37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 994239 |
Time | |
Date | 201202 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.ARTCC |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B747-400 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Recirculation Fan |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100 Flight Crew Total 22000 Flight Crew Type 1000 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Flight Engineer Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150 Flight Crew Total 20000 Flight Crew Type 4200 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor |
Narrative:
[We] experienced a 'burning electrical fumes' event in cruise flight. Utilized CRM; and followed standard practices and procedures. Event was stabilized and resolved satisfactorily. A very big concern to me is the fact that this aircraft had four previous maintenance problems with the lav-galley fan system and each time the 'fix' was to cycle circuit breakers; and sign the bird back online. This is the same as if a pilot had reset circuit breakers four times for a faulty system which is specifically forbidden. My suggestion is to have a procedure in place that maintenance control can use to track these types of events. A second instance of a fault in any electromechanical system should warrant more than a system reset; that is; be treated as if a circuit breaker had popped; which would be indicative of a possible serious electrical problem. This event caused major inconvenience to our passengers and crew. It very well could have had much more terrible results. Another fault in the system; while not specifically safety related; is that there is a communication disconnect in getting information to the departments that need them. Part of our response to an in flight event is to 'team build'. A wrap up communication with dispatch confirmed that my request to have a 'passenger recovery' team meet the passengers when we landed was forwarded into the system. When we blocked in; over seven hours after the request was made; the station had no idea there was a problem and nothing had been done.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B747 flight had a 'Burning Electrical Fumes' event in cruise flight. The incident was successfully resolved in flight partly due to the events recurring nature. The Lav-Galley fan system had been written up four times previously and signed off with circuit breaker resets.
Narrative: [We] experienced a 'Burning Electrical Fumes' event in cruise flight. Utilized CRM; and followed standard practices and procedures. Event was stabilized and resolved satisfactorily. A very big concern to me is the fact that this aircraft had four previous maintenance problems with the Lav-Galley fan system and each time the 'fix' was to cycle circuit breakers; and sign the bird back online. This is the same as if a pilot had reset circuit breakers four times for a faulty system which is specifically forbidden. My suggestion is to have a procedure in place that Maintenance Control can use to track these types of events. A second instance of a fault in any electromechanical system should warrant more than a system reset; that is; be treated as if a circuit breaker had popped; which would be indicative of a possible serious electrical problem. This event caused major inconvenience to our passengers and crew. It very well could have had much more terrible results. Another fault in the system; while not specifically safety related; is that there is a communication disconnect in getting information to the departments that need them. Part of our response to an in flight event is to 'team build'. A wrap up communication with Dispatch confirmed that my request to have a 'passenger recovery' team meet the passengers when we landed was forwarded into the system. When we blocked in; over seven hours after the request was made; the station had no idea there was a problem and nothing had been done.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.