Narrative:

Our medium large transport (non-EFIS) was cleared: 'musec 4 departure, trm transition at or below 3000' until 6 DME, maintain 4000', expect FL370 after 10 mins.' we set up the cockpit and briefed the departure in accordance with our company operations manual for the sna noise abatement 'normal cutback' procedure. Distrs were as follows: new captain (first non chkride line departure from sna), new first officer (first line trip ever), no APU (requiring airstart at gate, and decision from captain to perform noise abatement procedure bleeds on (normally it is bled off, with APU for pressurization), unfamiliar aircraft (neither of us had much time in the non EFIS medium large transport), unfamiliar clearance. (Specifically the 'below 3 until 6 DME' part.) our company procedure calls for a maximum performance takeoff, flaps 15 degrees (normally reduced thrust, flaps 5), 28 degree nose up body angle to 1000', then a radical thrust reduction, simultaneous flap retraction to 5 degrees, and a shallow climb at 1/2+15 to 6 DME, on autoplt (vertical speed mode +200 FPM, engaged after thrust cutback). It is a challenging procedure even with practice, but for 2 new guys, no APU, new cockpit...it starts to add up. Now consider the very heavy GA activity at and around sna on a sat, and you start to get the picture of the scene in this flight deck. I made the takeoff and cutback (to 77.6% N1 based on an extremely light weight of 88000 pounds) and attempted to engage the autoplt at 1000' as per procedure. Rate of climb at this point was well in excess of 6000 FPM (vsi needle pegged). At that moment, we were handed off to departure by ATC, and advised to watch for VFR traffic 12 O'clock at 3000' (typical). I lowered the nose and told my first officer to 'stay outside and keep your eyes open.' the autoplt would not engage, and in the 2-3 seconds I spent trying to figure it out (unfamiliar cockpit), the altitude horn went off. I thought it was the first alert (2000 for 3000'), but in the initial climb we both missed that one, and it was the second alert (you blew it!). We were at 3300' and our ballistic path carried us to 3500' at about 4.5 DME. I briskly lowered the nose and reduced thrust. ATC asked, 'what was your assigned altitude?' my first officer replied '3000'.' I added, 'we're correcting.' ATC answered crisply, 'roger.' he then cleared us to 13000', and advised us again of 'traffic 12 O'clock, 3 mi, northbound along the coast at 3000'.' in my opinion the sna noise abatement procedures are an extreme menace to aviation safety and should be abandoned at once. This flight had all the necessary ingredients for disaster: new crew (both captain and first officer), new aircraft (in the fleet for quite some time but both pilots relatively unfamiliar), radical, one-of-a-kind, maximum performance, totally non standard departure procedures (well practiced in simulator, but done only once before by captain on company line check), heavy GA traffic, extremely busy flight deck, high deck angle (28 degrees) making see and avoid a complete farce, unfamiliar departure clearance. I strongly recommend the following actions: a thorough review of all non FAA imposed noise abatement regulations and procedures. A spotlight on sna in particular (that airport is an accident waiting to happen, ground operations ramp, are just simply crazy). Scheduling guidelines that preclude the new captain/new first officer scenario any time the flight is into severe WX or into particularly difficult airports. Standardization of airline cockpits, or assignment of flight deck crew to only one variant (medium large transport a or medium large transport B or medium large transport B EFIS only). Advising ATC to simplify departure clrncs as much as possible at all times, but particularly when extra conditions (WX noise abatement rules, etc) are imposed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG OVERSHOOTS ALT DURING NOISE ABATEMENT CLIMB.

Narrative: OUR MLG (NON-EFIS) WAS CLRED: 'MUSEC 4 DEP, TRM TRANSITION AT OR BELOW 3000' UNTIL 6 DME, MAINTAIN 4000', EXPECT FL370 AFTER 10 MINS.' WE SET UP THE COCKPIT AND BRIEFED THE DEP IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR COMPANY OPS MANUAL FOR THE SNA NOISE ABATEMENT 'NORMAL CUTBACK' PROC. DISTRS WERE AS FOLLOWS: NEW CAPT (FIRST NON CHKRIDE LINE DEP FROM SNA), NEW F/O (FIRST LINE TRIP EVER), NO APU (REQUIRING AIRSTART AT GATE, AND DECISION FROM CAPT TO PERFORM NOISE ABATEMENT PROC BLEEDS ON (NORMALLY IT IS BLED OFF, WITH APU FOR PRESSURIZATION), UNFAMILIAR ACFT (NEITHER OF US HAD MUCH TIME IN THE NON EFIS MLG), UNFAMILIAR CLRNC. (SPECIFICALLY THE 'BELOW 3 UNTIL 6 DME' PART.) OUR COMPANY PROC CALLS FOR A MAX PERFORMANCE TKOF, FLAPS 15 DEGS (NORMALLY REDUCED THRUST, FLAPS 5), 28 DEG NOSE UP BODY ANGLE TO 1000', THEN A RADICAL THRUST REDUCTION, SIMULTANEOUS FLAP RETRACTION TO 5 DEGS, AND A SHALLOW CLB AT 1/2+15 TO 6 DME, ON AUTOPLT (VERT SPD MODE +200 FPM, ENGAGED AFTER THRUST CUTBACK). IT IS A CHALLENGING PROC EVEN WITH PRACTICE, BUT FOR 2 NEW GUYS, NO APU, NEW COCKPIT...IT STARTS TO ADD UP. NOW CONSIDER THE VERY HVY GA ACTIVITY AT AND AROUND SNA ON A SAT, AND YOU START TO GET THE PICTURE OF THE SCENE IN THIS FLT DECK. I MADE THE TKOF AND CUTBACK (TO 77.6% N1 BASED ON AN EXTREMELY LIGHT WT OF 88000 LBS) AND ATTEMPTED TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AT 1000' AS PER PROC. RATE OF CLB AT THIS POINT WAS WELL IN EXCESS OF 6000 FPM (VSI NEEDLE PEGGED). AT THAT MOMENT, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP BY ATC, AND ADVISED TO WATCH FOR VFR TFC 12 O'CLOCK AT 3000' (TYPICAL). I LOWERED THE NOSE AND TOLD MY F/O TO 'STAY OUTSIDE AND KEEP YOUR EYES OPEN.' THE AUTOPLT WOULD NOT ENGAGE, AND IN THE 2-3 SECS I SPENT TRYING TO FIGURE IT OUT (UNFAMILIAR COCKPIT), THE ALT HORN WENT OFF. I THOUGHT IT WAS THE FIRST ALERT (2000 FOR 3000'), BUT IN THE INITIAL CLB WE BOTH MISSED THAT ONE, AND IT WAS THE SECOND ALERT (YOU BLEW IT!). WE WERE AT 3300' AND OUR BALLISTIC PATH CARRIED US TO 3500' AT ABOUT 4.5 DME. I BRISKLY LOWERED THE NOSE AND REDUCED THRUST. ATC ASKED, 'WHAT WAS YOUR ASSIGNED ALT?' MY F/O REPLIED '3000'.' I ADDED, 'WE'RE CORRECTING.' ATC ANSWERED CRISPLY, 'ROGER.' HE THEN CLRED US TO 13000', AND ADVISED US AGAIN OF 'TFC 12 O'CLOCK, 3 MI, NBOUND ALONG THE COAST AT 3000'.' IN MY OPINION THE SNA NOISE ABATEMENT PROCS ARE AN EXTREME MENACE TO AVIATION SAFETY AND SHOULD BE ABANDONED AT ONCE. THIS FLT HAD ALL THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR DISASTER: NEW CREW (BOTH CAPT AND F/O), NEW ACFT (IN THE FLEET FOR QUITE SOME TIME BUT BOTH PLTS RELATIVELY UNFAMILIAR), RADICAL, ONE-OF-A-KIND, MAX PERFORMANCE, TOTALLY NON STANDARD DEP PROCS (WELL PRACTICED IN SIMULATOR, BUT DONE ONLY ONCE BEFORE BY CAPT ON COMPANY LINE CHK), HVY GA TFC, EXTREMELY BUSY FLT DECK, HIGH DECK ANGLE (28 DEGS) MAKING SEE AND AVOID A COMPLETE FARCE, UNFAMILIAR DEP CLRNC. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: A THOROUGH REVIEW OF ALL NON FAA IMPOSED NOISE ABATEMENT REGS AND PROCS. A SPOTLIGHT ON SNA IN PARTICULAR (THAT ARPT IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN, GND OPS RAMP, ARE JUST SIMPLY CRAZY). SCHEDULING GUIDELINES THAT PRECLUDE THE NEW CAPT/NEW F/O SCENARIO ANY TIME THE FLT IS INTO SEVERE WX OR INTO PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT ARPTS. STANDARDIZATION OF AIRLINE COCKPITS, OR ASSIGNMENT OF FLT DECK CREW TO ONLY ONE VARIANT (MLG A OR MLG B OR MLG B EFIS ONLY). ADVISING ATC TO SIMPLIFY DEP CLRNCS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AT ALL TIMES, BUT PARTICULARLY WHEN EXTRA CONDITIONS (WX NOISE ABATEMENT RULES, ETC) ARE IMPOSED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.