Narrative:

I was in command of aircraft X for a skydiving operation at C83. Our operations in byron generally consist of takeoffs from runway 12 and landings on 30 (the drop-zone/loading area is located near the run-up of runway 12). Winds throughout the day were mostly from the north. For the first half of the day; I elected to depart on runway 30; into the wind. As the wind began to decrease; I elected to begin departures from runway 12. We had just finished refueling the aircraft; and had pulled away from the loading area with a full load of jumpers ranging from students to experienced skydivers. The right half of the cockpit on this aircraft is normally blocked with skydivers when we are full. It is difficult to see any traffic when my view is blocked; and I generally ask the skydivers to move to one side or the other so I can look for landing traffic on 30. The only two aircraft that I noticed at this time were a yellow cub on right downwind for 30; and the glider's tow-plane who was reporting landing on crosswind runway 5. I confirmed the position of the tow plane over the CTAF frequency in the following manner: 'confirm you are landing on runway 5?' his reply was; 'yes; landing on runway 5.' I made the decision to begin my takeoff based on confirmation from the tow plane; and also by noting the location of the yellow cub on right downwind. I determined that I had adequate time to execute the takeoff on runway 12 prior to the cub beginning his descent from the right downwind. I made a takeoff announcement on CTAF in the following manner: 'byron traffic; XXX departing runway 12; straight-out; byron.' at this time; I completed my before-takeoff checklist; positioned myself on the runway; and advanced to takeoff power. During the takeoff roll; I divided my attention between the runway center-line and the engine instruments. At approximately 80 KTS; I heard over the CTAF frequency; 'glider on final runway 30.' the transmission sounded like it may have come from the glider's ground crew who generally park on one of the taxiways leading onto runway 12-30. Upon hearing this transmission; I looked up and noticed the glider at my 12-o'clock position and he was configured for landing. I immediately rejected my takeoff by bringing the power levers to idle and applying max braking. Because the aircraft was heavy; it took more time to bring the aircraft to a complete stop. I applied right rudder to position myself on the right side of runway 12; and the glider pilot positioned himself to the right side of runway 30. In doing so; we passed each other on runway 12-30 within an estimated 40 ft. We had slowed to approximately 20 KTS when the glider had passed off my left wing. The first witness of this event that I heard from was the pilot of the yellow cub who was on the right downwind for runway 30. He mentioned that he heard the glider pilot making radio calls for 30; and he also heard me announce my departure from 12; but neglected to say anything over CTAF. The chief pilot of the glider's tow-plane (whom I spoke with the following day) mentioned that he was told that the pilot of the glider was making radio calls. I remarked however; that I did not hear any of his transmissions. I have encountered problems in the past with weak radio transmissions from the glider pilots; and the radios installed on my aircraft have had a history of being weak in both transmitting and receiving. The main factors in this incursion were communication barriers and complacency. Communication issues could be resolved by installing better equipment on the gliders and in my aircraft. All airmen involved in the gliding or skydiving operation should have a working knowledge of each operations individual goals and inconsistencies. When combined in a busy and uncontrolled airspace; knowing the location of all operations can be difficult. However; having a concept of what may be occurring is better than assuming everything will be cleared for your operation. My solution tothis problem is to accomplish better communication with the glider pilots; ground crewmembers; and the glider tow-plane pilot by calling together a meeting; where we can learn about each other's needs and concerns. I am also planning to restrict the number of skydivers that will be able to sit in the cockpit area; so as to allow for improved visibility during ground and flight operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A sky diving transport pilot at C83 made Runway 12 CTAF takeoff reports with no conflicting traffic reporting but rejected his takeoff when a glider landed opposite direction causing a near miss by 40 FT.

Narrative: I was in command of Aircraft X for a skydiving operation at C83. Our operations in Byron generally consist of takeoffs from Runway 12 and landings on 30 (the drop-zone/loading area is located near the run-up of Runway 12). Winds throughout the day were mostly from the north. For the first half of the day; I elected to depart on Runway 30; into the wind. As the wind began to decrease; I elected to begin departures from Runway 12. We had just finished refueling the aircraft; and had pulled away from the loading area with a full load of jumpers ranging from students to experienced skydivers. The right half of the cockpit on this aircraft is normally blocked with skydivers when we are full. It is difficult to see any traffic when my view is blocked; and I generally ask the skydivers to move to one side or the other so I can look for landing traffic on 30. The only two aircraft that I noticed at this time were a yellow Cub on right downwind for 30; and the glider's tow-plane who was reporting landing on crosswind Runway 5. I confirmed the position of the tow plane over the CTAF frequency in the following manner: 'Confirm you are landing on Runway 5?' His reply was; 'Yes; landing on Runway 5.' I made the decision to begin my takeoff based on confirmation from the tow plane; and also by noting the location of the yellow Cub on right downwind. I determined that I had adequate time to execute the takeoff on Runway 12 prior to the Cub beginning his descent from the right downwind. I made a takeoff announcement on CTAF in the following manner: 'Byron traffic; XXX departing Runway 12; straight-out; Byron.' At this time; I completed my before-takeoff checklist; positioned myself on the runway; and advanced to takeoff power. During the takeoff roll; I divided my attention between the runway center-line and the engine instruments. At approximately 80 KTS; I heard over the CTAF frequency; 'glider on final Runway 30.' The transmission sounded like it may have come from the glider's ground crew who generally park on one of the taxiways leading onto Runway 12-30. Upon hearing this transmission; I looked up and noticed the glider at my 12-o'clock position and he was configured for landing. I immediately rejected my takeoff by bringing the power levers to idle and applying max braking. Because the aircraft was heavy; it took more time to bring the aircraft to a complete stop. I applied right rudder to position myself on the right side of Runway 12; and the glider pilot positioned himself to the right side of Runway 30. In doing so; we passed each other on Runway 12-30 within an estimated 40 FT. We had slowed to approximately 20 KTS when the glider had passed off my left wing. The first witness of this event that I heard from was the pilot of the yellow Cub who was on the right downwind for Runway 30. He mentioned that he heard the glider pilot making radio calls for 30; and he also heard me announce my departure from 12; but neglected to say anything over CTAF. The Chief Pilot of the glider's tow-plane (whom I spoke with the following day) mentioned that he was told that the pilot of the glider was making radio calls. I remarked however; that I did not hear any of his transmissions. I have encountered problems in the past with weak radio transmissions from the glider pilots; and the radios installed on my aircraft have had a history of being weak in both transmitting and receiving. The main factors in this incursion were communication barriers and complacency. Communication issues could be resolved by installing better equipment on the gliders and in my aircraft. All airmen involved in the gliding or skydiving operation should have a working knowledge of each operations individual goals and inconsistencies. When combined in a busy and uncontrolled airspace; knowing the location of all operations can be difficult. However; having a concept of what may be occurring is better than assuming everything will be cleared for your operation. My solution tothis problem is to accomplish better communication with the glider pilots; ground crewmembers; and the glider tow-plane pilot by calling together a meeting; where we can learn about each other's needs and concerns. I am also planning to restrict the number of skydivers that will be able to sit in the cockpit area; so as to allow for improved visibility during ground and flight operations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.