Narrative:

Ramp viability less than 500 ft at times; the aircraft was cold and covered with ice and snow. At time of departure the ATIS turned to 24025g33kt 1/8SM VV400 +sn blsn M03/M04 2933 runway xx RVR 2000. The forecast was for 1SM sn. I called dispatch and said let's get this going and maybe it will get better by the time we de-ice. The dispatcher said no. Do not board with +sn and take a long delay with passengers on board and away from the gate. We (I; my first officer and flight attendant) would wait for the weather to return to the forecast sn. We agreed that the taxi time needed to taxi from the de-ice pad to the end of the runway would probably take 10 to 12 minutes and this would easily exceed 5 minute limitation in the section under 'operational restrictions' referring to 'takeoff is authorized in heavy snow (+sn) provided: the aircraft is free of contaminants prior to the application of anti-ice fluid; the aircraft is anti-iced with 100% type iv fluid; takeoff is conducted within 5 minutes of an external check. The +sn changed to sn and we boarded and taxied to position ourselves by the de-ice pad. An emb 170 was almost done with de-icing and a B737 was next for the pad. In the time it took the emb to de-ice and taxi out; the 737 began to reposition and revealed 12 inch snow drifts where his main tires were. The 737 completed the anti-ice application and we were ready to move into position when the ATIS changed back to 1/8 SM +sn. We contacted dispatch and were told to return to the gate at and wait for the +sn to change back to sn as forecast. We continued to monitor the ATIS. Approximately 1 hour 45 minutes later; I was advised that there was a discussion going on in operations among some training department personal and fleet standards about why I was not departing. It would seem that some management individuals looked at the taf and the current weather and were unable to justify the decision that the dispatcher and I had made. The director of flight standards called me and asked if he could discuss the reasons for me not departing when the RVR was adequate and there is a provision for heavy snow in our procedures. I explained that there were many factors involved with our decision but currently the fact that we could not get the aircraft positioned to takeoff with in 5 minutes of the external inspection was the biggest hurdle. He said lets walk through all of the factors involved with this complicated situation.after a long discussion we came up with no new considerations of why we should depart. I still felt with +sn our taxi time to the runway would be 10 minutes plus. Our de-ice pad is over one mile away from the end of the runway. I told him that there is no way we could reconfigure the aircraft and taxi to the end of the active runway safely in 5 minutes. It was not possible. He told me that several aircraft were departing and that we should give it a try. I told him that no crj's had departed and that only B737's; a dc-9 and an md-80 had made it out. I told him that I did not know what their operating procedure is for heavy snow but I knew that they had only half as much distance to the runway and they de-iced near the intersection. He said; 'the company would like you to try it.' I repeated it back to him saying; 'the company wants me to try to depart with +sn and a 10 minute taxi?' he said that if he were in my position he would try it and yes...the company would like me to try.I explained what the company wanted us to do to dispatch; my crew and to the agents. They all agreed to 'try' but understood that the potential for success was remote. We boarded up; taxied to de-ice; used a fair amount of type I to clean off the frozen precipitation and then they applied the type iv. We got our external inspection and started our clock. It took about 70% N2 on both engines to move off the de-ice pad because we had become frozen to the ground. As we turned out of the de-ice pad the nose wheel slipped and the aircraft headed toward a large snow removal dozer. I stopped and regained control and we began our taxi out. The visibility dropped to nearly zero two more times before our 5 minutes expired as we found the intersection. The ramp conditions had deteriorated now and I knew that we would not be trying this again unless they could improve the conditions on the ramp and taxiways. We returned to the gate and canceled. The weather was 1/8SM +sn VV200 to VV400 for 7 hours. I write this because I have been a captain here for 12 years and 3 years at my previous flying job. I thought it was my job to assess the conditions and along with dispatch; together try to find ways to make difficult situations work out to the best conclusion. There was no new information added by management into this equation; just the peer pressure that other pilots are taking off but I am not and the trump card of 'the company wants you to try this.' you pay me to not spend thousands of dollars on useless taxi time and wasted de-ice fluid. I try to fly these aircraft in a safe and responsible manner and I try to fly them the way you want me to. This is why we have pilots with four stripes. Otherwise you could have all first officer's with a king captain that could make all of the decisions for all of the flights over the phone. The fact that dispatch and I had a plan that was safe and reasonable and it was changed by 'the company' to make some kind of effort to get off the gate and make something happen is reason to be concerned. The facts of the situation no longer mattered. The weather was far worse than forecast. This is a question that management will have to answer. As long as they continue to write up pilots for not taking aircraft in situations that the pilot feels it is the wrong thing to do; we will continue to have the potential for a compromised flight situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 flight crew reports strong pressure from company management to depart in heavy snow with a five minute hold over time and a long taxi. An attempt is made; but slick taxiways and low visibility cause the HOT to be exceded.

Narrative: Ramp viability less than 500 FT at times; the aircraft was cold and covered with ice and snow. At time of departure the ATIS turned to 24025G33KT 1/8SM VV400 +SN BLSN M03/M04 2933 RWY XX RVR 2000. The forecast was for 1SM SN. I called Dispatch and said let's get this going and maybe it will get better by the time we de-ice. The Dispatcher said no. Do not board with +SN and take a long delay with passengers on board and away from the gate. We (I; my First Officer and Flight Attendant) would wait for the weather to return to the forecast SN. We agreed that the taxi time needed to taxi from the de-ice pad to the end of the runway would probably take 10 to 12 minutes and this would easily exceed 5 minute limitation in the section under 'OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS' referring to 'Takeoff is authorized in Heavy Snow (+SN) provided: The aircraft is free of contaminants prior to the application of anti-ice fluid; the aircraft is anti-iced with 100% Type IV fluid; takeoff is conducted within 5 minutes of an external check. The +SN changed to SN and we boarded and taxied to position ourselves by the de-ice pad. An EMB 170 was almost done with de-icing and a B737 was next for the pad. In the time it took the EMB to de-ice and taxi out; the 737 began to reposition and revealed 12 inch snow drifts where his main tires were. The 737 completed the anti-ice application and we were ready to move into position when the ATIS changed back to 1/8 SM +SN. We contacted Dispatch and were told to return to the gate at and wait for the +SN to change back to SN as forecast. We continued to monitor the ATIS. Approximately 1 hour 45 minutes later; I was advised that there was a discussion going on in Operations among some Training Department personal and Fleet Standards about why I was not departing. It would seem that some management individuals looked at the TAF and the current weather and were unable to justify the decision that the Dispatcher and I had made. The Director of Flight Standards called me and asked if he could discuss the reasons for me not departing when the RVR was adequate and there is a provision for heavy snow in our procedures. I explained that there were many factors involved with our decision but currently the fact that we could not get the aircraft positioned to takeoff with in 5 minutes of the external inspection was the biggest hurdle. He said lets walk through all of the factors involved with this complicated situation.After a long discussion we came up with no new considerations of why we should depart. I still felt with +SN our taxi time to the runway would be 10 minutes plus. Our de-ice pad is over one mile away from the end of the runway. I told him that there is no way we could reconfigure the aircraft and taxi to the end of the active runway safely in 5 minutes. It was not possible. He told me that several aircraft were departing and that we should give it a try. I told him that no CRJ's had departed and that only B737's; a DC-9 and an MD-80 had made it out. I told him that I did not know what their operating procedure is for heavy snow but I knew that they had only half as much distance to the runway and they de-iced near the intersection. He said; 'The Company would like you to try it.' I repeated it back to him saying; 'The Company wants me to try to depart with +SN and a 10 minute taxi?' He said that if he were in my position he would try it and yes...the company would like me to try.I explained what the company wanted us to do to Dispatch; my crew and to the agents. They all agreed to 'Try' but understood that the potential for success was remote. We boarded up; taxied to de-ice; used a fair amount of type I to clean off the frozen precipitation and then they applied the type IV. We got our external inspection and started our clock. It took about 70% N2 on both engines to move off the de-ice pad because we had become frozen to the ground. As we turned out of the de-ice pad the nose wheel slipped and the aircraft headed toward a large snow removal dozer. I stopped and regained control and we began our taxi out. The visibility dropped to nearly zero two more times before our 5 minutes expired as we found the intersection. The ramp conditions had deteriorated now and I knew that we would not be trying this again unless they could improve the conditions on the ramp and taxiways. We returned to the gate and canceled. The weather was 1/8SM +SN VV200 to VV400 for 7 hours. I write this because I have been a Captain here for 12 years and 3 years at my previous flying job. I thought it was my job to assess the conditions and along with Dispatch; together try to find ways to make difficult situations work out to the best conclusion. There was no new information added by management into this equation; just the peer pressure that other pilots are taking off but I am not and the trump card of 'the company wants you to try this.' You pay me to not spend thousands of dollars on useless taxi time and wasted de-ice fluid. I try to fly these aircraft in a safe and responsible manner and I try to fly them the way you want me to. This is why we have pilots with four stripes. Otherwise you could have all First Officer's with a King Captain that could make all of the decisions for all of the flights over the phone. The fact that Dispatch and I had a plan that was safe and reasonable and it was changed by 'The Company' to make some kind of effort to get off the gate and make something happen is reason to be concerned. The facts of the situation no longer mattered. The weather was far worse than forecast. This is a question that management will have to answer. As long as they continue to write up pilots for not taking aircraft in situations that the pilot feels it is the wrong thing to do; we will continue to have the potential for a compromised flight situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.