think what caused the problem was lack of clarity on what needed to be done and why; clarity on handling work packages; and also reading through the MEL. To prevent this from happening again I need to review the MEL maintenance procedures more closely. I corrected the situation by replacing the actuator and removing the locking plate and the dummy plug.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A Line Mechanic reports that after replacing the #2 Fuel Control and Monitoring Computer (FCMC-2) on an A330 aircraft; he wasn't aware that a 'Dummy' electrical connector plug and the locking plate for the horizontal stabilizer trim tank fuel inlet valve actuator also needed to be removed when he cleared the MEL.
Narrative: I was assigned the task by my Lead to replace the Fuel Control and Monitoring Computer (FCMC-2) on an A330 aircraft due to [discrepancy] history. The aircraft was scheduled for Routine Over-Night (RON) maintenance and a work [paper] package was assigned. An MEL was written against the [horizontal stabilizer] trim tank inlet valve; but I wasn't aware that this was partly due to the FCMC. A [previous] MEL maintenance procedure (MP) to place [install] the trim tank inlet valve actuator locking plate was not reversed [removed] and a 'dummy' plug was not removed.There wasn't any indication that the [MEL] maintenance procedure had been complied with and the [FCMC] system tested OK. Another Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) that was more familiar with the pre-merger paperwork for that aircraft informed me that the item was written against an MEL. I did not see any MEL that involved the FCMC; but he told me that the MEL that was on the aircraft needed to be cleared since I changed out the FCMC. I cleared the MEL. I think what caused the problem was lack of clarity on what needed to be done and why; clarity on handling work packages; and also reading through the MEL. To prevent this from happening again I need to review the MEL maintenance procedures more closely. I corrected the situation by replacing the actuator and removing the locking plate and the dummy plug.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.