Narrative:

Enroute to lga the captain [was] flying aircraft. Dca controller cleared us to descend to FL240 and then cross davys at 12;000 and 250 KIAS. In the descent; we were then cleared to descend via the korry 3 arrival to cross korry at 10;000. We had a strong tailwind (278/60 at top of descent FL400) and I elected to descend in vertical speed mode; watching the ara (altitude range arc) on the nd for crossing restrictions. We descended at 2;500 FPM and I did not want to be high and behind during the arrival; which had many step down fixes. About FL210 I gave the jet to the first officer while I switched to the PA to address the passengers. This took a couple of minutes at most. At this point; my attention was divided between the PA the descent profile. We were still descending in vertical speed at 2;500 FPM and I assumed the first officer was monitoring crossing restrictions and would reduce the rate of descent or return to VNAV path or vertical speed; if needed. He did not. When I resumed flying the aircraft I noticed we were low on the profile and stopped the descent at 17;200 ft to determine our location and altitude. At this point we were crossing skipy intersection on the korry 3. The crossing restriction was FL190 and we were almost 2;000 ft low. Yikes! Within 10 miles we were back on profile; crossing bessi at 17;000 ft. I had not flown with the first officer before this flight. Typically; I will tell the first officer that while I'm off the command radio to point to the heading; airspeed; altitude; FMS; or radio frequency if a change occurs. I will then roger the change with a 'thumbs up' so he is aware I am aware of any changes. None occurred and I assumed he was watching the rate of descent. Automation can be a good thing or a bad thing. In this instance; it bit us. It's easy to get complacent and assume everything is working properly. I always use the arrival chart for the descent and cross check the nd and crossing restrictions; even to the point of calling them out to the first officer so we're both crosschecking the automation. I have to blame myself for not re-emphasizing the fact we were in vertical speed mode for the descent; even though I announced it and pointed to the FMA on the pfd when this mode was selected. Although I was watching the progress of the flight on the nd; I did not reduce the scale enough to clearly show all of the descent points. I therefore missed the fact we were low at skipy until it was too late. In the future; I will re-emphasize the vertical speed mode to the first officer if it is in use for a descent and make certain he knows that while flying the aircraft; he is supposed to insure all crossing restrictions are complied with. Ultimately; what we had was a breakdown in CRM. It can and does happen. And; we're both responsible; but ultimately; as the captain; the blame falls squarely on my shoulders. This should not have happened. Despite being careful and precise; I missed a restriction due to a strong tail wind; using a mode (vertical speed) that requires constant vigilance; and being out of the loop at the wrong phase of flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Captain gave his First Officer aircraft control while he made a PA and the First Officer failed to monitor the aircraft's descent. They were 2;000 FT low crossing a KORRY 3 arrival constraint.

Narrative: Enroute to LGA the Captain [was] flying aircraft. DCA Controller cleared us to descend to FL240 and then cross DAVYS at 12;000 and 250 KIAS. In the descent; we were then cleared to descend via the KORRY 3 arrival to cross KORRY at 10;000. We had a strong tailwind (278/60 at top of descent FL400) and I elected to descend in VERT SPD mode; watching the ARA (altitude range arc) on the ND for crossing restrictions. We descended at 2;500 FPM and I did not want to be high and behind during the arrival; which had many step down fixes. About FL210 I gave the jet to the First Officer while I switched to the PA to address the passengers. This took a couple of minutes at most. At this point; my attention was divided between the PA the descent profile. We were still descending in VERT SPD at 2;500 FPM and I assumed the First Officer was monitoring crossing restrictions and would reduce the rate of descent or return to VNAV Path or VERT SPD; if needed. He did not. When I resumed flying the aircraft I noticed we were low on the profile and stopped the descent at 17;200 FT to determine our location and altitude. At this point we were crossing SKIPY Intersection on the KORRY 3. The crossing restriction was FL190 and we were almost 2;000 FT low. Yikes! Within 10 miles we were back on profile; crossing BESSI at 17;000 FT. I had not flown with the First Officer before this flight. Typically; I will tell the First Officer that while I'm off the command radio to point to the heading; airspeed; altitude; FMS; or radio frequency if a change occurs. I will then roger the change with a 'thumbs up' so he is aware I am aware of any changes. None occurred and I assumed he was watching the rate of descent. Automation can be a good thing or a bad thing. In this instance; it bit us. It's easy to get complacent and assume everything is working properly. I always use the arrival chart for the descent and cross check the ND and crossing restrictions; even to the point of calling them out to the First Officer so we're both crosschecking the automation. I have to blame myself for not re-emphasizing the fact we were in VERT SPD mode for the descent; even though I announced it and pointed to the FMA on the PFD when this mode was selected. Although I was watching the progress of the flight on the ND; I did not reduce the scale enough to clearly show all of the descent points. I therefore missed the fact we were low at SKIPY until it was too late. In the future; I will re-emphasize the VERT SPD Mode to the First Officer if it is in use for a descent and make certain he knows that while flying the aircraft; he is supposed to insure all crossing restrictions are complied with. Ultimately; what we had was a breakdown in CRM. It can and does happen. And; we're both responsible; but ultimately; as the Captain; the blame falls squarely on my shoulders. This should not have happened. Despite being careful and precise; I missed a restriction due to a strong tail wind; using a mode (VERT SPD) that requires constant vigilance; and being out of the loop at the wrong phase of flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.