37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 986117 |
Time | |
Date | 201112 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LGB.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120 Flight Crew Total 6100 Flight Crew Type 3100 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying First Officer |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100 Flight Crew Total 3200 Flight Crew Type 150 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
We were cleared the kayoh four arrival and ATIS was reporting ILS 30 for the landing runway. We had the box built for the kayoh four with all the restrictions from the chart and had briefed the STAR and the ILS to 30. After commencing the kayoh four; we were cleared direct to kayoh; descend to 8;000; and disregard the speed restriction at kayoh. Upon reaching kayoh; we were cleared direct midds which is not part of the kayoh four. I set up the box for direct midds; confirmed with the first officer; and just prior to pushing the final button; sct called and said disregard direct midds and go direct becca. I changed the direct to becca; confirmed with first officer; and nav'd us direct to becca. After about 1 minute controller came back and reversed himself again and said 'I was on the phone with the other controller and now you are cleared back direct midds; cleared to descend to 4;000; cross midds at 4;000.' during the time the controllers were talking on the phone; we were left at 8;000 and now had to turn direct midds and make the crossing restriction at 4;000 with less than 16 miles to midds with a 30 KT tailwind; and also the requirement to slow to 200 KTS for being under the class B airspace.controllers never gave us any indication that we would be starting the ILS from midds and the database does not load midds as the IAF for the ILS to 30 when you load the approach. As I was explaining to the first officer the best way to get down and slow down in order to make the crossing and the speed restriction; sct cleared us direct midds; cleared ILS 30. He did not clear us the ILS 30 via midds which is how the box is set up to use midds as the IAF and we were never told to expect the ILS 30 via midds which would have given us time to review the procedure. At this point it was obvious we were not going to make the restriction with only half speedbrakes; so the first officer turned off the autopilot and went full speedbrakes. I announced we were cleared direct midds and the ILS to 30; and looked at the box to see a flight plan discontinuity after midds. I sensed we needed a heading out of midds; but the first officer was very busy trying to make the altitude and speed restriction and I was monitoring that closely since the autopilot was off; so I didn't have time to review an IAP or the via options in the box; or query the controller for what he wanted after midds. When I cleared the disconnect; the fmcg strung midds direct to becca since becca was part of our original clearance. The aircraft turned to a heading of 285. After about 1 minute; sct asked if we were flying the procedure. I told him since we were not given a clearance past midds; but we were cleared the ILS 30; we were flying 285 heading to intercept the localizer. He said we should be flying the procedure. I told him we had never been cleared to fly any procedure; just direct midds and cleared for the ILS 30. I quickly looked at the approach plate and realized that he wanted us to go direct midds and then fly the ILS 30 using the via midds procedure with midds as the IAF. At that point I directed the first officer to come left heading 255 to intercept the localizer. The first officer was confused about what our clearance was and the fact that we were rapidly going above the glide path. The first officer asked if I would take control; so I took control; turned off the autopilot; turned left to intercept the localizer; slowed; and configured to get back on the glide path for a stable approach and uneventful landing.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air Carrier flight crew reports being confused arriving LGB via the KAYHO 4. The crew is issued direct MIDDS then the clearance is changed to direct BECCA; then back to direct MIDDS and the ILS 30. With the multiple changes the crew does not comprehend that MIDDS is an IAF with a published heading to intercept the LOC and proceeds direct BECCA after MIDDS. ATC corrects them.
Narrative: We were cleared the Kayoh Four Arrival and ATIS was reporting ILS 30 for the landing runway. We had the box built for the Kayoh Four with all the restrictions from the chart and had briefed the STAR and the ILS to 30. After commencing the Kayoh Four; we were cleared direct to KAYOH; descend to 8;000; and disregard the speed restriction at KAYOH. Upon reaching KAYOH; we were cleared direct MIDDS which is not part of the Kayoh Four. I set up the box for direct MIDDS; confirmed with the First Officer; and just prior to pushing the final button; SCT called and said disregard direct MIDDS and go direct BECCA. I changed the direct to BECCA; confirmed with First Officer; and Nav'd us direct to BECCA. After about 1 minute Controller came back and reversed himself again and said 'I was on the phone with the other Controller and now you are cleared back direct MIDDS; Cleared to Descend to 4;000; Cross MIDDS at 4;000.' During the time the Controllers were talking on the phone; we were left at 8;000 and now had to turn direct MIDDS and make the crossing restriction at 4;000 with less than 16 miles to MIDDS with a 30 KT tailwind; and also the requirement to slow to 200 KTS for being under the Class B airspace.Controllers never gave us any indication that we would be starting the ILS from MIDDS and the database does not load MIDDS as the IAF for the ILS to 30 when you load the approach. As I was explaining to the First Officer the best way to get down and slow down in order to make the crossing and the speed restriction; SCT cleared us direct MIDDS; cleared ILS 30. He did not clear us the ILS 30 VIA MIDDS which is how the box is set up to use MIDDS as the IAF and we were never told to expect the ILS 30 VIA MIDDS which would have given us time to review the procedure. At this point it was obvious we were not going to make the restriction with only half speedbrakes; so the First Officer turned off the autopilot and went full speedbrakes. I announced we were cleared direct MIDDS and the ILS to 30; and looked at the box to see a Flight Plan Discontinuity after MIDDS. I sensed we needed a heading out of MIDDS; but the First Officer was very busy trying to make the altitude and speed restriction and I was monitoring that closely since the autopilot was off; so I didn't have time to review an IAP or the VIA options in the box; or query the Controller for what he wanted after MIDDS. When I cleared the disconnect; the FMCG strung MIDDS direct to BECCA since BECCA was part of our original clearance. The aircraft turned to a heading of 285. After about 1 minute; SCT asked if we were flying the procedure. I told him since we were not given a clearance past MIDDS; but we were cleared the ILS 30; we were flying 285 heading to intercept the localizer. He said we should be flying the procedure. I told him we had never been cleared to fly any procedure; just direct MIDDS and cleared for the ILS 30. I quickly looked at the approach plate and realized that he wanted us to go direct MIDDS and then fly the ILS 30 using the VIA MIDDS procedure with MIDDS as the IAF. At that point I directed the First Officer to come left heading 255 to intercept the localizer. The First Officer was confused about what our clearance was and the fact that we were rapidly going above the glide path. The First Officer asked if I would take control; so I took control; turned off the autopilot; turned left to intercept the localizer; slowed; and configured to get back on the glide path for a stable approach and uneventful landing.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.