Narrative:

Within 500 ft after takeoff first heard and noticed the ecias right duct leak message. The runway 01; tonil RNAV SID is a very busy departure procedure and with the non standard (metric) altitudes; language; and vectors off the SID to waypoints not on the procedure requires the utmost attention of the pilot flying and pilot not flying. Directed the relief pilots to run the associated checklist; and they isolated the right duct system per the flight manual procedure by 3;000 ft. Discussed the enroute weather (deep low pressure system at 175W) and determined that a decompression scenario with compromised anti-ice capability and decided that a divert was required. [We] considered rksi the best because it was VMC and rjaa as a secondary which was IMC. Note: no wing anti ice on the right wing. [We] called dispatch and maintenance control to review situation. Some discussion resulted with maintenance control concerning the availability of engine anti ice (nai) on engines 3 and 4 and the resolution was that nai was available on engines 3 and 4. Discussed landing above max landing weight or dumping fuel to allow landing below maximum weight. Went with the longer (2 hours vice 1 hour) flight time and diverted to rjaa. Dumped 15;000 pounds of fuel enroute and landed uneventfully below max weight on the longest runway; 34L; per our request. At the gate maintenance discovered a broken clamp on the high pressure ducting; missing covering on the nacelle and a gap in the ducting. [We] departed a few hours later. On taxi out discovered the #3 bleed valve would not close and called maintenance control. Cycled a circuit breaker and ran the engine up to 70% N1 on taxiway with no effect. Ran out of time and the tower denied takeoff due the night curfew. Once on runway 34L to taxi back to the gate I directed a relief pilot to run number 3 engine up 80% or higher to see if the bleed valve would move. It did close but it was not responding normally and its engine anti ice valve remained on or open after the switch was closed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: When the B747-400 flight crew received a RIGHT DUCT LEAK OVHT EICAS message shortly after takeoff from ZBAA they elected to divert for maintenance due to enroute weather over the Pacific and wing anti-ice considerations.

Narrative: Within 500 FT after takeoff first heard and noticed the ECIAS RIGHT DUCT LEAK message. The Runway 01; TONIL RNAV SID is a very busy departure procedure and with the non standard (metric) altitudes; language; and vectors off the SID to waypoints not on the procedure requires the utmost attention of the pilot flying and pilot not flying. Directed the Relief Pilots to run the associated checklist; and they isolated the right duct system per the Flight Manual procedure by 3;000 FT. Discussed the enroute weather (deep low pressure system at 175W) and determined that a decompression scenario with compromised anti-ice capability and decided that a divert was required. [We] considered RKSI the best because it was VMC and RJAA as a secondary which was IMC. Note: no wing anti ice on the right wing. [We] called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to review situation. Some discussion resulted with Maintenance Control concerning the availability of engine anti ice (NAI) on engines 3 and 4 and the resolution was that NAI was available on engines 3 and 4. Discussed landing above max landing weight or dumping fuel to allow landing below maximum weight. Went with the longer (2 hours vice 1 hour) flight time and diverted to RJAA. Dumped 15;000 LBS of fuel enroute and landed uneventfully below max weight on the longest Runway; 34L; per our request. At the gate Maintenance discovered a broken clamp on the high pressure ducting; missing covering on the nacelle and a gap in the ducting. [We] departed a few hours later. On taxi out discovered the #3 bleed valve would not close and called Maintenance Control. Cycled a circuit breaker and ran the engine up to 70% N1 on taxiway with no effect. Ran out of time and the Tower denied takeoff due the night curfew. Once on Runway 34L to taxi back to the gate I directed a Relief Pilot to run number 3 engine up 80% or higher to see if the bleed valve would move. It did close but it was not responding normally and its engine anti ice valve remained on or open after the switch was closed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.